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INTRODUCTION 
The research reported here examines how a person ' s knowledge 
of the world is used in l anguage recognition and production . 
Essentially it is concerned with the importance of .a word ' s 
meaning as a factor in its recognition by a listener or reader 
and is its production by a speaker or writer. This area of 
research overlays with a great many areas in psychology, drawing 
upon research i n attention, pattern recognition, memory , psy-
cholinguistics and thought . 
It is necessary to give some working definitions of the 
terms used . The definition of semantic memory used here is 
that supplied by Tulving (1972, p 386): "Semantic memory is 
the memory necessary for t he use of a language . It is a ment al 
thesaurus, the organized knowledge a person possesses about 
words and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, 
about relations among them and about rules, formulas and 
algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concept s and 
relations . II 
The contents of semantic memory are typically what a person 
would say that he "knows" rather than what he "remembers" . 
e . g. a person might say "I know canaries are yellow" whereas 
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111 remember canaries are yellow" l'1ould not IIsound right ll to 
most native English speakers. This also illustrates an i m-
portant property of semantic memory. The knowledge it contains 
is to a large extent common to members of a given culture . 
There will of course be individual differences but a sufficient 
body of knowledge will be shared in order to allow communication 
between persons. 
Retrieval from semantic memory is used here to refer to any 
process that involves making use of such stored knowledge . 
This may range from simply deciding that a particular sound 
pattern has occurred in speech before to verifying complex pro-
positions . 
Context is restricted here to linguistic context. The 
question asked is how' information provided by previous linguistic 
input affects processing of later input or output of language . 
The view of language comprehension taken here is similar to 
Goodman ' s (1967) approach to reading . This approach is des-
cribed as follows: " ••• Reading is a psycholinguistic guessing 
game . It involves an interaction between thought and language . 
Efficient reading does not result from precise perceptions and 
identification of all elements but from skill in selecting the 
fewest , most productive cues necessary to produce guesses lo[hich 
are right first time . The ability to anticipate that which 
has not been seen, of course , is vital in readi ng, just as the 
ability to anticipate what has not yet been heard is vital in 
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listening. " (p 260) 
It is assumed here that a person' s ability to anticipate 
is dependent upon the knoVTledge stored in semantic memory . 
The way this knowledge is used 1'lill in turn depend upon hOl'T it 
is organized . Since the Ancient Greeks the importance of 
organization in memory has been recognized but it is only 
relatively recently that psychologists have attempted to deter-
mine the principles underlying this organization. Since uillian 
(1966) a number of models of how semantic memory is organized 
have been proposed . 
sections . 
These will be discussed in the follOl'ling 
Many of the experiments reported here are concerned with 
\'1hat might be called "micro-context", that is hOlf individual 
words, phrases and sentences affect recognition of incoming 
stimuli. Of course, the use of context goes far beyond the 
immediately preceding input but as yet there are no satisfactory 
theories, linguistic or psychological, that can deal lnth these 
wider aspects of language use . In fact there is still con-
siderable disagreement over the processes involved in the recog-
nition of single words , (see for example Rubenstein, Lewis 
and Rubenstein, 1971; Baron, 1973) . 
The approach taken to word recognition here is similar to 
l~orman (1968) and 1-1orton (1969) . The notion "Thich is central 
to both these authors and Goodman (see above) is the realization 
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that no process can be analysed in isolation. The language 
system cannot decode the incoming sensory information without 
reference to stored knowledge . As Norman (1969, p 3) describes 
the role of memory, "it provides the information about the 
pa:st necessary for proper understanding of the present" . 
Thus context indicates to the memory system what knowledge is 
relevant to the analysis of the current input . 
To summarize this approach the information provided by 
context (immediate pa~t) is referred to semantic memory (pa~~) 
which in turn helps to produce the best guess as to the nature 
of the current sensory input (present) or even the nature of 
input 'ihich has not yet arrived (future) . 
The problem examined in this research is how the organizat-
ional structure of knowledge in semantic memory influences this 
guessing process . Uhether such guessing is an active process 
as suggested by some investigators (e . g. Liberman, stevens and 
Halle) or a passive process suggested by others (e . g. Morton, 
Treisman) will be discussed in a later section. 
Review of the Literature 
In the first part I shall discuss the linguistic approaches 
to semantics that form the background to the models of semantic 
memory that are discussed in the second part . In the third 
part I shall try to relate the models of semantic memory to some 
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models of speech production and recognition. No attempt is made 
here to review the more technical aspects of the linguistics. 
The theories are only considered from a psychological point of 
vie .. , • 
The Linguistic Background 
Some indication of the problem facing linguists dealing 
with semantics is given by the fact that Ogden and Richard ' s 
(1923) in their classic book "The meaning of meaning" were able 
to give 22 definitions of meaning. Meaning here will be res-
tricted largely to \i'hat Leech (1974) calls "conceptual meaning 
or sense ll which refers to a word's Illogical, cognitive or 
denotative content ll in contrast to other aspects of meaning 
such as a word ' s connotative or stylistic meaning. 
In spite of the problems Ogden and Richards took an op-
timistic vieu of likely progress in semantics. In contrast 
Bloomfield, ten years later "Trote "The statement of meanings is 
therefore the weak part in language study, and will remain so 
until human knowledge advances very far beyond its present 
state . " (1933, p 140) . This attitude dominated linguists 
thinking on semantics for over twenty years . 
Since the 1950s psychologists have taken a growing interest 
in the work of linguists . Much of this interest can be attributed 
to Chomsky ' s (1959) demonstration of the inadequacy of tra-
dit ional S- R theories of psychology to account for language 
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behaviour . For present purposes the most notabl e aspect of 
Chomsky ' s (1957) early ~lOrk is his belief that a syntactic 
theory could be constructed in-dependently of semantics . In 
this belief Chomsky still reflected the influence of Bloomfield. 
However , in his later work Chomsky (1965) makes some concession 
to the role of semantics in grammar . IIIn fact , it should 
not be taken for granted , necessarily that syntactic and semantic 
considerations can be sharply distinguished". (p 77) . 
One of th reasons for this shift in position was the 
publication of "The structure of a semantic theory" by Katz 
and Fodor ~1963), described by Bouveresse (1974) as "the official 
reintroduction of semantics" . The paper by Katz and Fodor was 
an attempt to produce a theory of semantics within the general 
framework of transformational grammar. It has been developed 
by Katz and Postal (1964) and Katz (1972) . The account here is 
based on the original 1963 paper . 
Although attempting to produce a semantic theory Katz and 
Fodor ' s famous statement IIlinguistic description minus grammar 
equals semanticsll seems to reflect Chomsky ' s (1957) thoughts 
on semantics . "l-leaning tends to be used as a catch- all term 
to include every aspect of language that we know very little 
about . " (pp 103- 104) . In spite of their rather negative 
definition of semantics Katz and Fodor were prepared to try to 
produce a semantic theory consistent with Chomsky' s transfor-
mational grammar . They describe their aims as follows: 
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IIA semantic theory describes and explains the interpre-
tative ability of speakers: by accounting for their performance 
in determining the number and content of the readings of a sen-
tence; by detecting semantic anomalies; by deciding upon 
paraphrase relations between sentences; and by marking every 
other semantic property or relation that plays a role in this 
ability . " (p 486) . 
Katz and Fodor contend that the basic fact a semantic theory 
must explain is that a fluent speaker can determine the meaning 
of a sentence in terms of the meaning of its constituent lexical 
items . There are t~vo components in the semantic theory to 
achieve this end . The first component is a dictionary of 
l exical items of the language and the second component is a 
system of rules 'l"Thich opera tes on the full grammatical des-
criptions of sentences and on the dictionary entries to produce 
semantic interpretations for every sentence in the language . 
Our main concern here is with the first component , the 
dictionary but some comment will be made about the rules later . 
(For a critical review of the operations of the rule system see 
\Teinreich, 1966; Savin , 1973) . 
A dictionary entry in Katz and Fodor ' s theory consists 
of tl-IO parts , a grammatical portion which provides part- of-
speech classification and a semantic portion which r epresents 
e~ch of the distinct senses the lexical item has in its occur-
rence as a given part of speech. A word is represented as a 
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string of semantic markers . This method derives from the 
technique of componential analysis used by anthropologi sts to 
describe kinship terms, (see f or example , Wallace and Atkins, 
1960; Romney and Andr ade , 1964 J. Leech (1974) describes 
componential analysis as "a technique f or describing inter-
relations of meaning by breaking each concept down into minimal 
components, or features, which a r e distinctive i n terms of a 
semantic oppos ition or dimension of contrast . So ' woman ' 
can be defined by the features + HUNAN, + ADULT , - :rv1A1E i n 
such a vlay as to discriminate it from the r el ated concepts 
I girl ' , ' man
'
, ' child ' , ' cow ' , etc . 1t (p 124) . 
Such a technique is an attempt to reproduce in semantics 
the success of Jakobson and Halle (1956) in phonology in des-
cribing phonemes in terms of a limited number of distinguishing 
features . It seems unlikely that it vdll be possible to re-
present all lexical items in terms of a finite set of binary 
features . In phonology the r ange of poss ible phonemes is sharply 
restri cted by the capabilities of the human speech organs , yet 
in semantics there is no comparable restriction on the range of 
possible lexical items . Ive need as many features as are neces-
sary to produce a unique representation of each lexical item. 
Such a set must be open- ended . Furthermore many of the dimensions 
needs to represent lexical items are not .binary (e . g. colour, 
shape) which means that simple presence or absence of a fea ture 
in a lexical item' s feature list will not be sufficient to 
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characterize that item on that dimension. 
Yet it must be admitted that the idea that an item's meaning 
can be broken dOi~ and represented in terms of its consitituent 
features is attractive and some such approach is used :j.n ·.3.1l ,the 
models of semantic memory discussed in the next section. 
To return to the relationship between the ti'TO components 
of Katz and Fodor ' s theory (the dictionary and the projection 
rules) semantic interpretation involves combining semantic 
features of individual words to produce a description of the 
entire sentence . This formulation 'l'laS followed by Chomsky 
(1965) and has been called "interpretive semantics" since the 
meaning of a sentence is obtained by applying semantic rules 
that interpret a syntactic bim"e • Thus in classical trans-
formational grammar syntax has ' priority ' over semantics, in 
that the generation of a deep structure is presumed to be in-
dependent of meaning . This position may be tenable in a com-
petence model but is certainly not acceptable in a performance 
model , i1here as a general rule the object of communication is 
meaning . 
Since 1965 there has been a considerable movement tOlmrds 
granting semantics a more central role in linguistic theory. 
Anderson and Bower (1974) have divided this movement into the 
Neo-Chomskians who accept the general framework of transfor-
mational grammar and the generative semanticists who claim that 
Chomsky ' s view of semantics is inadequate even for a competence 
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model . 
The most important of the Neo-Chomskian developments is 
the case grammar presented by Fillmore (1968) . Case grammar 
is designed to deal with the fact that the subjects of sentences 
such as John runs, John is afraid , The window broke , The medecine 
cures, Chicago is hot, are all treated alike in transformational 
grammar whereas they all have different semantic roles :examples 
from Anderson and BOlfer , (1974) . In case grammar these different 
roles are made explicit in the deep structure by assigning cases 
to the items (e.g . agent , passive object, instrument etc.). 
Fillmore argues that by emphasizing these "semantically relevant 
syntactic relations I! it is easier to produce a semantic inter-
pretation of the deep structure . Case grammar has been used 
in a number of recent models of memory (e . g . Rumelhart , Lindsay 
and Norman , 1972; Anderson and Bower, 1974) . 
The generative semanticists (McCal'Tley , Lakoff , Ross) differ 
more radically from transformational grammar . 1fuile accepting 
the necessity for the base , transformational, semantic and 
phonological components of language they question Chomsky ' s 
assumption of the deep structure as a separate level . Crystal 
(1971) summarizes their question as follol'fS: "If the uhole point 
about talking about deep structures at all in the first place 
was to take account of meaning ••• then why should not these 
meaning-problems he incorporated as part of the study of other 
meaning problems which the semanti'cs component has to face any-
TtTay?" (p 235) . 
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The most si gnificant feature of the genera tive semanticists 
from the point of view of the present research is that they take 
semantics as their starti ng poi nt for studying l anguage rather 
than the classical starting point of synt ax . At present there 
are considerable technical difficulties in using a generative 
semantics approach in a model of human language use. As ye t 
no model has made extens ive use of gener ative semantics although 
Rumelhart et al. make use of certain rudimentary concepts similar 
to those of generative semantics . 
Models of Semantic Hemory 
lliile the growth in interes t in semantics was occurring in 
linguistics there was a parallel development in psychology in 
the interest in meaning . as a factor in memory . The "association" 
as the basic unit in memory has been fundament al to psychology 
since the British Empiricists .. Tho themselves derived the i dea 
from Aristotle . For a long time the prevailing picture of 
memory was of a hotch- potch of associated ideas that arose 
from the accidental contiguities of experience . ·rore recently 
there has been a growing recognition within experimenta l psy-
chology of the fact that structure is i mposed on the contents 
of memory . The exis tence of such organization had been apparent 
to certain analytical psychologists for a considerable length 
of time . In particular Jung had observed It ••• the tendency of 
ideas to become associated around certai n nuclei-II (from 
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Fordham, 1953 , p 22) . Tithin experimental psychology this 
aspect of memory was largely ignored. The major factor in 
association was held to be contiguity in time . Deese (1965) 
comments that "attention to this property of temporal order has 
led to the neglect of structure . II (p 1). HO'YTever, during 
the last 30 years , beginning lrith the pioneering work of Bousfield 
and continued by ~mndler, Tulving, Bower , Deese and others , the 
structure of associations and the organization of memory has 
become one of t he major topics in memory research. 
review of this development see Deese , 1965) . 
(For a 
The models of semantic memor y considered here have al l 
developed out of this interest in organization of knowledge . 
Their common approach has been described by Anderson and Bolter 
(1974) as "neo-associaationist" . Neo-associationism is described 
as a "profane union" of me thodological empiricism and methodo-
logical r a tionalism. "The result i s a theory t hat irreverently 
intermixes connectionism 1-Tith natiVism , reductionism ,vi th 'YTholi sm , 
sensationalism with intuitionism, and mechani sm with vitalism." 
(Anderson and BovTer, 1 974 p 4). 
One of t he earliest and most influentia l models of semantic 
memory is ~illian ' s Teachable Language Comprehender (1 966 , 
1967, 1969) . The early versions of the model are computer 
based but psychological implications of the model have been 
examined by Collins and Quillian (1969, 1970). The model is 
designed only to hold denotative factual i nformation. Information 
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is represented in the form of an "association netlTork" . A 
concept is represented in the network as a node connected to 
other modes by different kinds of associative links. (See 
figure 1). The meaning of the concept is defined in terms of 
the other concepts to w·hich it is linked. To obtain the meaning 
of a concept a search is started at the node representing that 
particular concept . The search spreads out along all the links 
leading from the original mode to the connected nodes . The 
search will then proceed along all the links from these nodes . 
In this way the meaning of the concept is defined as " ••• all the 
nodes t hat can be reached by an exhaustive tracing process" . 
( uillian , 1967, p 413) . Such an exhaustive search involves 
rejection of Katz and Fodor ' s assumption that a word can be 
defined by a limited number of features . In Katz and Fodor's 
model only a subset of knowledge is called upon in defining 
meaning. In uillian ' s model the whole of a person' s world 
knowledge is used . 
The most important determinant of memory organization in 
Quillian ' s model is the need to avoid redundancy . Quillian 
regarded the space available for storage as limited and assumed 
that information would be stored in ways that l'l'Ould minimize 
the demands on storage space . Quillian proposed that the most 
efficient means of storing information is in a hierarchy of 
superordinates . Concepts in the model are grouped into cate-
gories. (see figure 1) . The properties that are shared by 
~s yellow 
Canary", 
can si ng 
Li vi ng thing 
/ ffioves 
Animal 
. "'-breathes 
Plant 
fly /ives in water 
Fish 
' has fins fe at hers 
can't f ly 
Ostrich/' 
' has long l egs 
Figure 1. Part of a hierarchical structure in 
long t erm memory. Based on Collins 
and Quillian (1 969). 
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all members of a category (e . g . ALL BIRDS CAN E~Y) are stored 
only once with the superordinate. Retrieval of such a property 
given a category member (e . g . CAl~ A CANARY FLY?) would involve 
first retrieving that the instance belonged to that ca tegory. 
The only properties that need be stored with the ca tegory members 
are those that distinguish them from each other (e . g . C Y 
IS YELLOi) or properties that are exceptions to a superordi nate 
propert y (e . g . AN OST ICR CAl~ ' T FLY) . Similarly superordinate 
terms can be grouped together to form higher order superordinates 
(e . g . BIRD, FISH, IjSE T are all AlIT ~) . 
It should be stressed that nodes are neither words nor 
images but some kind of abstract properties . A.J..4>o there is a 
need in the model for "labelled" associative links of different 
kinds in contrast to the "simple, indifferentiated associations 
assumed in most classical psychologica l studies of word associations" . 
(Quillian, 1967, p 416) . 
The aspect of the model which lends itself most readily 
to experimental testing is the assumption of hierarchica l storage . 
It is assumed that such a space saving system can only be achieved 
at the cost of extra retrieval time . Each node that has to be 
traversed adds time . Collins and Quillian (1969, 1970a) pro-
duced evidence vlhich they interpret as support for this assum-
ption. People liere quicker to verify sentences such as A 
C Y I S BI D than C lY IS AN IT lAL which in turn vIas 
verified faster than a C ~ Y IS LIVING TID JG . There have 
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since been a number sf studies that question this finding in 
particular and ~illian ' s cognitive economy principle in general . 
Schaeffer and ,allace (1 970) found that it t ruces subjects 
longer to decide a word does not belong to a category the closer 
the word an the category appear to be . E. g . It took longer 
to reject A DAISY IS A BI D than GOLD IS A BIRD . Such a finding 
is difficult for ~uillian ' s model to explain. (see hO,\iever 
Collins and Quillian , 1 972 ) . llilkins ( 1 971), Conrad (1 972) 
and Kosslyn and Nelson (1972) have all found measures (e , g , 
conjoint frequency, association norms) that predict results such 
as Collins and uillian ' s better than the hierarchical model . 
Other investigators (e . g . Landauer and Meyer, 1972 , Wilkins , 
1971) have argued that Collins and Quillian confounded hier-
archical structure vTith category size . Landauer and Meyer 
(1972) further criticize Collins and uillian for relying on a 
small number of semantic categories selected from the same 
domain. Rips, Shoben and Smith (1973) have presented evidence 
shOrTing that category membership is not an all-or- none relation-
ship but that instances vary in h01'l "close" they are to the 
superordinate . This finding can only be accounted for in 
uillian ' s hierarchical model in an ad hoc manner . There is 
thus considerable evidence against Collins ' and uillian ' s 
formal hierarchical structure . 
However , in a recent model of memory (Anderson and Bower, 
1974) uillian ' s initial assumption that storage space is limited 
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and that information >'fill be organized to make the best use of 
this space at the expense of retrieval time is completely 
reversed . Anderson and Bower assume that in human memory storage 
space is unlimited but time spent on retrieval is precious . 
Although the hierarchical principles of Quillian ' s model 
do not appear to be reflected in memory his use of association 
networks has been imitated in more recent models of memory 
(e. g. Rumelhart et aI, 1972 ; Kintsch , 1972; Anderson and Bower , 
1974) . These three models share a common approach in that they 
assume that knowledge is represented in the form of propositions . 
A proposition is built up from concepts connected together by 
labelled associations . Also all three models use a version 
of Fillmore ' s case grammar in producing propositions . These 
models differ from Quillian ' s model by drawing a shar per dis-
tinction between general 'forld kno'l'Tledge and dictionary infor-
mation about l'That a word means . !liore recently Collins and 
Quill ian (1972) also make this disti nction although the impli-
cations for their model have not been formally stated . 
Out of these three models the only one ,.,hich has been sub-
jected to extensive experiment al testing is Anderson and Bm-Ter ' s 
model HAl-1 . The other two models cases are largely unproven, 
although Kintsch (1974) has recently produced evidence consis-
~ent with his general assumptions . Anderson and Bower claim 
that liAr·1 is the only model " ••• in which the psychological meaning 
of the nebTorks have been carefully developed. It is not 
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enough merely to construct an intuitively satisfying graph and 
assert that it represents certain information in memory . Such 
graphs acquire psychological meaning only after one has addressed 
himself to the necessary task of defining the functional pro-
perties of the network . " (1974, p 510) . 
Recently Smith , Shoben and Rips (1974) have dra~m a dis-
tinction in models of semantic memory betw'een netw'ork models 
(e . g . Collins and uillian; umelhart et al) and set-theoretic 
models (e . g . Neyer , 1970; Schaeffer and Wallace , 1970; Clark, 
1970) . In the set-theoretic models a concept is represented 
as a unique list of features or attributes . This approach is 
derived from Katz and Fodor ' s theory discussed in the previous 
section . 
The difference between the classes of models can be illus-
trated by the \lay they treat category membership . In a network 
model (e . g . Rumelhart et al., 1972) the statement A CANARY IS A 
BIRD is verified by finding a link betlieen the concept ' canary ' 
and the concept ' bird ' which has an ISA label. I n the set-
theoretic models the attributes belonging to ' canary ' would be 
compared against the attributes of ' bird ' to see if a sufficient 
number matched . Smith et al . , (1974) make a further distinction 
between defining and characteristic features . They present 
evidence that is difficult for simple network or simple feature 
models to account for (e . g. Lakoff ' s (1972) analysis of hedges) . 
However , as noted in the discussion of Katz and Fodor ' s theory 
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there appears to be problems uith the feature approach . It 
seems implausible that a word ' s meaning should be restricted 
to a finite set of features. On the other hand network models 
do seem to capture this open-ended aspect of meaning. 1f.hat is 
perhaps needed is an approach that defines features in a more 
flexible manner than the Katz and Fodor +~ LE , +ADULT 
kind of feature. There is really no fundamental conflict be-
tween feature and network models . As Kintsch (1972) points 
out, defining a word by specifying the semantic relations that 
it enters into (as in the network models) ultimately amounts to 
specifying a word ' s features . It should be quite possible to 
produce a model which contains the characteristics of the set-
theoretic/feature models in a network system. Indeed as Smith 
et al . concede uillian ' s model is in some respects just such 
a model . Although undeniably a network model illian (1967) 
says " ••• 101m t begins as the English definition of a "Tord seems 
better vie"led after encoding as a completely structured bundle 
of attribute . values . " (p 421) . 
More ~ll be said about this problem later . 
I-lodels of word recognition 
Our main concern here is not directly with how a person ' s 
world knowledge is organized but with hovT such stored knowledge 
is used in the processing of language . It is assumed that the 
structure of semantic memory will be an important factor in how 
the contents of memory interact with other parts of the language 
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processi ng system. vIe shall first outline t wo classes of 
models of speech recognition and di s cuss the role of semant ic 
memory vIi thin each model. 
The models can be divided into active and passive model s . 
The active model is presented by Halle and Stevens (1962) and 
Liberman, Cooper , Sha~ieiler and Studdert-Kennedy (1967). 
The passive model is present~a ·by. -Noxman ('1-968)ana ~' Mlill'ton ~ (1)969), 
The research reported here is not directly concerned with this 
controversy. These experiments concentrate mainly on aspects 
of Morton ' s Logogen model . However it is valuable to contrast 
this class of model with the alternative active models . 
The active model is described as a "recognition model in 
which mapping from signal to message space is accomplished 
l argely through an active or feedback process . Patterns are 
generated internally in the analyzer according to a flexible or 
adaptable sequence of instructions until a bes.t match with the 
input signal is obtained." (Halle and ~tevens , 1962, p 155). 
The main argument in favour of the active model is that there 
is not a one- to-one relationship between the psychological and 
the physical events , e . g . although .. re hear speech as a series 
of discrete phonemes it is not produced as such. (For a revieli 
of the evidence showing the disparity between speech- as-spoken 
and speech- as- heard see Corcoran, 1971). 
lvha t is the role of semantic memory in this model? 
Ralle 'and Stevens argue against the notion of a dictionary 
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containing lV"Ord definitions . The role of past knowledge is 
in guiding the internal generation of the comparison signal . 
Halle and stevens describe its operation as follows: "This 
information is utilized by the control component to formulate 
strategies that ~lould achieve convergence to the required result 
with as small a number of trials as possible . 1I ( 1 962, p 1 57 ) • 
Exactly ho'l this generation process is guided is not made clear. 
There are a number of problems with active model, e . g . how 
do children understand language before they can talk . Miller 
(1962) argues that such a model would require an unrealistically 
high speed of decision making. The active model also has pro-
blems in explaining the "cocktail party phenomenon". For a 
fuller account of thes e and other problems see Norman (1969) . 
The passive models have arisen largely out of work on 
attentional problems such as the cocktail party phenomenon. 
Central to this approach is the notion of stimulus analysing 
mechanisms . s timulus analysing mechanisms are neural units 
which are sensitive to certain features of the incoming infor-
mation . Their most important property is that they can combine 
evidence . PhySiological evidence for such mechanisms has been 
provided by Lettvin, fl'Ia turana , r·cCulloch and Pitts (1959) and 
Hubel and i'Tiesel (1959, 1962) . Early theories making use of 
such mechanisms were Selfridge ' s (1958) Pandemonium model and 
Sutherland ' s (1959) pattern recognition model . 
In the passive models perception of speech is built up by 
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combining the outputs of a hierarchy of stimulus analysing 
mechanisms . Norman (1969) summarizes the process as foll01'1s: 
" • •• information about in-coming signals is abstracted by a 
number of different analysing mechanisms . As this information 
is processed by the nervous system the outputs of the analysers 
may be successively combined, forming a hierarchical process 
whereby the outputs of one level of analyser are analysed by 
yet another . Presumably the types of analysers are limited 
but the ways in 'ihich they can be combined are not. II (p 38). 
Treisman (1964) demonstrated that context could have an 
effect by biassing tests on the incoming stimuli towards the 
expected stimuli, (e~uating tests with stimulus analysing mech-
anisms) • The exact '\'lOrkings of context in such a system are 
described in greater detail by Norman (1968) and r·10rton (1969) . 
Norman's and 1-10rton ' s models are similar in many respects so ,,,e 
shall only discuss in detail Horton ' s Logogen model here . 
Morton has presented his model in a number of papers (e . g . 
1·10rton, 1964, 1969 , 1970) . The out line of the model given here 
is based mainly on the 1969 paper . Horton (1969) summarises 
the model as follows: 
"The basic unit of the model is the logogen . A logogen 
is a device which accepts information from sensory analysis 
mechanisms concerning the proper ties of linguistic stimuli and 
from the context producing mechanisms. 1ihen the logogen has 
accumulated more than a certain amount of information, a res-
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ponse (in the present case the response of a single word) is 
made available . Each logogen is, in effect, defined by the 
informa tion it l'Till accept and by the response it makes available . 
Relevant information can be described as the members of the set 
of attributes (Si), (Vi), (Ai), these being semantic, visual 
and acoustic sets respectively . " 
nodel is shown in Figure 2. 
(p 165). A diagram of the 
A logogen simply counts the number of its attributes that 
are (a) in the stimulus, (b) provided by the context system . The 
system is solely concerned with number of attributes and makes 
no distinction betueen the sources . If the attribute count 
of a logogen exceeds its threshold the logogen makes its res-
ponse available to both the semantic system and the output 
buffer . It is assumed that high frequency words will have 
lower thresholds than 10'1'1 frequency l'lords . The input to the 
logogen system from the sensory systems is assumed to be rel-
atively abstract acoustic or visual features which are the pro-
ducts of analysis of the stimulus by "loVTer order" analyzing 
mechanisms . The input from the context system is assumed to 
be in the form of semantic attributes that have been extracted 
from the previous input to the context system. In terms of 
the working of the logogen system attributes from context are 
treated identically to attributes from the sensory analysis . 
The effect of context-provided attributes on logogens which 
contain these attributes as part of their defining sets is to 
stimuli 
\, 
Auditory 
analysis 
Auditory 
attributes 
Context 1----------"1'. Logogen 
system Semantic system 
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Figure 2. Diagram of ll~orton' s Logogen Model. 
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reduce the number of attributes from the sensory analysis neces-
sary to reach threshold . 
The system is passive to the extent that decisions within 
the logogen sys tem are not controlled by any "higher" process. 
Such a system can explai n a t tentional phenomena which are 
problematic for the active models (see Norman , 1969 ) . In 
general t he model call handle a wi de r ange of results concerning 
vTord frequency . The evidence suggests that such effects are 
due to criter.ion differences, i . e . logogen threshold di fferences 
(see for example Broadbent, 1967). An active model would have 
to account for such effects in terms of sensitivity . 
From a practical point of view the logogen model as a means 
for combining information from different sources is described 
in sufficient detail to alloy; its implications to be tested . 
The active models are on the whole rather vague in their accounts 
of hOyT past kn01dedge is used i n word recognition. HOvTever, 
Morton (1970) concedes that while a passive model is adequate 
to deal loTi th word recognition it is clear that beyond this level 
speech recognition involves active "constructive procedures ll • 
passive approach is plausible if the to-be-recognized set is 
finite . \wrds , although a large set , can be regarded as finite 
in number . A passive model is i nadequate to deal with poten-
tially infinite sets such as sentences . Sentence recognition/ 
domprehension must involve the use of rules, i . e . an active 
process . 
25 
~ t the level of vlord recognition the difference betvTeen 
the active and passive models can be distinguished in the role 
of attention . In the active models attention is necessary 
throughout the speech recognition process , including vTord recog-
nition. I n the passive model attention is not required at 
the level of '·Tord recognition . The passive model is consistent 
vri th the view· of skilled adult reader whereas the active model 
may be more consistent 't'Ti t h the unskilled child reader. It 
is a characteristic of skilled performance that as much of the 
task as possible is reduced to an automatic l evel of processing, 
i . e . making minimal demands on attention. Goodman ' s (1967) 
approach to reading as a ski ll has already been mentioned (see 
Introduction) . More recently Laberge and Samuel s (1974) have 
discussed the role of automatic information processing in read-
ing. Laberge and Samuels put for'fard as the goal of fluent 
reading a state w·here " ••• the reader can maintain attention 
continuously on the meaning units of semantic memory, while the 
decoding from the visual to the semantic systems proceeds auto-
matically" • (p 313) . 
It has been knO'ill for some time that semantic context 
influences word recognition (e. g. Taylor , 1956; Miller and 
Isard, 1963; Rubenstein and Pollack, 1963; Tulving and Gold , 
1963 ). It is implied in the papers of Goodman (1967) and 
Laberge and Samuels (1974) that the more the reader can auto-
matically make use of contextual information the more fluent will 
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be his performance . Out of the models of 1"lOrd recognition 
I>1orton ' s logogen model gives the clearest and most formal account 
of context operating in just such an automatic manner . Morton ' s 
model is also amenabl e to experimental testing. The present 
research lias an attempt to develop and test the logogen model ' s 
account of the role of context in word recognition . 
Brief Outline of the Research in this Thesis . 
The intention of the research reported here is to examine 
the hypothesis suggested by Morton ' s Logogen Model that the 
f unction of contextual information is to facilitate the decoding 
from the visual to the semantic representations of words . 
The research has dralffi upon the work of 0. number of investigators 
(in particular 11 eyer and his colleagues) who have not been in-
cluded in the review. \lliere a previous finding is closely 
involved with work reported here it is discussed in the ex-
periments to which it relates . 
The first four experiments are concerned with the demon-
stration , di scussion and analysis of a number of context-produced 
priming effects . Experiments 5 and 6 examine such priming 
effects i n relation to one of the central functions of context , 
namely the resolution of ambiguity . Experiments 7 and 8 
investigate contextual priming effects in processes other than 
recognition in an attempt to demonstrate the gener ality of the 
model presented. 
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EXPERI I·lENT ONE 
Cued sent ence verif icat ion: 
Introduction: 
Quillian (1966) presented a computer model of semantic 
memory . His model of semantic memory is a highly structured 
network of concepts , words and images capable of making references 
and comprehending language . In the model each word is represented 
by a particular "node" in the netlwrk . Each word has stored 
with it a configuration of pOinters to other wor ds . 
figura tion represents the "Tord I s meaning . 
This con-
The idea of supersets plays a fundamental role in uillian's 
model , since this reflects the overall hierarchical organization 
of the memory system. 1uillian proposes that the grouping of 
concepts into categories saves storage space. Properties that 
are shared by all members of category need only be stored with 
the superordinate node . E. g. the fact that a canary is yellOW, 
can sing etc. are defining properties of "canary" and are thus 
stored directly with the "canary" node . The fact that it can 
also fly, has lrings, has a beak etc . are properties that canaries 
share with other birds and are stored at the "bird" node . 1e 
can infer the fact that a canary has these properties from the 
knowledge that a canary is a bird. 
Although this system of storage is efficient in terms of 
space it is less efficient in terms of time . Inferences 
require searches through the network and these processes take 
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time. Collins and ~uillian (1969) have presented evidence which 
is consistent with this concept of the organization of human 
semantic memory although an alternative explanation of their 
results has been suggested by Landauer and ~eyer (1972). 
Search processes are assumed to operate through an "activ-
ation" process that starts at a particular node and traces 
along all of the pointers to the other nodes in the network. 
The meaning of any given concept is defined in terms of the 
other concepts to which it is connected. E. g . from the node 
"canary" the first information retrieved ,·muld be that it is 
a bird, it sings, is yellow and so on. From the node "bird" 
the search would retrieve the fact that a canary is also an 
animal , that it flies and has feathers etc . An important 
assumption is that each node reached .. Till be "activated". In 
the computer model the node is tagged indicating that it has 
recently been passed through and also which node led to this 
tag . This is important for language comprehension. Each word 
in a sentence starts a search from its node that expands out-
"Tards . fuen the searches intersect , i . e . ..There one search 
reaches a node that has already been activated by another search, 
this will indicate that a path has been found bet..,een two nodes, 
in other words that they are related in some way . This relation-
ship must then be checked against the relationship in the sen-
tence to see that the found relationship is permissible . 
Collins and Quillian (1970b) suggested that if such pro-
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cesses do occur in human language comprehension then there is 
a possible i mplication for pairs of sent ences presented in suc-
cession in a sentence verification t ask . They put for .. rard the 
hypothesis that there .. 1ould be a facilitation effect leading 
to a shorter RT f or the second sentence if verification of the 
second sentence involved using the Same fact (following the Same 
path through the network) as the first sentence . E. g . verifying 
the sentence "A canary i s a bird" should reduce RT for "A canary 
can fly ll more than it should reduce RT for "A canary can sing" 
since t he fact t hat canaries fly i s assumed to involve f irst 
i nferring that a canary is a bird whereas the f act that canaries 
can sing is not supposed to involve this inferential s t ep . 
Simil arly RT for "A canary is a hird" should be more reduced 
by verifying "A canary can fly" than by verifying "A canary can 
sing" . Collins and ~illian derived 12 such predictions and 
found support for 8 of them. They conclude that t heir results 
f urther support the notions that human memory has the same kind 
of hierarchical organization as the semantic memory in Quillian's 
Teachable Language Comprehender (1 969) . 
Collins and Ouillian propose two possible models to explain 
how a previous inference might facilitate later retrieval. One 
model they call the Subway Map model, based on the electric 
maps in the Paris Me tro . They describe this model as follows: 
liTo use the sub"TaY maps of Paris a person presses a button for 
the station that he wants to travel to, and the shortest path, 
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the path of least electrical resist ance lichts U.l . In an 
analoGous vlay, one can i maGi ne that a IJath i n sern:mtic nell10ry 
lights Up connecting the 'lord concepts referred to i n the sen-
tence and that facilitation occurs for the fut1.Te use of t hat 
. ath. " (1 970 P 312) . 
The other model they c .11 the 3preaclin • ctivation model. 
This is similar t o Pavlov ' s (1 927) spread of a ctivation t heory . 
I n this case excitation spreads froD.! t he w·ord-concepts specified 
ill the sentence . The spreading a cti vation t heory assumes t hat 
f acilitation occurs for each surroundinG node reached in the 
intersection process , though facilitation may be great er for 
the starting nodes themselves . Thus the sent ence "A canary 
is a bird ll may_facilitate It .. canary can fly" more than" 
canary can sing" since "bird!! is connected directly to "fly" 
and "canarylt but only indirectly to "sinell . The spreading 
activation model predicts f acilitation for nodes both on and 
off the path betueen t he tv/o startine nodes . The subway map 
model redicts f acilita tion only for nodes on the path itself. 
Neither model specifies ~Thether it is the accessibility of the 
nodes that is f acilitated or the transit time betlyeen the nodes 
that i s facilitated or both . 
Collins and ·uillian examine four predictions t hat serve 
to differentiate the ti-1O models . Three of the four predictions 
are i n the right direction for t he spreaiing activation model 
but ~O~& reach the 0 . 05 si~~ificance level . Thus what tenuous 
evidence is availa ble su ports the spreading activation model . 
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Further evidence of facilitation of retrieval of information 
.. ,as found by Brenker (1973) . Brenker required subjects to 
verify sentences such as "A hor se has a tail" and preceded the 
sentence by a "primer" for the first concept i . e . the word 
"horse" . Such priming leads to a consistent decrease in verif-
ication time . 
effects. 
Synonyms used as primers also produced s i milar 
The present experiment was designed to test the t wo models , 
proposed by Collins and ~uillian, of how facilitation operates . 
s they indicate, the critica l difference between the t wo model s 
is tha t the spreading excitation model predicts facilitation 
for nodes both on and of f the path between t he two nodes . 
The subway map model, on the other hand, predicts facilitation 
only for nodes on the path itself . This experiment used a 
technique similar to that of Brenker but instead of priming by 
using the subject of the sentence , the sentence was cued with 
the ~ordinate of the subject . E. g . the sentence "A cat has 
a tail" would be preceded by the cue "Animal" . By using sen-
tences in "Thich the property or attribute of the subject was 
assumed to be stored directly with the subject , according to 
uillian ' s model, it is possible to derive different predictions 
from the t wo models . Since to verify the sentences required 
no kn01dedge about the subject ' s superordinate the subway map 
model would predict that a superordinate cue should produce 
no facilitation . However, the spreading excitation model tlould 
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predict f acilitation s ince there is a connection between a word 
and its superordinate along which excitation could travel . 
Ther e are a great many factors which mi ght reasonably be 
expected to affect verification t imes for sentences and uhich 
may also interact with any effects pro duced by the superordinate 
cue . Anderson and Bower (1974) describe the problem as f ollows : 
"Such r esearch is fraught with experimental dangers due to the 
confounding of experimental mani pul a tions with inherent char-
acteristics of the material s . The experi menter is not totally 
free to choose his experimental materials . He must select 
from \That has been provided by the whims and quirks of natural 
language and culture . 1'1hen t he experimenter assigns material 
to conditions on the basis of some semantic criterion he is 
also probably producing differences between conditions on t he 
basis of word frequency, conjoint propositional frequency and 
recency, concretences or some other dimension . It thus becomes 
very difficult to assess the significance of a difference in RT 
between the conditions . Is it due to the specified change 
i n the semantic variable or is it some unspecified variable that 
happens to correlate iii th the semantic variable? tI (p 379) . 
Clark (1973) has discussed some of the statistical implications 
of these problems . By using a suitable experimental deSign 
and the appropriate statistics some of these problems may be 
avoided . In the present experiment several variables might 
be assumed to play some role iiill be subjected to post hoc 
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examination. While certainly not a complete list of such 
possible variables it is hoped that they are some of the more 
important ones . These variables are frequency of occurrence 
in the language of both the cue and the subject of the sentence , 
the initial difficulty of the sentence and the size of the 
category from VThich the item "Tas drawn . 
Hethod: 
Equipment: The equipment used i n this experiment was a specially 
designed display system . In this equipment were inserted cards 
with the sentences typed on them . The sentences were covered 
by a shutter. lilien E pressed the "start" sW'i tch the shutter 
was lowered displaying the sentence underneath and simultaneously 
started a stop-clock . The shutter remained down until S pressed 
one of two response keys marked TRUE and FALSE which also stopped 
the clock . The tops of the cards "Tere visible above the shutter 
and on these were typed the particular superordinate cues or 
the words "NO CUE" . 
illaterials: 48 sentences ''lere used . These were all in forms 
of simple propositions . As far as possible the relational 
terms were restricted to "isll, "has" and "can" . The subjects 
of the sentences were selected from different categories of the 
Battig and Montague (1969) and the Brown (1972) category norms. 
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All subjects and sentences 1-Tere from the six most fre'luent in-
stance of their category. The superordinate cues w·ere the 
names given to the categories by Battig and I10ntague and Brotm. 
Bearing in mind the distinction made by Collins and quill ian 
between properties that would be stored with the exemplar node 
and those properties that vlOuld be stored with the superset 
node all the true sentences contained properties that were 
assumed to be specific to the particular instance and would not 
be stored with t he superset . 
Half the sentences .. Tere true and half "Tere false . Half 
the sentences were cued and half were not cued. These t vTO 
factors vTere combined so that there were 12 cued true sentences, 
12 cued false, 12 not cued true and 12 not cued false . 
Examples of the sentences are shown i n Table 1. 
Table 1. Examples of sentences 
TRUE SENTENCE 
Cars have l'Theels 
Do~s can bark 
CUE FALSE SENTENCE 
Vehicle Apples are blue 
Animal Vets cure people 
CUE 
Fruit 
Profession 
Subjects: 32 first year undergraduates acted as subjects • 
. These ''1ere divided into two groups of 16. The 24 sentences 
which "Tere cued and the 24 sentences which "Tere not cued were 
reversed for the two groups so that each sentence occurred 
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an e~ual number of times i n the cued and not cued condition. 
The subjects participated to fulf i l a course re~uirement . 
Procedure: S sat facing the tachistoscope llith a finger from 
each hand on two buttons . The right hand button vTas marked 
TRUE and the left hand button l'Tas marked }t'AISE . In each trial 
S read aloud the cue of the words NO CUE from the top of the 
card . E then displayed the sentence on the card and S responded 
by pressing true or false key . That card was then removed 
revealing the next cue on the top of the next card . The order 
of presentation of the cards was random. 
session lasted approximately 15 minutes . 
Each experimental 
12 practice trials 
were carried out before the experimental trials . 
Results: The mean RT f or each condition is shown in Fi gure 3 
The results liere analyzed by calculating quasi F ratios in which 
both subjects and materials are treated as random variables . 
(see Clark, 1973). Superordinate cues produced a mean reduction 
in verification time of 66msecs (min . F1 (1 , 57) = 7 .8 , p ~ 0. 01) . 
True sentences were on the average 175 msecs faster than false 
sentences (min . F' = (1,57) = 12 . 6, p < 0.01). The interaction 
between cueing and true/~alse was not significant by the quasi 
F test, although it was significant by the less conservative 
analysis by subjects (F(1,31) = 6 .1 3 , p < 0 . 025) . 
., ," 
, ' 
• I· II 
, ' 
:Mean S.D. 
it ... 1 
Cued - True 1366 207.5 
Not Cued - True 1582 217.8 
Cued - False 1473 211.4 
Not Cued - False 1607 219.3 
t>i an and standard deviations' for 
Figure 3. 
, . 
," 
.~ i 
' ... , 
" 
. " 
" 
R1' i n 
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1400 
1300 
Cued Not cued [J IJ 
True False 
l.lean v erification t ime . 
Fi gure 3. 
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OVerall error rate was 11 7" but there .. las no significant 
difference in error rates bet .. ,een conditions . 
Analysis of Extra-experimental variables: 
Six soores for each sentence liere used: 
Uncued verification time (UVT). This score gives an 
indication of how "difficult 11 each sentence was to verify. 
2 Cued verification time (CVT) . 
3 Facilitation score . This was obtained by subtracting 
cued verification time from uncued verification time. 
4 Size of category to which the sentence subject belonged . 
This was obtained by counting the instances of a category 
in the Battig and IvIontaeue norms which w·ere listed 10 or 
more times . 
5 Frequency of occurrence in the language of the category 
6 
name l'1hich lias used as the cue . The measure used was the 
Lorge I· agazine count since this is the only measure ei ven 
by Thorndike and Lor ge (1944) which lists exact frequencies 
for all words . 
Frequency of the subject of the sentence . 
count) • 
(Also the Lorge 
The first three scores can be regarded as " experimental 11 
in that they derive from the present experiment. The last 
three can be rega~ded as extra-experimental scores . True and 
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False sentences were analysed separately . Unfortunately the 
frequency data was not available for one of the true sentences 
reducing the number of true sentences to 23 . Spearman ' s Rank 
Correlation Coefficients were calculated for each pair of scores . 
See Table 3 for true sentence correlations. 
Kendall Rank Correlations and Partial Correlations were 
also calculated for -each pair except for cued VT uhich only 
correlated vnth uncued VT , and frequency of the sentence - subject 
which did not correlate 1nth any of the other scores . Kendall ' s 
f'T) for the remaining pairs is shmm in Table 4 . Table 5 
shows the partial correlation coefficients holding size of 
category constant . Table 6 sho'-1s partial correlations holding 
frequency of the category name constant . 
For false sentences none of the three "extra-experimental" 
scores correlated significantly uith any of the three "experi-
mental" scores . The correlation matrix for the three experi-
mental scores is sholm in Table 7 . 
UVT 
CVT 
Facil 
Size of Cat . 
F of Cat. Name 
F of sent . subj . 
True sentences . 
UVT 
Facil 
Size of Cat . 
F of Cat . Name 
True Sentences . 
UVT 
Facil 
F. of Cat . ·Name 
True Sentences . 
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UVT CV'l! Facil Size of F of Cat . F of Subject 
Cat . Name of sentence. 
** * 0. 696 0 . 45 0. 22 0 . 34 -0. 06 
0 . 0 -0. 12 0. 13 -0.02 
~+-* 
* 0. 63 0. 37 -0 . 05 
0. 31 -0.1 
0 . 05 
* = P ( 0. 05 ·H = p < 0 . 01 
Spearman ' s Rank Correlations for all pairs . 
TABLE 2 
UVT Facil Size of Cat . F of Cat . Name . 
0. 38 0. 21 0 . 31 
0 . 46 0 . 26 
0 . 29 
Kendall ' s Rank Correlations . 
TABLE 4 
UVT Facil F . of Cat. Name 
0. 32 0. 26 
0.1 5 
Kendall Partial Correlations Holding Size 
of Category Constant . 
TABLE 5 
UVT 
Facil 
Si ze of Cat . 
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Facil 
0 . 32 
Si ze of Cat . 
0 . 13 
0 . 42 
True Sentences . Kendall Partial Correlations Holding 
Frequency of Category Name Constant . 
'PABLE 6 . 
UVT <Nr Facil 
UVT 0.698 0.42 
CVT - 0. 342 
Facil 
False sentences . Spearman Rank Correlations . 
TABLE 1. 
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Discussion: These results provide further evidence of facilitation 
effects in retrieval from memory . Furthermore they reject the 
subway map model proposed by Collins and tuillian . Superor-
dinates are not on the path between a member of a category and 
its characteristic properties and therefore, according to the 
subway map model , cannot produce any facilitation . Out of the 
models proposed by Collins and '.).uillian this l eaves the spreading 
excitation model as the only one consistent with these results . 
There is, however, a third model, not discussed by Collins and 
uillian, that could also predict these results . l.eyer, 
Schvaneveldt and Ruddy (1972) have suggested a model of memory 
retrieval vThich makes the same predictions f or this experiment 
as the spreading excitation model . 
model the shifting location model . 
Heyer et al e call this 
ccording to this mode l 
memory is seen as simil ar to a reel of magnetic tape or a magnetic 
disk . Information i s retrieved by means of a fixed "reading-
head" . The time t aken to retrieve a piece of information 
depends on how far the tape or disk has to move so that the 
information is under the reading- head . Information on the tape 
or disk is organized so that related topics are found in the 
same area . Given a cue word (e . g. "animal") the tape !disk 
can move until the appropriate area is under the reading mechanism . 
Uhen presented with" cat has a tail" t he tape/disk has less 
far to move to find the relevant information that enables verifi-
cation of the proposition than if it had no cue . 
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The results of the present experiment are inadequate to 
distin~~ish between the spreading activation model and the 
shifting location model . Heyer et al . present evidence 'l'Thich 
gives more support to the spreading activation model than the 
shifting location model. The problem of distinguishing beh'een 
these models wil l be dealt with more fully in the next chapter . 
The present experiment is also unable to answer the question 
posed by Collins and Quillian as to whether it is the accessibility 
of the nodes that is facilitated or the transit time to move 
betvTeen nodes, or both . This problem is dealt with in greater 
detail in t he next section. 
nlat can be concluded about sentence differences from the 
post hoc correlations? As noted earlier a number of significant 
post hoc correlations were found for true sentences but not for 
false sentences . False sentences tended to be 4~ 9r, show 
considerably less facilitation (25 msecs versus 107 msecs) and 
to have much higher variance than true sentences . Also false 
responses were made with the left (Le . largely non-dominant) 
hand . These factors may account for the lack of significant 
correlations in the post hoc analyses . This discussion vTil1 
concentrate on true sentences . 
Consider first uncued verification time (~) . Not sur-
prisingly UVT correlates highly v1i th cued verification time 
(CVT) . The correlation betueen UVT and facilitation r eveals a 
possible "floor ll effect . The slow'er a sentence is when uncued 
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the more the facilitation it receives from the cue. Thi s may 
simply be that faster sentences have less room f or i mprovement 
or it may reflect some interaction bet ween "difficulty" of the 
sentence (as measured by verification time) and the effectiveness 
of the cue . It is not easy to identify a priori t'lhat constitutes 
an "easy" or a "difficult" sentence . For i nstance , one mi ght 
expect the frequency of the constituent t-rords to be an i mportant 
f actor . H011'eVer , UVT does not correlate with frequency of the 
subject of the sentence . This is rather surprising in view 
of the l ar ge body of evidence showing an inverse relationship 
between uord frequency and recognition time (e . g . Broadbent , 
1967) • This suggests that recognition of the t-lords i n the 
sentence is a relatively minor part of the verification task . 
It seems that it is the relationship bett-Teen the subject and 
its property that is more important . 
UVT correlates positively but not significantly with the 
size of the category to which the sentence-subject belongs . 
The partial correlation (see Table 6) indicates that much of this 
correlation can be attributed to the frequency of the category 
name (lar ger categories tending to have more frequent names) . 
The correlation between UVT and frequency of the category name 
is at first sight rather puzzling. \'1hy should VT be related 
to the frequency of the category name t-,hen that 1-lOrd is not 
present? One hypothesis , consistent ~tith the spr eading activ-
ation model , is that the more frequent t he category name the 
more likely it is to be activated when a member of the category 
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is presented . (An assumption of I'lorton ' s logogen I'jodel is that 
the threshold for any '"lord is related to its frequency). E. e- . 
flol'ler names may be more strongly associated to their super-
ordinate "flow'ert! than to any of their properties. 'rhe most 
i.t 
salient fact about a rose may be that ,..is a flovler rather than 
that it has thorns . When presented "Ti th" rose has thorns" 
the fact that a rose is a flOl'1er may be retrieved before the 
fact that it has thorns . The availabilit y of this fact may 
hinder the accessing of other facts, leading to a sImler VT . 
It is difficult to derive a comparable hypothesis from the 
location shifting model . 
Facilitation scores also correlate with size of category 
and frequency of the category name . Here , hOvTever, it seems 
that it is the size of the category which is the more important 
factor . The instances from bigger categories have higher 
facilitation scores than those from smaller categories . This 
appears to rule out any conscioys gueSSing strategy on the part 
of the subjects . Given a cue as to vrhich category the follOlring 
sentence "Till belong to , a guessing strategy should be more 
likely to roduce the actual instance the smaller the category . 
This is the opposite to the result obtained here . It should 
be noted that all the cate ories used contain at least 20 common 
members . ifferent results may be obtained if much smaller 
categories l'Tere used (e . g , months of the year ) . Presumably 
the l arger the category the more useful it is to have a label 
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for the class t;!.s a "Thole . This correlation may reflect that 
the bigger categories tend to be "bettertt l abelled and that these 
labels tend to be of greater help in accessing a category. 
This is similar to the suggestions of Sa ir and 1 horf that 
classes which are i~portant to a culture will be more differen-
tiated, i . e . members of the culture will be able to distinguish 
more instances of important classes . This ,'1ould be reflected 
in normative data on category size . Thus bigger categories 
uill be those that are more important to a culture and more 
likely to receive a well defined class name . This may be 
r elated to the effectiveness of a superordinate name as a cue . 
Conclusionsj Superordinate cues facilitate verification of 
sentences, even lThen verification requires no knowJ.edce of ... tho 
category to i'rhich the instance belongs . Out of t TO models 
proposed by Collins and ~uillian only the spreading excitation 
model is consistent .1ith these results . There is , however , 
a third model, the shifting location model, which malces the same 
predictions as t he spreading excitation model . 
The correlation bet"Teen uncued verification time and 
frequency of the category name is mor e easily explained in terms 
of a spreading activation model of memory search than a shifting 
location model. 
Sentences concerning instances of l arger categories tend 
to receive more benefit from a superordinate cue . This may 
reflect the fact that larger categories are "better" l abelled. 
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Superordinate and subordinate cues in a lexical decision t ask : 
EXPERHIENT T .[0 
Introduction: 
Exp . 1. provided evidence that superordinate cues can 
facilitate sentence verification. One of the major questions 
left unansloTered is whether the superordinate cue produced its 
facilitation by increasing the accessibility of the nodes (the 
'\"Tords ' "locatiollij i n memory) or by speeding up the actual veri-
fication part of the t ask . It ' ·18S argued that the lack 0 any 
correlation behTeen frequency of occurrence in the language and 
uncued sentence ~erification time suggested that word recognition 
\'18S a minor part of the verification task since there is con-
siderable evidence that word frequency is related to recognition 
time . On the other hand there is a l arge body of evidence that 
context influences vTOrd perception. Rubenstein and Pollack 
(1963) regarded verbal context as a constraint on the probability 
of a given word ' s occurrence and sh010fed that intellieibili ty 
is a simple povTer function of pro babili ty of occurrence. 
Similarly ~uller, Heise and Lichten (1951) found that words 
dra~m from a set of 2 alternatives required a signal-to-noise 
ratio of 24db less than the same words selected from a set of 
1000 alternatives to achieve the same level of intellieibility . 
It may be that the effect of the cue in Exp . 1 was to reduce the 
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number of possible alternatives for the subject of the sentence , 
louering its recognition threshold . Tulvine; and Gold (1963) 
describe the situation as follows: "It is reasonable to assune 
that different sources of information are complementary to one 
another in the sense that if one source provides much information 
then less information i s needed from other sources ." Thus 
given a cue indicating the possible set of alternatives the 
subject is prepared to accept the occurrence of one of the set 
on the basis of less evidence than if he had no cue . Requiring 
less information to make his decision will presumably mean the 
subject can make his decision more quickly . This description 
implies a conscious strateGY on the part of the subject . Morton 
(1969) has described such an interaction more formally in his 
logogen model of word recognition. I n this model the inter-
actions of information from different sources occurs automatically 
in a hypothetical 'lOrd- recognizing device ff,orton calls a logo gen . 
The verification task used in Ex . 1, although producing 
a facilitation effect, is not very suitable for a more thorough 
investigation of hOlT context affects word recognition . It 
inevitably involves reco{;,ni tion of several vlOrds and verification 
itself , is a complex process that is poorly understood at 
present . A more appropriate task i s provided by the lexical 
decision task, which has recently been used by a number of 
investigators . (e . g . Landauer and Freedman, 1968 ; Heyer and 
Ellis , 1970; Rubenstein , Garfield and I1illikan , 1970) . In 
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the lexical decision task the subject has to decide whether 
a string of letters forms a real word or not . 
Meyer and his co-workers (e.g. Eeyer and Schvaneveldt , 
1972) have produced evidence of facilitation in r ecognizing 
pairs of words . Subjects were quicker to decide that BUTTER 
lTas a word if they had previously made a decision about an 
associated word such as BREAD than if the word l'laS Unassociated 
e . g . NURSE. 
It is assumed here that these effects reflect the under-
lying organization of the lexical memory which contains the 
information a person has stored about the "Tords he movTs . The 
model assumed here is the same as that assumed by Heyer and 
Schaneveldt . The model includes hlO assumptions made by a 
number of other investigators (e . g. Norman , 1968 ; Morton, 1969; 
Collins and Quillian, 1969; Heyer , 1970; Rumelhart, Lindsay 
and Norman , .1972) . Meyer, SChaneveldt and Ruddy (1973) describe 
these assumptions as fol101"S: liThe first assumption is that 
,'lords are stored at distinct "locations" in lexical memory and 
the memory is organized semantically, so that in some sense, 
associated \'lords like BREAD and BUTTER are relatively close 
together , whereas unassociated words like NURSE and BUTTER are 
further apart . The second assumption is that accessing infor-
mation from a given memory location produces residual neural 
activity that spreads to other nearby locations . This tem-
porary increase of excitation then produces the faster recog-
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nition of associated lords . " ~ s was noted in Exp . 1. the shif-
ting location model makes a number of similar predictions as the 
spreading excitation assumptions . 
·~eyer et a1. have concentrated mainly on identifying uhere 
in the llord- recoenition process contextual effects operate . 
They have used materials drawn from association norms and have 
not specifically investigated the effects obtained with different 
kinds of associations . Recent models of semantic memory imply 
that certain kinds of relations may be basic to the organization 
of semantic memory . Collins and ~uillian's model relies heavily 
upon the superset relation as a means of efficiently storing 
information. Similarly Rumelhart , Lindsay and . Norman make 
fre~uent use of the ISA relation, although they place less 
emphasis on the hierarchical structure of memory than do Collins 
and quillian . (see also Sanford and Seymour , 1974) . 
The aim of the present experiment was to see vThether dif-
ferent kinds of associ ations ;fould produce difrerent facilitation 
effects . Simple associated pairs from association norms would 
be compared with superordinate-subordinate and subordinate-
superordinate pairs . According to a hierarchical model of 
memory these latter two types of pairs should be stored close 
together and thus produce facilitation . 
subsidiary aim was to examine the effects of a cue that 
was phonemically similar but neither graphemically nor seman-
tically similar to the test t'lord (e . g. CALF-LAUGH). Neyer , 
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Schvaneveldt and Ruddy (1973) examined the f~cilitation effects 
between uords that lvere either graphemically and phonemically 
similar (e . g . B IBE- T IB~) or phonemically dissimilar but gra-
phemically similar (e . g . COUCH- TOUCH) . If the two l'1Ords llere 
both graphemically and phonemically siillilar then recognition 
of the second word 1-ras facilitated. If, houever, the tlYO ''lords 
were graphemically similar but phonemically dissimilar then 
recognition was inhibited. heyer et al e propose a model of 
visual word recognition to explain these results . The model 
assumes that there is an initial encoding stage uhere grapherp.e-
phoneme correspondence rules are applied to form a phonological 
representation of the vlord . A lexical decision is made by 
accessing memory to determine whether or not the representation 
has been stored there previously . If it is not found and if 
the string has more than one possible representation thqn the 
encoding and decision operations are repeated . The results 
obtai ned by Heyer et al. can be explained in terms of encoding 
biasses . If the graphemic encoding stage detects similarities 
betueen the first and the second word then the phonemiC encoding 
stage is biassed towards applying the same rules to th@ second 
word as it used far the first. Thus graphemiC and phonemic 
s i milarity would facilitate recognition of the second word since 
less time need be spent applying the grapheme- phoneme conversion 
rules . This would be particularly important llhere the second 
word has more than one possible pronunciation. Inhibition 
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vlOuld occur for graphemically similar but phonemic ally dis-
sinilar pairs, since the second iiord l-muld receive the urong 
phonological representation . -:-Jhen the search fails to find 
this repres-entation in lexical memory the l'lOrd is recoded 
phonemically and the search repeated . This coding and search 
'rill add to recognition time . 
s the model stands it is not possible to predict the 
effects of phonemic similarity and graphemic dissimilarity . 
It is necessary to make one of two assumptions , culled here the 
"Teak and the strong assumption . The vleak assumption is that 
the phonological coding bias ~ on~y occurs when the graphemic 
encoding stage detects some similarity betueen the h10 uords . 
In this case there '-1ill be no effect of phonemic similarity 
and graphemic di ssimilarity . The strone assumption is sug-
gested by Heyer et a1. It assumes that differences in graphemic 
structure coul d bias the phonemic encoding stage to form dis-
similar representations of the two "Tords . This " ould lead to 
inhibition in the same way that graphemic similarity and phonemic 
dissimilarity does . 
Nethod . 
Equipment: The eqUipment used in this experiment ,ras a one 
channel tachistoscope, a millisecond stop-clock and a voice 
key . 
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Haterials : The materials used 1'1ere 60 rea l English "fOrds and 
60 pSeUd0l1'Ords . Each \-Tord and pseudo l'lord lms matched "I'Ti th 
a cue word . The r eal words were divided into 5 groups of 12 
words , according to t he relationship behleen the t est lvord and 
its cue . These relationships 'l'lere : 
2 
Cue superordinate to test word . The cue \-Tord \-Tas the mos t 
frequently given superordinate in t he Loftus and Scheff 
categorization norms (1 971). 
Cue subordinate to test word . 
E.e. BIRD - ROBIN. 
Cue \-Tord vras one of the 
six most frequently listed instances of the category i n 
the Battig and Hontague ca tegory norms (1 969 ) . E. g . 
VIPER - SNAKE . 
3 Cue ;'las a frequent associate of test w'ord a ccording to 
Palermo and Jenkins word association norms (1964), but 
't'ras neither a superordinate or a subordinate of the tes t 
vlOrd . E. g . BREAD - BUTTER . 
4 Cue ''lord was phonemically simila r but graphemically dis-
similar to test word . Also cue word ''1as not listed as 
an associate of the test \-Tord. E. g . AIR - CARE . 
5 Cue word was not an associate of the test vlord, i. e . not 
listed in the "lord associa tion norms as a frequent associate . 
E. g . PATH - QUEEN. These were also phonemically and 
graphemically dissimilar . 
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As far as possible test words in each' condition 'vere matched 
for length and frequency . 
The 60 pseudo'l"lOrds were formed by r eplacing one letter 
(vo1'Tel "lith vovTel, consonant with consonant) of frequent English 
lfOrds (or words in Thorndike-Lorge Count , 1944). Changes 
were made so that the resulting pSeUdOl'10rds conformed to English 
phonological and spelling rules . Each pSeUd01'lOrd was paired 
wi th a real English cue word , dralm from the same sources as 
the cue 'l"lords for the real English test words . 
The 120 word and pseudoword pairs vTere randomized . The 
cue words were then printed in a small booklet vTi th one cue on 
each page . 
Subjects : 12 undergraduates participated in the experiment as 
subjects to fulfil a course requirement . 
Procedure: The subject sat faCing the tachistoscope 'l'Ti th the 
booklet of cue words on the t able in front of him. The voice 
key vTas also positioned on the t a ble in front of the tachisto-
scope. On each trial the subject read aloud a cue 'l'lOrd out 
of the booklet . Ai3 soon as he had read the '\"lOrd-cue he looked 
into the tachistoscope and the experimenter pressed a button 
which displayed the test word /nonword and started the clock 
The subject was instructed to say lIyes ll if the item was a real 
English 'l"Tord and "no" if it was a pseudO'lwrd . He 'l"TaS instructed 
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- to respond as quickly as possible but \-lithout makine mistakes . 
The subject's verbal response stopped the clock and terminated 
the display . The subject then turned to the next page of the 
booklet and read the next cue Hord . The experimenter recorded 
the reaction time and the response . 
Ten practice trials were given . Each session lasted 
approximately 20 minutes . 
Resultll: The mean RT for each condition is shown in Figure 4. 
An analysis of variance l-laS carried out using only da.ta 
from real English test "Tords . Quasi F ratios ,.lere calculated 
treating both subjects and materials as random effects . (see 
Hiner, 1 970; Cla.rk, 1 973) . 
min F \ ( 4 , 93) = 5. 6 p < O. 01 • 
(N.B. Degrees of freedom depend on size of mean square errors) . 
Overall error rate was 137" but there was no Significant 
difference behleen conditions . Only data from correct responses 
'-lere used in computing statistics . Comparisons of each pair 
of conditions are shown in Table 8 . 
uper- Sub- Associate Non- Phonemically 
ordinate ordinate associate similar 
Superordinate N.S. N.S. 0 . 01 0 . 01 
Subordinate N.S. 0 . 01 0 . 01 
Associate 0 . 01 0 . 01 
Non- associate N. S. 
Phonemically 
Similar 
Pai r,.lise Comparisons (Newman-Keuls) 
TABLE 8 
.. 
., 
.. ' 
" 
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~, 
. , . 
. . 
. ' 
. .. 
Relati.on of cue Mean S.D. 
word to test word • 
Superordinate 693 103.9 
Subordinate 692 102.2 
Associate 697 106.1 
Phonemica11y similar 162 114.1 
Non-associate 151 168.5 
Pseudoword 181 93.8 
l.1eans and standard deviations for ' Fig. 4. 
ill' in 
Hsecs . 
850 
·800 
750 
700 
650 
600 
Super-
ordinate 
Printed I---~ 
Sub-
ordinate 
Ass-
ociate 
Phonemic-. 
ally 
sil'!lilar 
Non-
associate 
Relation of cue word to test word . 
Graphemic r -- - - .... Lexical f--" 
Pseudo-
word 
word r encoding memory ---. Respon3e 
retrieval 
.I 111onemic i 
'- ' encoding 
Dual encoding r.lode l of "lOrd rccoeni tion. 
(From Heyer et al. ,1974). 
Fi gure 5. 
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PSeUclO1ilOrds : 
• comparison of pseudo .. ,ords with the most cOhlparable re:ll 
word condition (Unassociated pairs) ShOl'led that pseudm'lords 
mean RT l'laS 24 msecs slower. The direction of thiG difference 
vTas observed in 11 out of the 12 subjects. 
p = 0 . 006, two-tailed test). 
Discussion: 
(si"';'n test 
Semantic associates as cues: These results provide further 
evidence of facilitation effects in word recownition, replicating 
the results of I· eyer and Schvaneveld t (1 972) . These results 
also show that this effect ~eneralizes from simple associates 
to the lOGical relationships of subordinate and superordiuate, 
althou h · these terms may not be hi -hly fre uent associates of 
the test Hord as indicated by association norms . All three 
related. conditions of superordinate, subordinate and associated 
pairs were significantly faster than the unassociated pairs . 
It is interesting to note that the three related conditions 
did not differ from each other . Uhile it is to be expected 
tl~t subordinates would be relatively strongly associated 
with their superordinates , it is less clear that superordinates 
should be equally strongly connected to their subordinates. 
The fact that a OBIN is a bird is perhaps the most important 
fact that a person needs about ROBIN. The fact that the cate-
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gory BIRD includes .lCBIH is less salient. It shoula be pointed 
out that the members of the ca tegories used Vlere all highly 
"representative!! members in the sense used Heider (1 973) e . g . 
ROBIn is judged as being a better representative of BI D tha.n 
is C::nCIWJ.{. (See also Smith , 3hoben and ips, 1974) . 
Irhese results suggest then that groulJing into classes is 
an i mportant principle in the organization of semantic memory . 
As far as the problem from Exp. 1 as to whether the super-
ordinate cues facilitated access to the subordinate nodes or 
decreased the transit time betvleen the nodes, is concerned, the 
resul ts of the present experiment are sug,"estive but not C011-
clusive . I n this e~periment words primed with their super-
ordinates nere 64 msecs . faster than >'lords preceded. by unassociated 
vlOrds . ,:(his compares with the 66 msecs . over.ll f'1.cilitatio11 
effect of superordinate cues in ;Jxp . 1. Since in Exp . 2. the only 
possib18 effect i3 on ,'lord recognition time this suCgests that 
the f acili ta ti on i n Exp . 1. lTas similarly cause d by increas ed 
access i bili ty of the incH vi dual ilord nodes . 
Phonenically similar words as cues: These results support the 
.. maker of the two hypotheses ut forward as ossible redictions 
fro~l 1 <eyer et aI ' s . visual \'iord recogni hon model . Tha t is, 
the phonemic encodinG bias only occU:CS 'Then the e;ralJhemic en-
codine sta..;e detects some similari ty betrreen the primin,:; ifOrd 
and the test word . There W!3.S no evidence that different e;ra-
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phemic codes biasses the phonemic encoding system to produce 
different (in this case "wrong") phonological representa tions . 
These areument s are assuming tha. t visua l 'I'mrd recogni t ion 
involves a grapheme-phoneme recoding stage , as in I- eyer et aI ' s 
model. A number of i nvesti gators (e . g. Bouer , 1970 ; Kolers , 
1970; Baron, 1973) have argued that visual liard recognition 
can occur directly f rom the gr aphemic code, lTithout any inter-
vening phonological encoding . The present result is also 
consistent with this model s ince any phonemic similarity between 
the lyords liould be irrelevant for deciding if they vTere words 
or not . Meyer et al e (1974) have proposed a parallel race 
model , where both a graphemiC and phonemiC code are used in word 
reCOgnition . (see Fig . 5) . Both codes can find a .. Tord in 
lexical memory and sometimes one and sometimes the other liill 
be quicker . Since the phonemic code involves an extra stage 
i . e . the grapheme- phoneme conversion which will presumably take 
time (c . f . Sternberg , 1969) , such a model i mplies that a phono-
logical representation is a more efficient code for lexical 
memory retrieval. OtheI'1-Tise the gr aphemic-code-based search 
would always lfl.ll. .the )"race" and hence a phonological code would 
be useless . If it is true that a phonological representation 
is advantageous for finding a word in lexical memory it i s 
reasonable to expect subjects to adopt this strategy (assuming 
they have some control over the process) . One is left with 
the original conclusion that there is a phonemic encoding bias 
, 
--
58 
only if there is graphemic s i mil arity . Meyer et al (1974) 
point out that the codes which help in recognizing printed W'ords 
may depend upon the type of task involved. There remains 
therefore the possibility that subjects may have only used 
graphemic encoding , in which case phonemic similarity would have 
no effect, as was found . 
s can be seen from the preceding discussion, a dual encoding 
model makes it difficult to reach any strong conclusions, using 
the lexical decision t ask . It is possible tha t the situation 
may be clarified by using a task 1'There the subject has to make 
a gr apheme- phoneme conversion . 
This is examined i n Exp . 3. 
Pseudowords: Pseudowords were significantly slower to be rejected 
as words than real l'1ords were to be accepted . This finding has 
been reported vTidely in the literature (e . g . Heyer and Ellis, 
1970; ubenstein, Lewis and Rubenstein, 1971) although the 
size of the difference reported here is less than is often 
reported by other investigators . This finding i s consis t ent 
with an exhaustive serial scan model of lexical memory . If 
memory search operates by examining in a serial fashion all 
locations to find a match for the letter string then pseudowords 
vlOuld take longer than real words since all locations lvould 
have to be examined . This suggests extremely fast search 
rates . According to an estimate by Oldfield (1966) somewhere 
betw"een 55 , 000 and 70,000 locations would have to be examined 
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in approxim?tely t second. This seems implausibly high but 
it is difficult to answer the question of "t'lhen serial search 
rates become_, lItoo fast" . 
A number of investigators (e . g . Oldfield, 1966; Swanson 
and 1'1ickens, 1970; ubenstein, Garfield and Nillikan, 1970) 
have explained frequency effects i n \-lOrd recognition by assuming 
a serial scan in which frequently accessed locations are examined 
first . According to this view' pseudowords are treated as highly 
infrequent words . 
An alternative model is suggested in Meyer and Ellis (1970) • 
• s a result of their investigations Meyer and Ellis propose 
that recognizing a string of letters as a "Tord does not depend 
on searching "all or even a significant part of the "Tords stored 
in memory . It According to this model visual and/or acoustic 
features of a string of letters are used to compute an "address" 
in memory (c . f . Norman, 1969; Atkinson and Schiffrin, 1968) . 
This address may then be used to check a location in memory to 
see if the letter string has occurred in the past . The system 
is able to compute an address for a pseudoword but examination 
of the corresponding memory location will find it "emptylt or 
"meaningless" in the literal s ense . According to this model 
frequency effects are assumed to be dependent upon the time 
taken to compute the address . Computation time for the address 
rather than memory search are assumed to be related to frequency 
of the word , frequent 110rds addresses being computed more quickly 
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than infrequent nords. PseudolTords being highly infrequent 
take a long time in the address computation stage . (See also 
Herriot, 1974) . 
This view' is similar to !·Iorton I S Logogen Nodel (1969), 
if it assumed that logogen is an address computing device . 
The logogen model, however , in its simplest form is incompatible 
with the view expressed above that the system can compute an 
address in lexical memory , even for pseudouords . 
necessa.ry to assume an infinite number of logogens to deal with 
an infinite number of possible pseudouords . The logogen model 
can account for the slow'er decision times for pseudOl'lOrds if 
it is assumed that the system lTaits a certain length of time 
after the input of a letter string for an output from a logogen . 
If after this set interval there has been no output from a logogen 
the system responds "non-~Tord" . This viel" differs from that 
of Ireyer and Ellis by assuming a failure of address computation 
for nont'lOrds rather than the discovery of an "empty" location 
in lexical memory . This view must be an oversimplification 
of the system since there must be a capacity for entering nell 
~'Tords into lexical memory . The logogen model as it stands 
at the moment makes no provision for handling nel'T information. 
One way to test l1hether pseudo~'1Ords ' longer deciSion times 
are due to some ear~y address computing stage or some meDOry 
search stage is to examine them in a task lrhich does not specifi-
cally demand an access of lexical memory. (See Exp . 3. ). 
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General Discussion: 
The present experiment makes no test of the two models 
proposed in Exp . 1 . to account for the associative primine 
effects . Both the spreading activation and the location shifting 
models make the same predictions . The problem of deciding be-
tween these models vlill be dealt 'l'lith in a later section. 
(See Exp . 4. ) . 
Neither does the present experiment give any indication 
as to 'l'There in the visual word recognition process these facili-
tation effects are operating. It is possible that context 
could influence either an encodin stage or a search stage . 
It is possibl e to examine this more closely by using a task 
involving no explicit memory search. 
Exp. 3. 
This is dealt with in 
It i s vTorth noting that the error rate is high compared 
to that reported by investigators using a two- button choice 
technique (e .g . See Neyer.and Schvaneveldt, 1972) . It may be 
that the use of a voice key and verbal response is somehOl'T 
more "artificial II than the button pressing task . HOlTever, 
the use of a verbal response is useful in that it enables a 
more di rect comparison between the results of Exp . 2 . and those 
of Exp . 3. 
It must also be pointed out that there are a number of 
methodoloCicai and technical problems with this experiment . 
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These >Till be discussed more fully in the next section since 
Exp . 3. used a similar design and largely the same materials . 
Conclusions: 
This experiment provides evidence that contextual priming 
effects occur not only for simple associates but also for super-
ordinate and subordinate terms . This is interpreted as support 
for models of semantic memory "Thich stress the importance of 
categorization. 
Evidence also indicates that phonemic similarity is in-
sufficient to produce f acilitation without graphemic Similarity. 
The r elative s lowness of rejection of pseudowords is inter-
preted as reflecting either slolmess in computing an address 
in memory for pseudowords or failure to compute an address a t 
all (logogen model) rather than time taken in searching all 
possible memory locations . 
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Superordinate and subordinate cues in a pronunci&tion task : 
EKPERIHENT 3. 
Introduction: 
In Exp. 2. three results ,-rere discussed . Various semantic 
relations and associations presented as cues were shmm to facili-
tate \'Tord recognition. Phonemically similar but graphemically 
dissimilar words were found. not to produce any facilitation of 
Hord recognition . Pseudm-Tords uere found to take lone;er to 
be rejected than rea.l words "ere to be accepted . 
Each of these findines left at least one question unansl-1ered. 
In the case of semantic associates as cues the problem remained 
as to >Thich stage in the proposed model .. las influenced by the 
cue . Either an early encoding stage or the lexical memory 
retrieval stage or both these staGes could be affected. 
In the case of the phonemically similar cues the dual-
encoding model allows for the possibility of subuects recognizing 
.. lords directly from their graphemic representation in which 
case phonemic similarity betvTeen cue and test vlOrd ,-muld have 
no effect . Alternatively subjects could be usine; a phonemic 
code but no bias occurs for phonemic encoding without graphemic 
Similarity. 
It is unclear ~lhether the slowness of rejecting pseudo-
words is due to as exhaustive serial scan of lexical memory 
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or to slowness in computinu an address i n l exical memory . 
All these problems can be investigated usine a t ask >"There 
the subject s i mpl y has to pronounce the strings of letters 
r ather than deciding i f they form a real '\wrd or not . Accord-
ing to Heyer , Schvaneveldt and Ruddy (1974), the pronunciation 
task and the lexical decision t ask share a common grapheme-to-
phoneme staGe but that they differ in terms of the other pro-
cesses involved. In particular the lexical decision task 
necessi ta tes retrieval from lexical memory ,\'1her eas the pro-
nunciation t~sk is assumed not to need access to lexical memory . 
If one can find similar f acilita tion effects for semantic assoc-
iations in both tasks then it can be assumed t hat in both cases 
it is the grapheme- to- phoneme stage that i s being influenced 
and not any retrieval from lexical memory stage . 
The pr onunciation t ask explicitly demands that t he subject 
makes a grapheme- to- phoneme conversion therefore it is reasonable 
to expedt that any phonemic encoding bias as a result of phonemic 
similari ty 1-TOuld ShOyT up here , although as suggested in Exp . 2 . 
any bias may only resul t i f there is graphemic similarity as 
well . 
If one assumes that the hypothesized address computation 
di scussed above l ar gely consists of producing an internal gr a-
phemic and phonological representation of the letter string, 
then the address computa tion stage of the lexical decision task 
w"ill al so be present in the pronunciation t ask . ROliever , 
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since in the pronunciation task there is no need to access 
lexical memory any slowness in pronouncing pseudol'lords cannot 
be attributed to any search of items in lexical memory. 
Hethod : 
Eguipment: The equipment used in Exp . 3. was the same as used 
in Exp . 2 . A one channel taChistoscope, a voice key, and a 
millisecond sto -clock . 
I~terials: These were the same 60 pairs of Bnglish words and 
cues as used in Exp . 2 . divided into the same 5 groups of 12, 
according to the relationship between the cue and the test word . 
To recap these were: 
cue superordinate to test \'1ord . 
2 cue subordinate to test w·ord . 
3 cue simple associate of test word. 
4 cue phonemically similar but graphemically dissimilar to 
test liord . 
5 cue not associated to test word - also both graphemically 
and phonemically dissimilar 
12 of the airs of pseudo\'TOrds and cues used in Exp . 2 • 
.. Tere also included. 
Subjects: 10 undergraduates participated as subjects to fulfil 
a course requirement . They were from the same pool as the 
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subjects used i n J:!iXp . 2 . but none of the subjects i Ll Exp . 3. 
had participat ed in Exp . 2 . 
Procedure: s in Exp . 2 . the subject sat facing the t achisto-
scope and voice key lTi th a booklet containing the cue l'l'ords 
in front of him . After reading a cue l'Tord out loud the subject 
looked into the t achistoscope and the test l'l'ord/pseudo't'Tord 
was displayed . Simultaneously the clock was started . The 
subject was instructed to pronounce the letter strine as quickly 
as possible but to make sure that he used the "correct" pro-
nunciation . The subject ' s verbal response stopped the clock 
and terminated the display . Ten warm-up trials .-rere given. 
Each session lasted approximately 15 minutes . 
Results: flexible criterion of "correctness" was used . 
As long as the pronunciation conformed uith a possible appli-
cation of English phonological rules, the data wQ~included . 
In pr actice subjects had little trouble in pronouncing either 
the real words or the pSeUdOl'1Ords . 
The mean RTs for each condition are sholm in Figure 6 . 
The results of Exp . 2 . are also included for comparison . 
An analysis of variance l'1aS Carried out for the real .. Tord 
data . Analysis over subjects F(4 ~ 36) = 5. 6 p ~ 0 . 01 • Analysis 
over materials F(4 , 55) = 2.81 p< 0 . 05 . The quasi F ratio 
was not si gnificant min F' (4,90) = 1. 9 p ") 0 . 05 . 
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A comparison of each pair of real uord conditions are shown 
in Table 9. lrin F" is an extremely conservative statistic . 
Th fact that min FI is not significant while the analyses by 
subjects and by materials were significant can be interpreted 
as follOlfS: lhile lve l'Tould expect this result to replicate 
using different materials \lith the same subjects or the same 
materials with different subjects we cannot be sure the results 
could be replicated using both ne~T subjects and nelv materials . 
Relationship of cue to test word . 
Super-
ordinate 
sub-
ordinate 
ssociate Phonemically ~on-
Similar Associate 
Superordinate N.S. U. . 0. 05 0 . 05 
Subordinate N.S. 0 . 05 0 . 05 
Associate 0 . 01 0 . 05 
Phonemically 1 . S . 
Similar 
Non-
Associate 
Pair .. Tise Comparisons (NevlIilan-Keuls) • 
TABU: 9. 
PseudOlTords: A comparison of pseudowords uith the most comparable 
real vTord condi tion (non- associated pairs) shol'Ted that pseudo-
words mean RT was 144 msecs slower . This difference was in 
this direction for all 10 subjects (by sign test p = 0. 002 , 
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two-tailed test) . 
Comparison of pronunciation task ~rith lexical decision task: 
It is possible to compare the results from the pronunciation 
task l'Ti th the results from the lexical decision task . 
Comparing mean RT for real nords only, the pronunciation 
task 'l'TaS on the average 68 millisecs. faster . This difference 
occurred for 54 of the 60 real words (by sign test Z = 6 . 1 p ( 0.0001) . 
Comparing mean RTs for the 12 pseudol'Tords used in Exp . 3. 
1'lith their RTs for the le:;rica l decision task (Exp . 2. ) the 
pseudow·ords 'iere 17 millisecs . faster in the lexical decision 
task . Figure 7 ShOllS the mean RT for the 12 pseudoiYords in 
the pronunciation and the lexical decision tasks compared with 
the real '-lOrd control (non- associated pairs) . 
The interaction behTeen pseudo/real \"lords and type of task 
is significant F (1 , 44) = 7. 01 p ~ 0 . 025 , analysis by materials) . 
See figure 7 . 
Discussion: 
The most striking fact about the results from the pro-
nunciation task is that the pattern is so similar to the results 
from the lexical decision task (except for pseudoHords which 
will be discussed in detail belmT) . For real llOrds the same 
pattern of significant differences was _found but mean RT l'laS 
faster in the pronunciation task thnn in the lexical decision 
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task . r·ieyer et a le (1 974) have ar gued that the fact that the 
pronunciation t ask is faster than the lexical decision task 
supports the assumption that the pronunciation task involves 
one less s t age (i . e . lexical memory retrieval) . An alternati ve 
argument is that producin~ a pronunciation of a string of 
letters is a far more pr a ctis ed task than deci ding if the stri ng 
of letters is a ''lOrd or not . It may be the pr actice variable 
that leads to RT differences rather t han any difference in the 
number of stages involved . 
Semantic associates as cues: 
Exactly the same results viere found in this experiment for 
semantically associated cues as i n Exp . 2. Superordinate, 
subordinate and simple associate cues all produced s ignificant ly 
f aster pronuncia tion time compared to unassociated cues . 
Superordinate , subordinate and simple associa te pairs did not 
differ s i gnifi cantly from each other . These results conf irm 
the conclusions dr a,m i n Exp . 2 . concerning the pl ausibi lity 
of hierarchical structure as a principle of organiza tion of 
semantic memory, as suggested by Collins and ·tuill i an (1969) . 
It i s necessary to note that there are a number of exper-
iments vThich produce evidence that conflicts 1'Ti t h this notion 
of a f ormal hierarchical structure (e . g . Schaeffer and ~llace , 
1 970; Conrad, 1972; Landauer and r·leyer , 1972) . It is worth 
noting an alternative viay of describing these results proposed 
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by Herriot (1 974), (See also Craik and Lockhart, 1972) . Herriot 
prefers to discuss the processes involved in memory rather than 
the structure and the content . In particular he is concerned 
~'Tith the coding of input in terms of attributes. Thus a l'1ord 
uill be coded in terms of gr aphemic, phonemiC and semantic 
attributes . A vTOrd will presumably share some of the attributes 
by l'1hich it is coded I"Ti th its superordina tes and its subordinates. 
It is these shared attributes 1"Thich facilitate the coding process 
rather than some underlying structure of lexical memory . Such 
an approach makes it clearer why superordinate and subordinate 
terms are equally effective as cues . As discussed in Exp . 2. 
a superordinate has many subordinates to uhich it may be con-
nected in some kind of associative netvTOrk but a subordinate 
has far ferTer possible superordina tes. If the "activation" 
which produces facilita tion (assuming for the moment a spreading 
activation model) spreads over all possible connections and 
assuming there is only a limited "amount" of excitation to be 
spread around (possibly in some kind of probabilistic way as 
inKiss ' model, \1972) , then a superordinate concept should spread 
its excitation over a greater number of subordinate terms and 
thus be less effective as a cue than a subordinate l1hich '\'lill 
be connected to fewer concepts . HOl-leVer, according to the 
view that emphasises coding by attributes it is more reasonable 
to expect superordinates and subordinates to produce equal 
facilitation . If facilitation depends on the number of shared 
71 
attributes which are used in codine then these attributes-in-
common I'Till be the same, regardless of liThether the superordinate 
or the subordinate is the cue . 
similar explanation holds for the simple associates . 
Associated pairs tend to be words which share a number of common 
attributes . This , of course , only applies to paradigmatic 
associations and not to syntagmatic associations . HovTever , 
paradigmatic associations form the vast majority of free as-
sociations (see Deese, 1965; Clark, 1970) . 
Phonemic Similarity as a cue : 
As in Exp . 2 . phonemically similar but graphemically 
dissimilar cues did not produce any facilitation . In pro-
nouncing the string the subject was forced to code it phonemi-
cally uhere as in Exp . 2 . the subject may have been able to 
decide the string vTaS a llord without forming a phonemic rep-
resentation . Yet even in this present situation phonemic 
similarity alone does not facilitate pronunciation. Neither 
w'as there any evidence that graphemic dissimilarity caused 
any problems by biassing subjects to produce phonemically 
dissimilar representations . However , in English the corres-
pondence between graphemic and phonemic representations is not 
one- to- one . English is notorious for its disparity between 
spelling and pronunCiation . English speaking subjects may thus 
be flexible in their approach to pronouncing letter strings . 
72 
It may be that subjects who speak a languaee vTi th a closer 
correspondence behleen spellin~ and pronunci ation (e . &. Russ i an 
or Turkish) would be inhibited by honemic s i milarity and 
graphemic dissimilarity as !'leyer et al. (1 974) suggest . 
The results obtained by Heyer et al. (1 974) and this 
experiment can be des cribed in a similar ';ray to the coding-by-
attributes approach used in the discussion of semantically 
associated cues . In the case of graphemic similarity subjects 
are biassed to use the same attributes to code the t wo w·ords . 
For phonemic coding there is only a bias to use the same attri-
butes if the subject has previously detected graphemic similarity . 
Graphemic, Phonemic and Semantic Coding: 
fhat is the respective status of graphemic, phonemic and 
semantic coding? Graphemic coding is operating most closely 
with the stimulus as presented (the nominal stimulus in Herriot ' s 
terminology) . The attributes used for coding here are directly 
obtained from the stimulus itself . Facilitation due to gra-
phemic similarity may be due to acti vi ty in very "10';1 order" 
stimulus analysing mechanisms (see I ntroduction) . 
Phonemic coding is dependent upon the opera tion of phono-
logical conversion rules upon the graphemically coded represen-
tation. Presumably these conversion rules are stored in some 
memory store . If a phonological representation can be formed 
only through the use of these rules then facilitation through 
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phonemic similarity may occur by biassing the selection of rules 
as lIeyer et ale (1974) suggest. ~tn alternative explanation 
is discussed in detail in the next section, "lhich assumes that 
knowledge stored about the \,Tord may enable the production of 
a pronunciation independently of the rule system . 
Similarly semantic coding depends upon gaining access to 
information in a long-term store (lexical memory) . Herriot 
,.Tould object to the use of the term "store". He regards sem-
antic memory as a process not a structure . However, it seens 
necessary to assume that past information is retained somehow' . 
It is assumed here that the results of both the graphemic and 
phonemiC coding operations are capable of being used in the 
semantic codinc process . .fuich code will be used depends 
upon the task . If ~ne assumes a loeog~n-like device which 
receives information from the graphemic and phonemic coding 
systems and uses this information to decide whether a given 
"lOrd has occurred, then after one word has been accepted as 
having occurred for a time afterwards the logogen system will 
accept that a related word has occurred on the basis of less 
evidence. 
This vie1'1 is consistent ,·Ti th F·reyer et aI ' s . ( 1 974) finding 
that association effects "Tere larger for visually degraded words. 
Given a complete listing of the phySical features of th~ stimulus 
the decision making system can easily decide which 1-lord has 
occurred . The less physical description the system has avail-
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able the greater the relative importance of context. This 
last point is also relevant to the question of '\'Thy it is neces-
sary to hypothesize an evidence w'eighing mechanism at all . 
It could be argued that a graphemic or phonemic representation 
of a .. ,ord should be sufficient to say that it has occurred and 
to retrieve its meaning. HO'\'lever , in most normal 1'lOrd recog-
nit ion Situations , such as reading or listening to a discourse, 
it is probable that the sensory information available for ' con-
structing a coded representation is far from complete . Given 
that the sensory evidence is only fragmentary, deciding "Thich 
word has occurred will be a probability problem. Context , 
mediated by past experience, helps the system to make the "best 
bet" . Hechanisms like the logogen describe this interaction 
of evidence in lvord recognition (see also Horman , 1968) . An 
advantage of such a mechanism is that the process is speeded 
up since analysis of the potentially available information 
from the senses is reduced to a minimum . A disadvantage is 
that since the mechanism '\wrks probabilistically it .-Till some-
times make mistakes and decide that the .. Trong ylord has occurred. 
An account of such a model is given in more detail in the 
next section. 
Pseudowords: 
As in the lexical decision task responses the pseudowords 
lTere sloYTer than to real \-Tords . Since it is assumed that the 
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pronunciation task involves no lexical memory search it must be 
assumed that pseudovlOrds are slo'\'18r in some other stage, either 
in an encoding or a response stage or both. It is interesting 
to note the interaction betvTeen w-ord/pseudoword and lexical 
decision/pronunciation task . (See Fig. 7). One hypothesis 
to explain this interaction is to assume that there are two 
sources of difficulty for pseudowords in the pronunciation 
task but only one source in the lexical decision t ask . The 
coding difficulty is common to both tasks but the pronunciation 
task has an extra difficulty in the response stage. Even when 
coded internally the actual motor plan for pronouncing the pseudo-
word is completely unpractised and therefore slower . 
discussed more fully in the next section. 
General Discussio~: 
This is 
As mentioned in Exp . 2. there a number of methodological 
and technological problems in both Exp . 2 . and Exp. 3. The 
major problem is that of comparing the results of the groups 
of words in the experimental conditions with those of the words 
in the control condition (the unassociated pairs) and comparing 
experimental group among themselves . In this design comparing 
difficult conditions involves a Between-lords comparison . 
There is the danger that differences between conditions may 
have been confounded with differences between different groups 
of Hords . For instance in the pronunciation task different 
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1'Tords may have taken different times to act ivate the voice 
key. HOI'lever, these effects are likely to be small and fTill 
probabl y have averaged out over \fords . It is unlikely that 
any such effects would be important to the overall facilitation 
effect which appears to be quite r obust . They may , how'ever, 
affect results where the differences may be smaller , possibly 
i n the comparison of the effectiveness of different kinds of 
cues . E. g . a lthough freCluency '\tTas controlled for as far as 
possible there was a non-significant trend for superordinate 
lTords to be more freCluent than subordi nate i'lOrds. 
On the technical side it '\tTas felt that havi ng the subjects 
read the cues from the booklet was not ideal, in that the time 
of exposure to each cue '\tlas not subject to close control. 
This is unlikely to have affected the results seriously since 
all conditions \Tere subject to the same variations . 
It is necessar y to hear i n mind the problems di scussed 
above '-Then drawing any conclusions from Exps . 2 . and 3 . How--
ever, while encouraging caution it is unlikely that these 
problems invalidate the basic f i ndi ngs. 
Conclusions: 
It is concluded from this experiment that associative 
priming effects influence a stage common to both the lexical 
decision and the pronunciation tasks . It is argued that this 
stage involves coding of the stimulus and that information from 
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visual, acoustic and semantic sources interact in this stage . 
Phonemic similarity uithout €,Taphemic similarity did not pro-
duce facilitation of pronunciation . This confirms the finding 
of Exp . 2 . It is argued that pseudm'lOrds are difficult to 
process in both an encoding and a response stage . 
--
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A proposed model of word recof~ition: 
In this section a model is outlined \-lhich can describe 
most of the existing data on "TOrd recognition and pronunciation . 
It is essentially I-lOrton ' s logogen system but 1vi th an additional 
feature to explain the handlinu" of non-words and some other 
results nhich present problems for the logogen model as it stands 
at the moment . The emphasis here is on visual lvord recognition 
although auditory word recob?Uition is also considered. The 
model is portrayed in Figure 8 . 
The logogen system is concerned exclusively with recog-
nizing words . At the same time it can make use of all the 
available information and lmo>1ledge (essentially abstract and 
non-verbal) stored in semantic memory . Each '-lOrd is represented 
in the logogen system as three arrays of attributes . These 
arrays consist of semantic, graphemic and acoustic features . 
Each logogen thus represents its '-Tord by a unique combination 
of attributes . Each logogen monitors the input from the sensory 
system and counts the number of its attributes it detects in 
the stimulus. If the count exceeds some tl~eshold the form 
of either an articulatory plan uhich can become vocalized or 
covertly rehearsed, or the output can be input into the semantics 
system. Both options can of course occur together . 
Let us consider in more detail the 1forking of the logogen , 
in particular the interaction of attributes from the three 
different sources . First we shall consider visually presented 
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w'ords . Let us arbitraril y assume that each 10Gogen describes 
its 1'1ord i n terms of 30 attributes , 10 for each kind of attribute • 
• Ie al so assume f or the sake of are;w:nent that t he average number 
of features needed to exceed threshold and make the word avail-
able is 10 detected attributes . H i gh frequency tv-ords tv-ill 
need less detected attributes and lou frequency more . These 
10 attributes needed to exceed threshold can be from any com-
bination of the sources . A complete visual analysis of the 
input "rill produce 10 features and reach threshold. Al ter-
natively 6 features may come from visual analysis, 3 from 
semantic input (context) , and 1 from auditory analysi s . It 
is assumed tllat once threshold is reached all attributes rep-
resented i n the logogen are made potentially available . In 
the extreme example given above "There threshold 'l'TaS reached 
urely as a result of visual analysis once threshold was r eached 
all the semantic and acoustic a ttributes of the word uere 
automatically made avail able . lthough meani ng , pronunciation 
and spelling are all available , which re resentation is selected 
for further rocessing will depend on the t ask involved . For 
example, it is quite possible (probably normal) to be at'Tare 
of the meaning of a communication 'I'd thout being aHare of the 
actual "Tords used . J arvella (1971) has sho"m that subj ects 
"code discourse in terms of its meanin , r etaining the exact 
form of nords only in the sentence currently being coded . " 
(Herriot , 1974, p 73) . Similarly it is quite possible to 
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read a passaGe out loud \'Ii thout being a1"Tare of its meanine . 
Sources of input to the logogen. 
Semantic Attributes: Each logogen has an array of semantic 
attributes defining the meaning of its uord . In Fig . 8 sem-
antic attributes are pictured as being conta ined in the logogen 
system, separate from semantic memory . This separation is 
"l'rithout doubt artificial , since attributes defining ,words must 
be part of semantic memory . How"ever , it is convenient , for 
the moment, to dis tinguish \'1Ords as ~lords from l'I"ords as la. bels 
for abstract concepts . 
Input to the semantic attributes array of the logogen comes 
from the semantic system as a result of previous output from 
the logogen system into the semantic system . (The semantic 
system may uell make spontaneous output to the logogen system) . 
A given attribute will be shared by a number of different 10-
gogens . If one of these logogens makes available the semantic 
system its semantic attributes , the semantic system will "acti-
vate" the shared attribute in the other logogens . (1-!orton . ( 1 970 ) 
has explicitly stated that logogens are not directly connected 
with each other) . E. g. if the attribute FOOD "Tas made avail-
able as a result of one logogen reaching threshold all other 
logogens containing the attribute FOOD as one of their defining 
set would detect its occurrence via the semantic system and in-
crease their count of members of their set which have occurred. 
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The semantic system also feeds into the logogen system infor-
mation from non-verbal context . Presumably the attribute 
detectors only remain "activated" for a limited period of time . 
It is unclear at the moment \'Thether they are simply "on" or 
"off" or l'lhether they decay over time . 
Graphemic Attributes: Seymour (1973) says that "conversion 
of stimulus to a visual representation (Vi) is an obli~atory 
operation, which is perhaps analogous to the formation of an 
icon . It is less clear l.,hether a ccumulation of members of Vi 
by units in the logogen system is a l s o obligatory or whether 
it is an optional oper a tion uhich corresponds to the encoding 
of information in the icon , and permits the type of spatial 
selectivity uhich has been demonstra ted by Sperling and others" . 
It is assumed here that i n normal readin~ the visual represen-
tation of the stimulus actually used by the system (the func-
tional stimulus, in Herriot ' s terminology) is a far from complete 
representation . Visual attributes represented in the logogen ' s 
array of visual analysers may be fairly crude , e . g . first letter, 
l ength, overall shape etc . Recognition of a \'lord in context 
means that some of the semantic attributes of the logogen uill 
already have contributed to the count of features , so that de-
tection of some , rather than all, visua l a ttributes niH be 
sufficient for the logogen to reach threshold . Only i n situations 
uhere there is no context i~ a complete letter- by- letter analysis 
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likely to be necessary . 
Acoustic Attributes: The model presented here assumes that 
as soon as a functional visual representation has been formed 
grapheme-to-phoneme conversion rules can operate . (See e . g . 
Gibson , Pick, Osser and Hammond, 1902 ; Bradsha,., 1975) . The 
other reason is the considerable body of evidence (Rubenstein, 
Lewis and Rubenstein, 1971; Snodgrass and Jarvella, 1972; 
Stanners , Forba.ck and Headley, 1 971) ShOl<Tine that phonoloBical 
representations influence vlOrd recognition. Thus some infor-
mation concerninc the acoustic attributes of a letter string is 
available as input to the logogen system. 
Sometimes the phonemic conversion using the rules system 
,"rill provide sufficient information to produce a pronunciation 
of a ,;ord before that '"Tord ' s logogen has reached threshold . 
This is most likely to happen in the case of rare vTords with 
a high threshold, and .dll also of course occur for non-words 
."rhich have no representation in the logogen system . _ fun-
damental distinction is dravm here betueen a subject being able 
to pronounce a 1JOrd because he "knows" the w"ord and being able 
to compute its pronunciation by applying the rules of pronun-
ciation he has learned. 
Audi torily presented vTOrds: 
The operation of the logogen system is baSically the same 
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for auditorily presented sti muli as for visually presented 
stimuli . Each logogen i nspects the input from the auditory 
analys is to see if any of its defininG acoustic a ttributes are 
present . The effect of the context is throu~h activati ng 
semantic attributes in the logogen in exactly the same way as 
for visu~l s timuli . Once a loaogen reaches threshold as a 
result of semantic and acoustic input all of its at t ributes 
are made potentially available , including t he visua l attributes . 
Presumably eople possess rules uhich enable them to pro-
duce some kind of graphemic code from a phonemic coding of neli 
"Tords and pseudmlOrds . HOVTever, such a possibility is not 
included explicitly i n the model s ince it seems unlikely that 
such a conversion occurs in normal word recognition i ndependently 
of the loeogen system . 
Uord production: The viet·, of the logogen syster.'l taken here 
is that word production opera tes in fundamentally the same way 
as word recogni tion . The semantic system input s to the log-ogen 
system a number of semantic a ttributes and the logoeen with the 
corr esponding attributes in its defining s et reaches threshold , 
making ei ther the visual or a coustic attri butes or both avail-
able f or output depending on the task . 
Sentence product ion and comprehension : The model at present 
does not dea l in detail with sentences . It is as sumed t hat 
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semantic memory contains the rules for combining words accord-
ing to the grammar of the language (see Tulving ' s definition 
of semantic memory in the Introduction) . These rules lTill 
interact uith the inut to and output from the logogen system. 
No attempt is made here t o examine this interaction . 
Summary of the model: The logogen system functions as a three-
1yay interchange for different kinds of codings of "Tords . 
Given a semantic, acoustic or visual !,epresentation of a 1fOrd 
as input , a semantic, acoustic or visual representation may 
be output . Each logogen represents its ",ord by a unique com-
bination of semantic, acoustic and visual feature detectors . 
Zach kind of detector examines input from its own information 
source . The detectors i nteract so that if one set of detectors 
recognizes a number of its attri butes f rom i t s olm source, l ess 
information is needed from the other s ources for the l ogogen 
to reach threshold . 
The present model differs from Horton (1969 , 1970) by 
assuming that erapheme- to- phoneme rules can operate on the visual 
representation of a stimulus independent ly of the logogen system . 
The results of this conversion are available as i nput to the 
logogen system . 
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EXP:8HI I-lENT 4 
Experiment on Associative Priming effects: their time course, 
differences over kinds of associative and the effect of inter-
vening items . 
Introduction: 
In the model of 'VlOrd recognition proposed in the last 
section it ,'ras suggested that associative priming effects occur 
by activating semantic attribute detectors in some hypothetical 
evidence- w'eighing mechanism named a logogen (after Horton , 1969) . 
If a logogen reaches threshold (i . e . detects a sufficient number 
of its definin~ features) it makes available a full visual, 
acoustic or semantic description of its ~Tord . If the list of 
semantic attributes are input to the semantic system there is 
a feedback from the semantic system to the logogen system in the 
form of information about , .. hich semantic attributes have recently 
been used . These attributes are nov, "activated" in all logogens 
"Thich contain them as part of their defining set . The result 
of this activation is that these logogens will reach threshold 
on the basis of less information from other sources . This 
lO'VTered threshold appears as reduced recognition times . 
ActiVation of the feature detectors can only l ast for a 
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limited period of time . othervli s e as input to the semantic 
systera increases so vTil1 the acti va tion of detectors in the 
logogen system and logogens Vlill be reachine threshold although 
their words have not been presented. Horton (1 969) suggests 
that activation "Till rapidly decay and "Till have disappeared 
completely after one second. Heyer, Schvaneveldt and Ruddy 
(1972) have reported that associative priming effects do decay 
over time, being grea tes t vTi th a zero time interval betvleen 
words . How-ever, they report that there was still considerable 
facilitation after four seconds . I-lorton ' s figure of one second 
may still be correct for normal reading and listening situations 
where there is a continuous input . In the Ileyer et al. ex peri-
ment subjects may have been able to maintain excitation by some 
kind of rehearsal loop. The time intervals used by Heyer 
et al. w-ere 0, 1500, and 4000 msecs. It may be possible to 
clarify the situation by using other time intervals . In par-
ticular,a time interval between 0 and 500 msecs . may be long 
enough to demonstrate any decay of activation over time but 
be short enough to discourage any active rehearsal strategy. 
In Exp . 1 . tvlO models were proposed to explain the associative 
priming effects . These were the spreading activation model 
and the shifting location model . The model of lIord recognition 
put forward in the previous section is more consistent with the 
former model since the concept of activation of feature detectors 
is central to its vlorking . As yet, though, no evidence has 
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been presented vThich alloYls a choice to be made between the hlO 
models empirically . IJleyer et a1. (1972) M .ve tested the tiW 
models by separating bro associated words by an unassociated 
w'ord (e . g . BREAD- DOCTOR- BUI'TER) . According to the location 
shifting model the presence of the Ullassociated word alone 
should prevent any facilitation of the third \'lord by the first . 
On the other hand the spreading excitation model predicts that 
the unassociated i'lord YTill not prevent facilitation provided 
that the time interval betw'een the hw associated words is not 
too long . (See the Discussion of Exp . 1. for the rationale 
behind these predictions) . l'!eyer et a1. found that separating 
the associated 1wrds with an unassocia ted w'ord did not eliminate 
the associative priming effect. Thus the shifting location 
model can be rejected . 
One curious result reported by Heyer et al . (1972) was 
that inserting a non-iiord bet.veen the associated vTords (e . s . 
BRE~\D-SATH-BUTTER) completely eliminated any facilitation . 
They suggest that "such an effect indicates that processing 
a non- ,\,lOrd may lIreset" the memory system to a neutral state . tI 
It is hard to thiruc of any reason why this should be . It was 
proposed in this experiment to subject this finding to a severe 
test by separating associated words by two non- words . If there 
lias any evidence of priming effects in this situation then 
doubts must be cast on Meyer et aI ' s . finding. 
One clear prediction f rom the model proposed in the previous 
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section that is tested in the present experiment, is that facili-
tation of recognition of a nord w'ill be dependent on the number 
of attributes it shf\res with the priming Hord . The aruwnent 
here is restricted to shared semantic attributes . Synonyms 
should produce most facilitation since they have identical lists 
of attributes . 1 Next most effective should be antonyms since 
they differ from each other only on one feature . As sh01m in 
Exp . 2. and 3. subordinates are effective at producing facilitation . 
It is to be expected that subordinates ~Tould be less effective 
than synonyms and antonynls having relatively fewer attributes 
in common with their superordinates . The type of associates 
Underw'ood (1974) calls parallel associates (mainly coordinates, 
e . g . BRT:.' BUT'l'ER, A.ZIY- NAVY , but also such pairs as SPIDER-
iwB1 should also produce facilitation since they share a number 
of attributes . It is expected that they ~"l'ill be less effective 
than synonyms or antonyms . It is not easy to decide hou parallel 
associates vTill compare with superordinates since there ~Till be 
considerable item variation but on the average the number of 
shared attributes will be approximately the same for both kinds 
of aSSOCiations . 
The present approach has a number of similarities t'Tith the 
account of vTOrd associations given by Clark (1970), if it is 
1. 
This prediction is complicated by the fact that there are very 
felT "true" synonyms , in the sense of tt'lO vTords being completely 
interchangeable . AI thOUGh t110 'fOrds may have the same referent 
there are usually connotative or stylistic differences . 
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assumed that the processes underlyin,,: nor d association production 
overlaps to a l ar c;e extent 1'Ti t h the pri min.; effects . Clark 
fo11ol'lS Katz and Fodor (1 96~) by assw:ling t hat a "Tord can be 
represented by an ordered list of abstr act features that com-
letely characterize the "surface realization" . B.e. r iN 
could be represented as (+Noun , +Det __ , +Count, +Animate, 
+Human, + dult , +!·lale) . Clark states that free associations 
follow a "simplicity- of- production ll rule which can be sumnarized 
as IIperform the least change on the lowest feature 'tri th t he 
restriction that the result must correspond to an English 
uord ll • Clark describes rules to roduce associations which 
are tried in the order of "simplest first" . The first rule 
is named the "minimal contrast rule" uhich produces antonyms . 
The second and third rules are feature detection and addition 
rules uhich respectively produce superordinate and subordinate 
associations . Feature addition may also produce near- synonyms . 
Other rules include idiom-completion and selectional feature 
realization rules . It is not clear l'Thy exact synonyms are not 
given preference over the minimal contrast rule that produces 
antonyms since they require no feature Changes a t a l l . Clark 
seems to assume that the feature list must be changed. This 
is a difference between predictions from the word recognition 
model and Clark 's theory . Clark ' s theory, by assuming a feature 
must be changed predicts antonyms "Till be more probable associ ates 
than synonyms and by inference ,Till produce more f acilitation. 
--. -
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The proposed word recognition model assumes that the only factor 
will be the number of shared attributes and hence synonyms are 
predicted to produce more facilitation than antonyms . 
There are thus three aims for this experiment: 
To examine the effects on associative priminG effects of 
time intervals . 
2 To examine the effects of nomTOrds intervening between 
tno associated words . 
3 To investigate associative priming effects over different 
kinds of association . 
method: 
Egui pment : The experiment VTaS carried out using a GT40 display 
screen (DiBital Equipment Corporation) under on line control 
of a PDP 11/45 computer . The computer controlled display time 
and response- stimulus interval (RSI), measured reaction time 
and recor.dad subject I s responses . 
Naterials: Two groups of three lists were made up , the two 
groups conSisting of paired "All and IIBII forms . Each list 
contained 10 practice items and 94 test items . Four different 
kinds of associations were used . Each list contained four 
pairs of antonyms (e . g . BL CK- \rnITE) , four pairs of conceptual 
associates (subordinate- superordinate e . g . CAlif. . Y- BIRD) , four 
pairs of parallel associates (e . g . BREAD- BUTTER) and four pairs 
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of synonyms (e . g . TI JY-Ski1L) . r·:ost associa ted pairs "Tere 
dra1'm from the materia l s used by UndervTOod (1974) but some 
" ericanisms" Here replaced VTith items from ass ociation norms . 
(Pnlermo and Jenkins, 1964). 
There t·Tere t\-TO conditions of intervening items betHeen 
associated pairs: no intervening items and hTO intervening 
items . Half the pairs of ea ch kind of association folloued 
each other in the list and half the pairs "Tere separated by hlO 
non- w·ords • Also in each list .. Tere 16 non-associated '\'lords that 
lIere from the same pool as the associated words . Each ,.,ord 
in " " list that '''as paired l'n th an associate appeared in a "B" 
list .. d thout an associate; Similarly each word in "B" list 
that was paired with an associate a .)eared in an 11 " list l'1ithout 
an associate . This desien meant that each critical item (i . e . 
the second '-Tord in an associated pair) appeared in the lists 
an equal number of times pri med and unprimed . 
The remaining 46 items in each list vlere non- "Tords produced 
by chaneine one letter in AA words from the Thondike- Loree 
Frequency count , 80 that they no longer formed real Bnglish 
"TOrds but still conformed to English spelling and prom.mciation 
rules . 
Procedure : The subject sat facine the GT40 screen with one 
f i nger from each hand on a micro- switch. He uas instructed 
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that he l'Tould be presented In th strings of letters and he mus t 
decide as 1uickly as possible whether the string of letters was 
a real En lish word or not . If he decided it \'Fas a real word 
he ressed the right hand snitch, if he decided it was not real 
he pressed the left hand switGh . Subjects ' response terminated 
the display of the letter string l'Thich l'laS then follow'ed by a 
set interval before the next letter string VTas presented . If 
the subject did not respond the display l'Tas terminated automati-
cally after two seconds and the interval before the next item 
follovled . Each subject ren:eived three lists, either a ll "At! 
or all "B" from lists . Each list constituted one block and 
for each block there VTaS a different response- st:L1,ulus interval 
(Le . the time betl'Teen the subject pressing the button and the 
next item appearing) . These l~Is were 300, 1000 and 2000 
mse cs . Half the subjects received the lists and half the 
B lists . For the A and B lists subjects, lists RSls , and 
order of presentation VTere combined in a Graeco-IJati n Square 
as sholm in Table 10 . 
Thus each critical "\'lOrd appeared an equal number of times 
pri med and unprimed in each 81 condition and each order of 
presentation of blocks . 
Subjects Vlere instructed in vlhat order they would receive 
the different RSls . They erformed all 3 blocks i n one session 
ui th a tvTo-minute interval betueen blocks . 
approximately 25 minutes . 
Each session lasted 
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Order 1 Order 2 Order 3 
Group List 1/RSI List 3/RSI 3 List 2/RSI 2 
Group 2 Li st 2/RSI 3 List 1/RSI 2 List 3/RSI 
Group 3 List 3/RSI 2 List 2/RSI List 1/RSI 3 
Orders of Presentation of I·:aterials 
TABLE 10 . 
Sub,jects: 18 subjects ,vere used . They 'l'Tere all sychology 
undergraduates of Stirlin University partici ating as a course 
requirement . If one of them had partici ated in Exps . 1, 2. or 
3. 
Results and Discussion: 
The results presented here include only the results of 
critical items (second members of each associated pair) . The 
overall error rate for these items 'vas 2 . 970 . There 'VTere no 
significant differences in error rate between conditions. 
Only data from correct responses Has included in the analyses . 
Analyses of variance 'Tere carried out treatine both subjects 
and materials as random effects (see Clark , 1973). There vIaS 
a significant main effect com aring 0 intervening items versus 
2 intervening items (by subjects: F(1 , 17) = 10 .06 p ( 0 . 01; 
by materi als: F (1 , 94) = 4 .24 , p ( 0 . 05; 
min. F1 (1,96) = 2.98 , 0. 1) . See Figure 9. 
There 'Has al so a s ignificant main effect for primed versus 
" 
" . 
,,, 
, .. 
· "". f.Iean S.D. 
Primed: 0 intervening items 726 143.5 
. 
• • 
2 ' , , , 754 113.8 
Unprimed:O ' , , , 751 192.9 
2 ' , , , 761 139.3 .. 
!Ileana and standard deviations for Fig. 9. 
Nean S.D. 
, " 
Primed: 300ms . RSI 730 175.2 
'. 1000ms . RSI 733 141.8 
2000ms .RSI 710 114.3 
unpri.med: 300ms.RSI 732 110.7 
· lOOOms . RSI 76? 1~ .3 
2000ms. RSI 16.1 132.4-
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Means and s t andard rl eviations for Fig.lO. 
-" 
'''' 
RP in 
lirse cs. 
800 
775 
, 750 
725 
700 , 
IHl in 
I.Isecs. 
800 
775 
750 
725 
700 
0 lntervening items ~ 
2 intervening itens !:ll--< 
-a 
Primed Unprimed 
Mean RT for 0/2 i ntervening i tems conditions, 
primed and unprimed. 
Figure 9. 
300 msec . RSI 
1000 msec . IlSI D :I 
2000 mse c. ESI A 
'" 
Primed Unpr i med 
Hean Ill' for primed and unprimed conditions 
at each ESI with 0 i ntervel"ling i tens . 
Figure 10 . 
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unprimed items (by subjects F 1 , 17) = 11 . 06 p ( 0 . 01 ; 
by materials: F (1, 94) = b .63;1 
p < 0. 02 J min .li'
1 (1,80) = 4 . 1 4 p < O. 05 ) . 
See Fi gure 9 . 
There Tere no significant overall effects of response-
stimulus i nterval or ki nd of association . Only one i nter a ction 
approached sienificance and that was only Significant by subjects : 
kind of association x primed/unpri med x 0 /2 intervening items 
F (3 , 51) = 2 . 76, p (. 0 . 05 . 
Analysis of reaction time data presents a problem because 
of the non- normal distribution of the data . Typically reaction 
time data is skeued to the left . number 
of suggestions have been made by different experimenters for 
the analysis of reaction time data . In the present analysis 
a log transform nas carried out on the data in an attempt to 
normalize it . ~ alternative procedure is to use non-par a-
metric statistics and so avoid the problem of the non-normal 
distribution . Having established a significant priming effect 
with the analysis of variance a number of further non- arametric 
analyses of the data ~Tere carried out to examine diffepences 
between the different conditions . 
lUnalysis of the materials proved to be more amenable to 
correlational techniques . Correlations revealed a number of 
subtle relationships which l'lere not readily apparent in the 
results 'of the analysis of variance . 
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The effects of lenp;th of .i.SI - 0 interveninr; items . 
The mean Ts for the pri med and un rimed cond.itions at 
each RSI with intervenin;::: items are shown in <igure 10. 
The differences betlleen unprimed and primed "itT at each 
RSI are : 300 - 4 msecs , not sie;nificant; 1000 - 29 IQ.se cs, 
not sienificant, 2000 - 51 hlsecs, sign test over subjects, x=3 
p = 0 . 004 . 
Uone of these differences were siGnificant over materials . 
S 1·Till be seen later different items tended to produce different 
resul ts at different ,::>1s . 
A comparison can be made bet\Teen these results and those 
of I-!eyer , Schvaneveld t and uddy (1 972) • A facilitation score 
is used, which is obtained by subtrac ting the primed RT from 
the unpri med T. This s core can of course be negative as lTel1 
as positive . The comparison i .... sh01m in Figure 11. 
The results obtained in the present experiment do not shoH 
a significant difference betueen the three RSIs but the trend 
is clearly in the opposite direction t o that of Heyer et aI ' s . 
The reason for these different findings may lie in the nature 
of the materials used . Later analyses and discussion vrill 
shm·, that it is insufficient to describe the time course of 
excitation independently of the nature of the materials used . 
The effects of length of RSI - 2 intervening items: 
The mean RTs for the primed and unprimed conditions at 
' 1 • 
' . ' 
· .. 
" I 
., 
. . 
'. 
" 
" 
... 
. " 
• 
1 
" 
• 
Primed: 
Unprimed: 
Nean S.D. 
300ms.RSI 739 116.1 
1000ms.RSI 768 125.1 
2000ms.RSI 153 103.5 
3I)Oms . RSI 168 141.0 
1000ms.RSI 769 159.8 
2. ':" ::·:)rns . RSI 746 120.1 
Heans and standard deviations for Fig.'12. 
Facilitation 
in l.isecG. 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
o 
Heyer et al. G 
Shana-han . I'.:I-::I--~ 
o 300 1000 '1500 2000 
RSI i n 1.1secs. 
4000 
Rl' in 
r'"isecs. 
800 
775 
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725 
700 
Comparison of priming effects obtained by 
Heyer et al.(1972) and Shanahan (1 975 ). 
Figure 11. 
300 msec. RSI 0----0 
1000 l!lsec.HSI ~
2000 msec. RSI 6 A 
Primed Unprimed 
Mean Rr for primed and unprimed conditions 
at each HSI with 2 intervening i teEls . 
Figure 12. 
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each RSI with 2 intervening items are shown in Figure 12. 
Differences betvreen unprimed and primed RT at each RSI 
are: 300, 29 msecs, sign test over subjects x = 4, p = 0.015; 
1000, 1 msec, not significant; 2000, -7 msecs , not significant. 
Friedman ' s Comparing facilitation scores for each RSI 
df = 2 p ( 0 . 01 . 
Sign test pairwi se comparisons . 
300ms RSI v . 1000 ms 'I. x = 3 
300 ms RSI v . 2000 ms RSI. x = 4 
p = 0 . 004 
p = 0.015 
1000 ms RSI v . 2000 ms RSI not significant . 
At a short time interval between items (300 ms) even in-
serting two nomlOrds between t'l'IO associated words does not 
eliminate facilitation . This result gives further support 
to I'leyer at aI ' s rejection of' the shifting location model , but 
it contradicts these i nvestigator 's finding that intervening 
nom-lOrds eliminate facilitation. It is interesting to note 
that in two intervening item conditions the time between the 
t'l'TO associated nords is approximately 2 to 2t seconds, that is 
about the same as interval that produced greatest facilitation 
in the no intervening items condition. comparison of facil-
itation scores at 2000 ms RSI with no intervening items and 
300 ms RSI with 2 intervening nonwords reveals no significant 
difference . (by sub~ects - Sign test x = 7, p = 0 . 4). 
This suggests that time is the more i mportant variable than 
intervening items . 
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Differences in facilitation between kinds of associatiog: 
_ s stated above there ~TaS an indication of an inter:lction 
betvleen kind of association x primed/unprimed x 0 /2 intervening 
items. This interaction is depicted in lirure 13. For the 
sake of s i mplicity facilitation scores (unprimed T - primed 
T) have been lotted . 
Analysis of facilitation scores of each kind of associa tion 
with two i ntervening items r evealed no significant differences . 
The res t of this discussion \'Till concentra te on the results 
from t he no intervening items condition . 
Analys is of the different kinds of aSS OCia tions facilitation 
scores by Kruskal l - ITallis shoiied an overall significant dif-
ference (H = 7.4 d. f . = 3 p < 0 . 05 . ' .E. Only s i gnificant 
over materia ls, not over subjects) . The results of pairwise 
comparisons by I'lann- '[hi tney are shoim i n Table 11. 
Antonyms Conceptual Parallel Synonyms 
.d.ssociates ssociates 
Antonyms l~ . S • U.S. 0 . 01 
Conceptual 
Associates N. S. 0 . 025 
Parallel 
ssociates 1 • d . 
Sy,nonyms 
Pairwise Comparisons Hann - Whitney) 
TliBLffi 11 • 
.. 
, ; 
; 
" 
' . 
. ' 
.' 
. , 
fJ:iwec., r~ean S.D. lTnI2.:imed. Mean S.D. 
,-
• 
.. 
, 
o intervening 720 769 items:Antonyms 43.3 74.3 
. 
~i C . A. s 708 40.5 740 64.0 
P.A.s 728 67 . 5 762 44.7 
Synonyms 749 '5'5.6 743 37.7 
2 i.ntervening items: Antonyms 
I' 
737 65.6 739 42.7 
I 
C.A. s 7'53 47.1 746 40.0 
P.A . s 762 83.3 772 68 .5 
Synonyms 763 71.8 787 56.3 
I,leans and standard deviations for Fig.13. 
. . 
Facili tation 
in Msecs .~ 
45 , 
30 
15 
o 
-15 
Antonyms 
Conceptual associates 
Parall el associat es 
Synonyms 
o intervening 
items 
2 i ntervening 
items 
Priming effects for different ki nds 
of associations with 0 or 2 intervening 
items . 
Figure 13. 
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What are the implica tions of these results for the pre-
dictions me..e.e by the model of "lOrd recognition and Clark ' s 
theory of word associations? Consider each pair of possible 
comparisons . ~tonyts are predicted oy both models to produce 
more facilitation than conceptual associates . These results 
although not s i gnificant were in the predicted direction . 
The same is the case for antonyms and parallel associates . 
The critical test behreen the t rTO models is their predictions 
for antonyms and synonyms . The word recognition model predicts 
superiority f or synonyms and Clark predicts superiority for 
antonyms . The resuits clearly support Clark . This i mplies 
that the model ' s prediction based merely on number of shared 
attributes is too simple . However , it will be shown l a ter t hat 
the model can handle these results by including information about 
word freCluency in deriving the predictions . 
Conceptual and parallel associates are predicted by the 
word recognition model to be eClual which is supported by the 
data . Clark predicts a superiority for conceptual associates 
which is not borne out . The average difference between the 
two was only 1 msec . ) . Comparing synonyms vii th conce tual and 
parallel associates again the data su ports Clark . The word 
recognition model predicts greater facilitation for synonyms 
whereas Clark predicts less facilitation . 
Overal l then both theories do reasonably well at predicting 
the results of antonyms , conceptual associates and parallel 
associates . However Clark ' s theory is better able to handle 
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synonyms than the s i mple predictions from the word recognition 
model based only on number of shared attributes . 
Item differences: 
Clark (1973) has stressed the importance of including lan-
guage materials as a r~ndom and not a fixed effect in the cal-
culation of statistics . It was readily apparent in analysing 
these results t hat there rrere large differences betueen items 
in the facilitation scores they had for each RSI and at the 
same time there were differences within items over RSIs . 
In order to try to discover what were the factors deter-
mining these item differences a number of post-hoc analyses 
were carried out. Since the priming effects were much less 
reliable in the tvlO intervening item condition only words used 
in the no intervening item condition were included in these 
analyses . Four facilitation scores were used in these analysis . 
These vlere each i'Tords facilitation score for each RBI and a 
mean facilitation score for all RSls . 
Table 12 shows the intercorrelations between unprimed RT, 
primed RT and f acilitation. 
These results follow' the same pattern as the results of 
Experiment 1 on cued sentence verification . The most interesting 
finding is the positive correlation between unprimed RT and 
facilitation . Tha t is , items wi th a slOvT unprimed RT tend to 
have high facilitation scores and items \1ith fast unprimed 
RTs have small facilitation scores . 
Unprii...led itT 
Primed T 
Facilitution 
100 
Ull)rillled T 
-\:-)(--*) <. 0.001 
PriI1:ed _ T 
** +0.42 
SpeartJ.:m R:l.nk Correlations. 
T \..Bu, 12 . 
This is )resumably the result of ~ ceilin~ effect. 
Facilitation 
-*.:~* 
+0. 57 
-1(-,. 
-0 . 48 
£ho elsier 
an item is to reco nize unprimed the less "roon" there i3 for 
facilit3.tion • 
• s discussed in xp . 1 . one factor lvhich is lmoun to 
affect both associations and nord reco[;ni tion is the fre ... uency 
of occurrence of a lvord in the languae;e . 
The zrodel of .. TOrd recognition proposed here specifically 
includes fre uency as a factor in nord recognition. The relation-
ship bet Teen un ri ·led • T and facili ta tion nay arise beaause 
they are both related to word fre uency . Lo .. , frequency -lOrds 
have high thresholds in that they need to detect a large number 
of their attributes in order to accept that the ~vord as occurred. 
This leads to slo11 recognition time . "'n the other hand high 
frequency ~;ords llre accepted as h vine occurred on the basis 
of detectine el..ltively feu u ttributes . Thus activation of 
semantic attributes by !,resentine a related 1lord has more 
"roo!u" to facilitate a lOll frequency word uhich is far . from 
threshold before priroin",.: than a high freq,uency lTord Thich 
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is near threshold before priming . 
This hypothesis 'VTaS tested by correIa tine freCJ.uency 'l'Ti th 
unprimed RT and facilitation . Frequency nas measured by Thorndike-
Lorge, where two words tied ranking was determined by referring 
to the Thorndike count. Table 13 shows the correlations. 
Correlation of frequency and unprimed RT 
Correlation of fre uency and facilitation 
*H- p " 0 . 001 
Spearman Rank Correlation 
TABLE 13. 
**-* 
-0 .47 
+0.05 
The negative correlation between frequency and unprimed 
T is standard result . 
the RT and vice versa . 
The higher the fre~uency the faster 
However , there l'1aS no correlation at 
all beti-Teen frequency and facilitation. Thus there is no sup-
port at present for the hypothesis that words l'Ti t h sloi'1 RTs 
unprimed have high facilitation s cores because of a related 
word frequency variable. 
As mentioned earlier it was apparent that individual words ' 
facilitation scores varied considerably between the three RSIs . 
To see if any pattern could be identified the facilitation 
scores at each RSI f or the 48 items '-Tere correlated. See 
Table 14. 
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300 IUS itS I 1000 ms RSI 2000 IUS RSI 
**-x- ; ~.r,~ ~A~ 300 rus R'SI -0. 53 -0. 51 
1000 IUS RSI 0 
2000 rus RSI 
,~ x ..·~· P ~ 0 . 001 
Spearman Rank Correlations . 
TABLE 14. 
These correlations suggest that there may be several dif-
ferent groups of l'lords all receiving different amounts of facil-
itation at different intervals . The existence of different 
groups of words differing over SI may explain uhy no correlation 
was found between frequency and facilitation . Information may 
have been lost by averaging over all RSIs . To test this fre-
quency l'TaS correlated 1'li th f acili ta tions scores at each RSI . 
No s i gnificant correlations l'lere found . 
Facilitation is a complex interaction beh-een hTO 1'1ords 
as has been shown in the differences bet"Teen different kinds of 
associations . Since two "Tords are involved it may be inade-
quate to consider only the frequency of the second ,fOrd . 
ccordingly s ome analysi s is required which truces into account 
both the frequency of the pri ming word and the fre uency of the 
associated l'fOrd . 
In an effort to gain a clearer understanding of what r ole , 
if any, frequency pl ys in associative priming effects , the 48 
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pairs of words :Tere divided into those pairs 1'I'i th a high fre-
quency pri mer and hieh frequency associate , low primer and hi gh 
associate , high primer and lou associate , and 10 i[ primer and 
ImT associate. These "l'Tere then analyzed accordi ng to vThether 
the frequency of the primer and associate vTere the Same or 
different . .J:'ig . 14 shous the average facilitation for each 
kind of pair avera~ed over all 113Is . Figures 1 5, 16 and 17 
ShOiT the average facilitation for each kind of pair for each 
81. 
Over all RSls . (see Fig. 14) althou6h there is a tendency 
for same-frequency pairs to have a higher facilitation s core 
than different-frequency pairs the difference is not significant . 
The inter action is not s ignificant . For the 300 ms . RSl (see 
Fi g . 15) the difference betueen Same and different-frequency 
pairs is significant . (F(1,44) = 4 . 4 p < 0 . 05) . For the 
1000 ms and 2000 ms . RBIs (Figs . 16 and 17) there are no sig-
nificant effects although for 1000 ms RSI there is a tendency 
for different- frequency pairs to be superior to same-frequency 
pairs (F(1, 44) = 2. 5 p < 0. 1) . 
fuat can be concluded from t hese analyses? t the 2000 ms . 
RSI there is a large facilitation effect that is independent 
of the fre'lnency of the "\tlords in the associated pairs . At 
the 300 ms and 1000 ms Is facilitation is related to 1"lOrd 
frequency . 
two RSls . 
The nature of the relationship is reversed for the 
t 300 IDS RSl same- frequency pairs are superior 
I.lean S. D. 
Low frequency pr imer : low associate 31.1 73.2 
.. hi g h ' , 11.0 65.3 
Hi r,-h f requency primer: low ' , 25.1 50.2 
high ' , 34. 7 64.9 
, , 
" 
" 
Heans and standard deviations for Fi g. 14. 
, 
. j 
., 
": 
... 
I·lean S.D. 
Low frequency primer:: low associate 42.1 253.3 
hi6h ' , 
-134.5 218.0 
High frequency primer: 10\'1 ' , -1.8 189.8 
high ' , 76.3 167.1 
M~ans and standard deviations f or Fig.l? . 
... 
'. 
Facili tation 
i n Msecs. 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Facili t ation 
in 1,1sec8 . 
160 
120 
80 
40 
o 
-40 
-80 
-120 
0-0 Associate sa...:le frequenc:Jr a3 primer 
tJ.---g Associate differen!; frequencjr from primer 
Low f~'equency 
pri mer 
High frequency 
primer 
1',lean fadli tation for each kind of 
frequency pair averaged over a ll RBIs . 
Figure 14 . 
Associate same frequency as primer 
a---a Associate different frequency from primer 
LOVI frequency 
primer 
High fre quency 
primer 
Me a n faci l itation .I.or each kind of 
frequency pair at 300 msec.RSI. 
Figure 15. 
t, 
o " 
Nean S.D. 
Low frequenoy primer: low associate 7.1 211.3 
high ' , 138.3 222.6 
High frequency pri mer : 10\'1 ' , 169. 8 14.5 
high ' t 
- 41 .0 213 . 8 
J·1eans and standard deviations for Fig.16. 
I • 
I':ean S.D • 
.. . 
I • Low frequency primer: low associate 43.7 165 .2 
high associate 33.9 150.3 
High frequency primer: low associate 61.9 212.6 
high associate 61 . 5 210.8 
Means and standard deviations for Fi g.17. 
Facili t ati on 
in Msecs . 
160 
120 
80 
40 
o 
- 40 
- 80 
-120 
Facili tation 
in Msecs . 
160 
120 
80 
40 
o 
-40 
-80 
-120 
c>---o Associate same frequency as pri mer 
D--\'J Associate different frequency from primer 
Low frequency 
p r i me r 
Rig requency 
primer 
Mean facilitation f or each kind of 
frequency pair at 1000 msec . RSI . 
Figure 16. 
Associate s ame frequency as primer 
a---a Associate different frequency from primer 
Low frequency 
primer 
o 
H1gh frequency 
primer 
1.1ean facilitation for each kind of 
frequency pair at 2000 msec. RSI. 
Figure 11. 
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uhile at 1000 ms RSI. different-frequency pairs are superior . 1 
Figure 18 shows this relationship, collapsed over different 
kinds of same and different-frequency pairs. 
The interaction is significant ( (1,92) = 6 . 7, p ( 0 . 02) . 
The factors underlying this interaction can be made clear by 
dividing the data into pairs vdth a high fre uency associate . 
In Fig . 19 the interaction is significant (F(1 , 44) = 10. 69 
p < 0 . 01 ) . In Fig . 20 the interaction does not approach sig-
nificance . 
It seems that there is a difference between high and low 
frequency associates at RSls . of 1 sec . and less . Lm, fre-
quency associates appear to be relatively unaffected by either 
high or 10'1"1 frequency primers (except possibly 10l'1-1m., pairs -
average facilitation = 42 . 1 msecs) . I'Iost of the difference 
betvleen 300 and 1000 msec . R3Is can be attributed to pairs with 
a high frequency associate . 
It is assumed here that the processing of a 'Hord that 
results in facilitation effects will continue after the response 
that the letter string is a ,.,ord has been made . First consider 
airs llith both words of high frequency . After 300 msecs there 
is alar e facilitation effect . The pri 'ng v10rd is quickly 
processed and the results of this processing are rapidly made 
available to the 10gogen system . The activation of feature 
1. 
It is interesting to note that there is some suggestion that at 
300 rns RSI a 101'1 frequency "Tord priming a high frequency word 
actually "inhibits" recognition . 1 0 of the 1 2 words were slow'er 
primed than unprimed. (Sign test p = 0 . 038) . 
", 
.' 
, 
, 
.' 
.j 
.. ,
'. 
" . 
41 
" 
300ms . RSI: 
10OOms . RSI: 
Means 
. , 
Nean S.D. 
same frequency 59.3 210.5 
different frequency -68 .1 211.1 
s ame frequency -17.0 209.3 
different frequency 76.4 203.7 
and standard deviations for Fig.18. 
Facilit ati on 
in Msecs . 
80 
60 
40 
20 
o 
- 20 
- 40 
-60 
Primer and associate-same frequency 
Primer and associate-different frequency 
300 msec . 1000 msec. 
PSI. RBI. 
Pri mine; effects f or pairs of words 
of same or different frequency . 
Figure 18 . 
., 
.' r 
'" 
.• ) 
The means and standa.rd deviations for Figures 
19 and 20 can be obtained from the tables 
f acing Figures 15 and 16,following page 103. 
Facilitation 
in Asecs. 
160 
120 
80 
40 
o 
~-40 
-80 
-120 
Facili tat ion 
in Fsecs . 
160 
120 
80 
40 
o 
-40 
-80 
-120 
o----e.'I Primer-low frequency 
Primer-hi.3h frequency 
300 msec . 1000 msec . 
RSI. RSI. 
Mean facilitation for pairs of 
words with a high frequency associate. 
Figure 19. 
Primer-Iovi frequency 
Primer-high frequency 
300 msec. 1000 msec . 
RSI. RSI. 
1.1ean facilitation for pairs of 
words with a low frequency associate . 
Figure 20 . 
105 
detectors produced by this feedbacL dec3.Ys over time and <J. t 
1000 msecs . there is an absense of facilitation. It is in-
teresting to note that this decline of f acilita tion for high-
high fre-luency l)airs is of the same shape, although much more 
rapid, as the results found by I-leyer et al . (1 972) • If, as 
seems not implausible, I'.eyer used associated pairs with both 
members of high frequency, this may ex lain the apparent con-
tradiction between the t rw sots of findings . 
Consider nOvl pairs ud th a lou frequency primer and a high 
fre~uency associate . LOiv frequency lVords may take longer to 
process even after they have been recognized as "lords . This 
processing may still be carrying on 300 msecs. after the response 
and this may interfere vTi th the processing of the next word. 
Such an interference could account for the fact that high 
frequency .Tords appear to be inhibited when follouing closely 
behind a lou frequency word . (See footnote page 104). 
EOi'lever , it must be noted that 101'1 frequency associates follolVing 
lou associ ate primers do not shovT such an inhibition. It is 
possible that similarity of frequency per se may produce facil-
itation. Let us assume, in a manner similar t o Oldfield 
(1 966 ), that logogens are organized into ensembles on the 
basis of frequency. Some preprocessing stage determines 
the degree of a stimulus. Once the degree of familiarity 
is established the information is input into the appropriate 
ensemble of logogens . As already described in the model , 
threshold of a logogen is related to its frequency . 
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For a time after accessi nc an ensemble (possibl:T up to t second) 
it is easier to access the same logogen . 
'fuy should facilitation at 2 seconds RSI be independent of 
frequency? It is assumed that "There facilit ation occurs at 
300 and 1000 mse c. RSIs the processes are largely automatic 
and are an integral part of normal luneuage comprehension me chan-
isms . ~"i t h a 2 second interval betueen Vlords the subject can 
code and process the , .. ord comlJletel y , and mqy still have time 
to carry out some conscious operations leading to facilitation . 
Another problem is lihy 10'1'1 frequency associates should 
be largely i mpervious to associative priming effects at the 
shorter RSIs . This finding suggests that the predictions from 
both the word recognition model and Clark ' s theory of word 
associations are i nadequate if the only factor consi dered is 
shared features . Attributes-in-common may be a necessary 
condi tion for tuo l'Tords to be associated but it i s not a suf-
ficient condition . Frequency must be included as a factor . 
The word recognition model can easily account for frequency 
effects since it already incorporates frequency as a determinant 
of threshold . Jhen a '\'lOrd is processed by the semantic system 
it feeds back to the logogan system information about t he semantic 
attributes recently used. If we assume t wo logogens share an 
equal number of a ttributes ui th the "Tord just processed the 
one 1 .. ith the higher frequency will be closer to threshol d , i. e . 
more likely to be produced i n a 1'1ord associat ion s ituation or 
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,'Till be more f a cilitated in a llord recognition situation. 
These aSSlUllptions can also account for the superiority of 
antonyms to synonyms in the present experiment . It is poss i ble 
that in the comparison of synonyms and antonyms number of features-
in-common rTaS confounded rTi th frequency. If a rlOrd has an 
antonym of higher frequency than its synonyms, then the dif-
ference in the number of shared attributes may be outw'eighed 
by the difference in threshold . ior example, given the l'Tord 
KI NG the word HONARCH has the same list of s emantic attributes . 
However, the rlOrd 1U.cJ~lr has a similar, but not identical, list 
of semantic attributes and being of higher frequency than 
LONARCH is more likely to be given as an associate to KhIG. 
This roblem of robabili ty of a .iOrd being given as an associate 
and fre uency of the uord is fol101'Ted u in the next experiment. 
Conclusions: 
The conclusions of the present experiment are that time 
is a more important variable in associative primine effects 
than intervening items. At short time intervals (approximately 
1 second and less) facilitation is the result of automatic 
processes . These processes are closely involved vTi th the 
frequency of occurrence of the vlords used . t longer intervals 
facilitation is not dependent on frequency, possibly because 
the longer time interval allows the use of conscious strategies . 
Number of shared features also determine amount of facilitation . 
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It is suge;ested that this factor also interacts with l'Tord 
frequency. 
These results sUg{;est that a 'odel of .. TOrd recognition 
which includes fre~uency of occurrence as a variable is to be 
preferred to Clark ' s theory of nord associations \'lhich does 
not include frequency as a factor i n either "TOrd associations , 
or by inference in associative priming effects . 
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The relationship between Rated ssociation Value, Facilitation 
and Frequency. 
Introduction: 
The results of Experiment 4 suggest that associative priming 
effects (also possibly llord associations) are the result of an 
interaction betvleen number of shared semantic attributes and 
frequency of the associate . Let us borrow the "hydra.ulic 
analoeY lI of Broadbent (1967). Broadbent describes the analogy 
as follol-TS: "Let us suppose a vast array of test tubes f each 
partly full of water, and each corresponding to a l'lord in the 
language . The choice of one tube corresponds to perception 
of a nord, and the probability of choice of any tube is greater 
when the level of uater in it is higher . " The more frequent 
the word the higher the level of water in its test tube . The 
effect of detecting one of a l-Tord ' s defining set of attributes 
is to add a drop of vTater to its test tube . Thus according 
to the word recognition model the effect of recognizing one 'I'1Ord 
is that other words sharing some of its semantic attributes 
have the water level raised in their test tubes. The rise in 
the l'l'ater level lfill be dependent upon the number of shared 
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attributes . Thus the probability that the t es t tube of the 
word with most shared attributes will have the highest .. Tater 
level in the array is increased . HOllever, the t es t tubes 
all started t-1i th different lIater levels and so it is possible 
that some other l'fOrd although having feVTer shared attributes 
beinu more fre uent and consequently st¥ting ui th a hiGher w'ater 
level may still be higher than the v10rd 1'1i th most shared attri-
butes . 
The aim of this ' experiment \'las to gain further evidence 
for the lausibility of this two-factor theory of associative 
priming effects. By usine a task loTi th some similarity to 
normal word associations it I-las hoped to examine more closely 
the assumption made in EXp . 4 that the processes underlying word 
associations overlap to a laree extent .. nth the processes 
underlying associative priminG effects . The task used in the 
present experiment required subjects to r a te the probability of 
a given ''lord beine given as an associate to another '-ford . If 
there lvas considerable agreement betl'1een pairs of words rated 
association value and their facilitation scores in Ex . 4 then 
the assumption of overlap of processes uould be supported. 
ain predictions can be made for this experiment concerning 
different kinds of associations. The predictions from Clark ' s 
theory (1970) for rated association values are the same as for 
Exp. 4: 
Antonyms :> Conceptual Associates » Parallel ssociates 
') Synonyms . 
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The predictions for the word recoL~ition model are less 
clear cut since there i s the possibility of frequency outHeiehing 
number of shared attributes , but other things beine equal they are: 
Synonyms > Antonyms > Conceptual Associa tes 
~ Parallel ssocia tes . 
Hethod: 
r"aterials: The 48 pairs of associated words used in no inter-
vening items condition of Exp . 4. w"ere used. There liere 1 2 
pairs of antonyms , 12 conceptual associ ates , 12 parallel assoc-
i ates and 12 synonyms . Use of these materi als unfortunately 
precludes varying ki nd of association and frequency independently 
but they do enable a comparison betueen ".A.V. and facilitation 
scores . 
Subjects: 20 postgraduates and lecturers in the Depart ment of 
Psycholo y of the University of Stirling acted as subjects . 
elatively "S0 histicated" subjects liere used to facilitate 
understandinG of the instructions . 
Instructions: Subjects Here asked to make an estimate of the 
probabili ty that the second liord of a pair -vTOuld be given as 
an associate to the first lvord in a free association test . 
Subjects were told to give a r ating of 7 to pairs lihere t hey 
t hought the first word woul d a l ways elicit t he second ana a 
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rating of 1 to pairs 'ihere they thought the 1 st liord would 
never elicit the second . 
Results: For each pair of ,lOrds their rated association value 
was calculated as a ercentage of their total possible score . 
The degree of agreement betvleen subjects in their ratinG was 
calculated by Kendall ' s Ooefficient of Concordance. 
I = 0 . 64 2 X = 597 . 9 d .. f. = 47 p <' 0 . 001 
There is a highly significant correlation between subjects 
indicating the reliability of the results . 
The mean rated association value for each kind of association 
is shO'lm in Figure 21 . 
Analysis showed an overall Significant difference between 
the kinds 0 associations . (F(3 , 33) = 26 p ~ 0.001). 
PairvTise comparisons by Newman- Keuls are shmm in Table 14. 
Antonyms Parallel Conceptual Synonyms 
Assocs . Assocs . 
Antonyms 0.05 0 . 01 0 . 01 
Parallel 
Assocs . 0 . 01 0 . 01 
Conceptual 
Assocs . H. . . 
Synonyms 
Pairllise Comparisons (Nevrman-Keuls) 
TillL.t..i 14· • 
." . 
" 
." 
, I 
", 
.1, 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
• 
.. , 
., 
gean S .D • 
Antonyms 90.3 8 .7 
C.A. s 53.4 8 .1 
P. A. s 79.7 18.1 
Synonyms 56.1 11.2 
I,leans and s tandard deviations for Fig. 21 . 
f·lean S.D. 
Low frequency primer: low associate 60.5 16.3 
high ' , 61.9 10.7 
High frequency pri.mer : low ' t 67 .3 23 .0 
high ' , 90.3 10.5 
Means and standard deviations for Fig .22. 
Percentage 
RAV. 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
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10 
Percent age 
RAV . 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Antonyms Parallel Conceptual Synonyms 
Associates Associates 
Mean rated association value f or 
each kind of association. 
Low frequency 
primer 
Figure 21. 
High frequency associate 
Low frequency associate 
High frequency 
primer 
Uean rated association value accordi ng 
to frequency of primer and associate . 
Fi gure 22 . 
11 ..) 
..l.l1J. overd.ll f .cili b. ti0J.. 0001':;;8 i 1 X... is +).39 L (.0 . 01 ) . 
_ted \.sbocia tioll V cllue a.1 
.8 i Exp . 4 . the ..... 1. scores vlere also analysed 3.ccord-
in..; to -hether the priller 'ma the as ... ociute '\'Tere of hiCh 0 low 
fre u ncy of occurrence . The me"l.n • .• v' . I:;core3 for e .ch lind 
of air are shOim in _ 'igure 22 . There is u si~nific nt difference 
bet een hieh frequency as~ociatot an 101 frequency associ tes: 
F(1,44) :: 7 .1 4 , .i)< 0 . 01 . 
The e i3 a si.., ific.l11t difference behTeen high fre ~uency 
rime s an 10 T fre'luency !)ri~er",: F(1, 44) = 14 . 99 :) « () . 01. 
The interaction between fre.uency of !l imer aml f e~u ncy 
of associate is also si~nificant: F(1 , 44) = 5 . 22 p ~O . )5 . 
Freouency of association: 
s mention6 above there is somE:) confoun in"" of freCJ.uenc 
and kin of association . Table 15 shovlS tha mepn fre uency 
of l)ri er n as",ociate for each kind of air-. 
The frequency of the -rimers in each kin of association 
are s ienificantly different (Kruskall-.allis H :: 13 . 2 d~f . 
:: 3 p <. o. ~1 • 
The freg,uency of the associates are also signific3.ntly 
lifferent (Kruskall- l llis :: 7 . 9, d. • f . :: 3 p ( o. 05 ) . 
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Antonyms Conceptual 
ssociates 
Parallel Synonyms 
Primer 
Associate 
1526 
1573 
325 
336 
ssociates 
740 
642 
I·lean frequency per 4-t million words 
(Lorge Count) . 
TABLE 15 . 
226 
1125 
This means it is possible that the differences between 
kinds of associations on R. l .V. scores are due to frequency 
effects or conversely that frequency effects are due to dif-
ferent kinds of associations . 
It is still possible to examine the effects of frequency 
by correlating R . . V . scores with frequency scores within each 
kind of association , thus holding kind of association constant . 
Table 16 shows R. A.V. scores correlated .. lith frequency of both 
primer and associate for each kind of association. 
Correlation of • • V. scores over all kinds of associations 
with frequency of primer r = +0 . 43 p <. 0 . 01 
s 
Correlation of ._ .V. scores over all kinds of association 
rlith frequency of associate r = 0 . 31 p ( 0 . 05 . 
s 
Frequency 
Primer 
IJ..ssociate 
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_wtonyms Conceptual Parallel 
Associates IJ..ssociates 
'k -x· .;~ 0. 6 -0. 52 0. 57 
* 0. 39 0 . 52 - 0. 18 
or. p < 0 . 05 . 
S earman Rank Correlations of Rated 
ssociation Value and Frequency . 
Tlli1:8 16. 
Synonyms 
0. 06 
+0 . 35 
The confounding of kind of association and frequency: 
s has been noted it is not clear vThether the differences 
shown in Figurel1 are caused by the kinds of associations or 
the differences in frequency . In an att empt to disentangle 
these variables a scattergram (see Figure 23) vTas plotted, 
plotting ranked • • V. scores aeainst the r anked sum of the 
frequency of both words for each air . The correlation be-
tween these variables (Spearman ' s r ) = +0.502 , P ~ O.01. 
s 
A line of unit s lope vTaS dr a\in through the origin. 
It was argued t hat if there 1Tere no differences betvTeen kinds 
of associations scores on • • V. then for any given kind of 
association there should be an equal number of points lying 
above and belovT t he lines . Table 17 shovTs the number of 
points f or each kind of association lying above the line. 
Thi s distribution does not differ significantly from 
chance . There i s however some evidence of a trend in the data . 
Since this test is r ather vTeak another method of analys is "las 
" 
.. 
.. 
, I 
. , . 
•• 
.. 
. '
.. ~. 
'0 
.. 
. 
. 
.. 
Nean S.D. 
Antonyms 27.5 2 .7 
C.A.s 20 . 6 6.1 
P.A.s 26.6 6.4 
Synonyms 20 . 9 6 .0 
Neans and standard deviations fo:t' Fig.24. 
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Figure 23 . 
Antonyms Parallel Conceptual 
Associates 
Synonyms 
Associates 
Mean RAV flog sum frequency for each 
ki nd of ass ociation. 
Fi gure 24 . 
used . 
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Antonyms Parallel 
. ssoci9.tes 
8 8 
T .illLE 17. 
Conceptual 
Associates 
6 
Synonyms 
2 
An alternative method of trying to see if there are dif-
ferences between kinds of associations inde endent of frequency 
is to use a "correction for frequency" . This lias achieved 
by dividing each •• • V. score by the log of the sum of the 
fre uency of both words (the distribution of frequency is 106-
arithmic) • 
The result of this correction is a score whi ch has a high 
correlation with R. A.V. (r = + 0. 76 p <. 0 . 01) but no correlation 
s 
"lith frequency (r = - 0. 08) . 
s 
.i! igure 24 shmis the mean corrected R. • V. scores for each 
kind of association. analysis of ~ariance produced a sig-
nificant effect of kind of association. (F (3 , 44) = 5 . 1 4, p <. 0 . 01) • 
Table 18 ShOl'TS the results of pairwise comparisons by 
Newma.n- Keuls . 
The most notable difference betueen Table 18 and Table 
14 is that in Table 18 Antonyms do not differ Significantly 
from parallel associates, 'Thereas they do differ in Table 14. 
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Antonyms Parallel Conceptual Synonyms 
Assoes . .i.ssoes . 
Antonyms II . S. 0 . 05 0 . 05 
Parallel 
Assocs . 0 . 05 0 . 05 
Conceptual 
ssocs . II . 3 . 
Synonyms . 
Significance levels of pairvlise comparisons . 
(Nelmtan-Keuls) • 
TABLE 18. 
Discussion: 
Associative P-1.'iming :Sffects and ~Tord Associations: 
The significant correlation between R.A.V. and facilitation 
supports the assumption that association processes and associative 
priming effects share some underlyin~ mechanisms . Uhile the 
R.A .V. technique may not necessarily produce exactly the same 
results as collecting association data in the usual way , it is 
assumed th~t the results obtained are sufficiently similar 
to make the comparisons valid . Both vlord associations and 
associative priming effects are assumed to be by-products of 
normal processes of word recognition and language use . 
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Kind of .\.ssociation and i!'re'luency: 
These findings have shom1 that R . .. TT . , like facilitation , 
is dependent on both kind of association and frequency of the 
'fOrds in the pairs . It has become a?parent in the analysis 
of these results tho.t any model of "Tord recognition and associ-
ations must include both ki nd of association and word freluency 
as f actors . Cl ark (1 970) is correct in tryinG to relate \Tord 
associations to no rmal speech processes but such a feature-
based model is inade uate if it i gnores frequency as a variable . 
As can be seen from Figure 22 associated airs \'lith both 
words of high frequency differ dramatically f rom the other three 
kinds of pairs , 'l'Thich have rela ti vely similar scores . Not 
only do members of these hi gh fre uency pairs share many attributes 
but they tend to form common idioms . An i diom is assumed here 
to be a phrase of bTO or three w·ords "Thich occurs frequently 
in the languaee . The \"lords may or may not be connected by a 
function word such as ' and ' (e . g . BL CY- llHrr3 , LOV~-HATB , GIVB-
T;~ , B_ AD- BUTTLR) . Cl ark does i nclude an idiom completion 
rule in his list of rules for association production but its 
priority relative to the other rules i s uncertain . It is 
difficult to decide whether pairs such as LOVE- HATB are products 
of the minimal contrast rule or the idiom completion rule . 
It is i n the nature of language use in the real lTorld t hat idioms 
tend to be contrastive i n nature (e . g . LOST- FOU1rD ) or reflect 
objects that naturally occur together (e .g . LOme- KEY ) . These 
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pairs are consistent with both a feature-chanee rule and the 
i diom-completion rule . (Of course , there are some pair s e . g . 
COTTAGE- CHEESE that are only consis tent with the idiom-completion 
rule) . Generally speaking synonyms and subordinate-super-
ordinate pairs do not frequently occur in idioms . One approach 
to this finding is to assume tha t if a word frequently occurs 
in an idiom then membership of this idiom >vill be included i n 
its defining set of semantic attributes . So far the model of 
word recognition has made no assumption about ordering of attri-
butes. ( ~ cf . Clark ' s theory 1'lhich is based on ordered lists of 
features) . It may be that attributes are ordered i n terms of 
l evel of saliency , i . e . some attributes carry more wei eht in 
that they contribute more to the logogen reaching threshold than 
other attributes . Thus the attribute "IS A NOUN" may contribute 
li ttle to the count of detected attributes lvhereas "FRE!i.UEl TLY 
OCCURS UITII BREADII may contri bute great ly . Possibly the saliency 
of an attribute is inversel y rel ated to the number of logogens 
sharing that attribute . It may also be the case that the 
semantic system feeds back into the logogen system information 
about the last word processed in the order of the YTord ' s most 
sal ient attributes first . Attributes concerning membership 
of idioms are likely to be highly salient and this information 
is likely to be the f i rst feedback to the logogen system from 
the semantic system. This is consistent Id th the finding i n 
Exp 4 . that the pairs with both ",ords of high frequency (Le . the 
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idioms) showed a high degree of facilitation at the short interval 
(300 ms . ) . It is reasonable that a mecbanisr.:l should exist for 
rapid feedback of information about idiom wembers}up since in 
normal language use the words in idioms "lQuld follow each other 
almost immediately . Conversely in normal speech if after 1 
second the idiom has not been completed it is probable that the 
,"lOrd is not being used in its idiomatic context . After 1 second 
idioms tended to be inhibited rather than facilitated (see 
Exp . 4 , Fig . 19) . As mentioned in Exp . 4, after a 2 second 
interval other strategies may operate independently of the nora 
mal word recognition processes . 
vlliat about word pairs that do not form idioms? The assum-
ption of the word recognition model that number of shared attri-
butes will be the dominant variable (if frequency is controlled) 
seems to be over- simple . In particular there is some indication 
that antonyms are still rated higher than Similar frequency 
synonyms even after idiomatic pairs have been removed . No 
firm conclusions can be draim since the number of pairs suitable 
for comparison is very' small . But antonyms such as DIRTY-
CLE f are still rated higher than similar frequency synonym 
pairs such as STARVED-HUNGRY. 
Deese (1965).points out that most frequent adjectives tend 
to form pairs defining some dimension . As such the definition 
of an adjective is very closely related to that of its opposite 
and information about its antonym is likely to be more s~lient 
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than information about Hords of similar me:inin..; . r:L'he Sane is 
true for nouns that can be represented a.s polar op}osites. 
It is interesting to note in Table 16 that for conceptual 
associates frequency of the instance is negatively correlated 
'I'Ti th R. ti . V • This SU3ests that cate~ory membership is a more 
salient attribute for lovl fre uency 1I'ords than for hiCh fre-
quency . It is more important to be able to classify a rare 
word (e . g . ! nINo:J) 1'J'hich may have fel'T stored attributes than 
to classify a COD1Iaon \rord (e .g . C. ~) which has niany stored 
attributes . As Collins and ~illian (1969) have sta~ed it is 
possible to gain much more information than may be available 
from the instance alone by classifyin~ it . 
Conclusions: 
The present experiment suge;ests that liord associations 
and associative rinin..; effects share the same underlyinc processes 
and that these processes are ,{lart of normal \'lOrd reco[;ni tion 
and language use. Zxps . 4 and 41. indicate that the following 
may be a plausible account of word association production and 
associative priming effects: 
fuen a "'ord is recognized (i. e • its logogen reaches thres-
hold) the logogen system makes available to the semantic system 
the attributes that characterize the word . Attributes are 
made available according to their saliency-attributes with a 
high information content being made available first . The 
semantic system feeds back to the loeogen system information 
" 
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about the most salient attribute '-Thich activates this attribute 
detector in loc;oe-ens contail'line it as part of their defining 
set. If this feedback is sufficient to cause a logo~en to 
reach threshold then this word is produced as an associate . 
It is this part of the process vThich i3 influenced by frequency 
of occurrence . High frequency words are more likely to reach 
threshold as a result of the first input of feedback . If no 
logogen has reached threshold after the first feedback , information 
about the less salient attributes is input to the logogen system 
until a logogen reaches threshold . 
,,-
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EXP}.JRI J, E lrr 5 
Context and Ambiguity . 
Introduction: 
Ambiguity has long held an important place in the study 
of the psychology of language, dating back to Huep~ings Jackson 
in the last century . The maj or problem is that although am-
bigui. ty is very frequent in the :;;nglish language ue are rarely 
troubled by it. 
Ambiguity in a language can arise from a number of sources . 
One source can be called lexical ambiguity . This arises from 
the fact that many English words have more than one meaning and 
vl'e may be uncertain which one is intended . E. g . "He has lost 
his bat." Hhich meaning of "bat" the l"is'teneJ:' assigns may 
depend on i'Thether "he" refers to a zoo- keeper or a cricketer . 
Another source of ambiguity may be ca lled phrase structure 
ambigui ty . In this case we are uncertain vThat phrase structure 
fits a particular sentence . E. g. "They are visiting sailors" . 
It is not possible to decide if it is the sailors who a re doing 
the visiting or whether they are being visited. :fuich meaning 
is intended will depend on some wider context . 
Another source of ambiguity may not be resolved by either 
knowing the meaning of the lexical items or knowing the appropriate 
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phrase structure . This can be called, after Chomsky, deep 
structure ambicuity . E. g. "The shootin~ of the hunters llas 
terrible . " This sentence has only one phrase structure but 
two deep structures. _.\.gain which one we assien .. Till depend 
on .. That we kno .. , of the conte.'l:t i n vThich the sentenc ~ occurs . 
The present experiment deals only with the first kind of 
ambiguity , that is , ambiguity due to lfords having more than one 
meaning. Huch of the previous work on ambiguity has been con-
cerned l'li th ambiguity arising from other sources but whatever 
the source a problem common to all is l.,hether only one meaning 
or all possible meanings of a word or sentence are computed . 
One of the important functions of the 1-Tord recognition 
model proposed earlier is to integrate information from differ-
ent sources so that the correct word in any situation is per-
ceived . Each logogen defines its words by semantic, graphemic 
and acoustic feature lists . Different ,verds may have lists 
in common . TvTo words may have the same meaning, i.e . have 
similar semantic feature lists (e . g . TIHY- SKALL) . Two words 
may have identical acoustic features (e . g. SEA- SEE) . In this 
experiment we are concerned with words that have identical 
graphemic and acoustic features but have different semantic 
feature lists (e . g . BAl , £ILE, SOLuetcJ 
Before considering how the .. ,ord recognition model decides 
which is the intended meanin of an ambiguous word let us f i rst 
examine the previous approaches to ambiguity . 
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One of thu earliest approaches uas by L!lshley (1951) 11ho 
roposei a hy othesis uhich h'ls since been c ... lleJ. th, G3.rden 
Path Hypothesis. Lashley too~ as evidence sentences of the 
sort ". apid / r1.jti ~ / l'Tith his uninju.ced hand saved froll loss 
the contents of his capsizel canoe. II L."l.shleJ arbueJ tlLt 
peo le rocess only one Be nine at a time so that if one meqning 
'oeco es ina :Jro ri 'e 1e haVE: to the.11 ,.) 'OCCSS the other ueanj.n..;. 
o that uhen the first interpretation of / r jti ~ / is seen 
to be uronu uhen the 'VTord lIC psi~ed" is heard thE' listener has 
to 80 b~cl to the beeinnins and r )rocoss the sentence in the 
Ii ~ht OI the ne T llleanin..,. In this theory conte <t deterLlines 
which me nill"; of an ambi...,uous \Tord ue access, or if no conte t 
is available e choose the meaning lith the hi ..... her a )riori 
probabilit occurrence . lihile this vieu is consistent 1'1i th 
our intros..?ections th:it we r only auare of one me nine, as 
I .ck'.3.Y 1 )70) oints out this does not e clude the l)ossibili ty 
that 11 me ninea are accessed at so e Gubconscious level . 
HackaY (1970) presents a model Thich he calls the ::Jxbaustive 
.!.his model conflicts uith the Gar en 
Path HYpothesis by assUhlinc that all possible ueanings of an 
a bieu.ous item are COl puted t an early st (5t; of 'rocessinG lni 
at some later .,oint a single re't ling is selected for '-l L tention. 
L.ackay has also state' a strol1v er version of this hypothesis 
uhich he calls the :t eree tual • Ul) ression Theory . This theory 
ro)oses that all :De ninss of an ambie,uou3 i tE:: are llrocessed. 
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in parallel at an unconscious level. In order to perceive 
one meaning the other meanings must be suppressed. 'J.'he time 
for suppression depends on the a priori likelihood of the sup-
pressed meaning, independent of context . Context does have 
an effect hm1ever, by strengthenine tho activation of the appro-
priate meanine . Hackay quotes evidence from ambiguous visual 
figures (e . g . the Necker cube), physiological evidence for sup-
pression (Mountcastle, 1961) and extensive experimental evidence. 
In summary the Garden Path I~pothesis suggests that context 
and a priori probability determine which ~ of the possible 
meanings vTil1 be accessed . The Exhaustive Computation H ypo-
thesis and the Perceptual Suppression Theory suggest that all 
possible meanings are dccessed at an early stage and only later 
does context and a priori probability combine to determine l .. hich 
meaning 'I'lill be selected. 
The evidence for these theories is itself ambiguous . 
Evidence for the Garden Path HYpothesis has been found by Carey, 
Behler and Bever , ( 1970), Foss, Bever and Silver (1968) , Foss 
and Jenkins (1 973) and Foss (1970) . ~Yidence supporting t he 
Exhausti ve Computation ~pothesis has been produced by Fodor, 
Ga~"ett and Bever (1968), Lackner and Garrett (1973), Mackay 
(1966 , 1970) and Conrad (1974). I shall return later to possible 
reasons for these contradictory results . 
A related problem w"as r aised by Hiller (1970) . The problem 
he posed is "Can we shol'l that there exists a subjective lexicon 
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which is an isolable sUb-system i n memory? The subjective 
lexicon refers to our intrinsic lcnovrledge of the meanings of 
words. It is a set of concepts 1fhich have been acquired and 
refineQ. over a relatively lone period of time; a set of dic-
tionary entries iihich define words, specify their selection 
restrictions and perhaps provide information about their possible 
syntactic roles." (l<Tom Conrad, 1974 p 130) . 
Hiller is suggesting the existence of a "lexical look-up 
process 1IJhich is not influenced by context." This is a similar 
position to the Exl~ustive Computation Hypothesis and the Per-
ceptual Suppression Iwdel . It implies that all meanings of a 
i'1Ord will be accessed in the lexicon . Conrad (1974) found 
evidence consistent ",ith this assumption . 
The 1vord recognition model assumes that the input to all 
logogens will be the same . vlords with hw meanings will be 
represented by tw'o different log-ogens. These logo gens VIill 
have identical graphemic and acoustic feature lists but different 
semantic feature lists. Given a sensory input which logogen 
reaches threshold first will depend on both the level of the 
threshold determined by fre uency of occurrence and the activation 
of semantic fea ture detectors by the context/semantic system . 
In the absence of any context the more frequent logogen will 
reach threshold first. The less frequent logogen may reach 
threshold first if a sufficient munber of its semantic features 
have been activated by prior context . In assuming some level 
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af accessine; of all possible neanings the tlOrd recoenition model 
is related to the Lxhausiive Computation I- odel and the Fer-
ceptual Suppression Theory . Houever, the IOGogen system is 
not identical with liller ' s subjective lexicon. Hiller ' s lexicon 
operates completely independently of context. In the word reco3-
ni tion model "Thile input to the loeogen system is inde endent of 
context the output is explicitly affected by context . 
The present experiment is an attempt to test these different 
models . The experiment uses a task where a sub j ect -uses a "lOrd 
'vi th one meaning and then has to process either (A) the same 
meaning of the same word, (B) a different meaninB of the same 
uord, or (C) a completely different '·Tord . 
can be derived for each model . 
Different predictions 
It is assumed here that repetition of a "fOrd leads to a 
decrease in its recognition time (e . 6' . Bertelson (1 961) has 
sho\ffi that RTs to a repeated s i gnal are shorte·r than to ' nell ' 
signals) . Accordine to the Garden Path Hypothesi s if sufficient 
context is provided to indicate l'lhich eaning of a word is 
i ntended then only that particular meaning vTill be accessed . 
RTs '-Till be shortened if the same meaning of the item is tested. 
Since di fferent meanines have not been accessed they should be 
treated as completely nell items . 
Path By othesis is: 
( B = C. 
The prediction for the Garden 
The simpl est assumption of the uxhaustive Computation 
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lfudel is that all meanings will be accessed anJ will result 
i n e ual facilitation for either meanin5 . The prediction for 
the Exhaustive Com utat ion Iwdel (the sarne as Hiller I S isolable 
subjective lexicon model) is: 
A = B ~ C. 
The word recognition model is more specific than the .uX-
haustive Computation I!odel. Facilitation occurs throu~h activ-
ation of feature detectors in the logogen . The logogen re-
resenting the meaning of the lord used Ifill have graphemic, 
acoustic and semantic fe tt~es activated. The losogen represen-
ting the mea.ninG not used will only have graphemic and acoustic 
features activated . This im lies that although both meanin s 
will be facilitated relative to the control condition the meaning 
actually used will be more facilitated than the meaning not 
used . The prediction is: 
A < B ~ C 
The perceptual Suppression Theory althouch assuming that 
all meanings Ifill be accessed makes the further assumption that 
non-selected meanings ,.,ill be sup ressed . This suegests that 
rocessin . non- riIiled meanings will take Ion er than control 
words . The prediction is: 
~ C <' B 
r:ethod: 
Haterials: 60 nouns vlith a fre uency of at least 50 er million 
uere selected from the Thorndike- Lorge Count . 1.11 the words 
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had at least tvlO distinct meanings (e . g . PARTY , POKE, BAT) . 
'rhe words vIere combined with a Clualifier to indicate one of the 
meanings of the word (e . g . IROn POKER , POLITICAL PARTY) . These 
60 phra.ses formed the "priming phrases" . 
60 other hlo-word phrases vTere formed for the test phrases . 
Half the phrases consisted of a noun vTi th an a cceptable qualifier 
(e . g . ELECTRIC IRON) and half consisted of a noWl vli t h an Wl-
accept able qualifier (e . g . SA.F:I ~ CLOUD). 
Each priming phrase .vas paired vTi th a test phrase to produce 
the follow'ing conditions . (+ = a cceptable test phrase, - = 
unacceptable test phrase) . 
A+ Test phrase used same noun i'li th same meaning as priming 
phr ase . The qualifier i n t he t est phr ase was not an 
associate of the qualifier in the pri minG' phrase (N=10) . 
B+ Test phrase used same noun vTi th a di fferent meaninG' 
from the priming phrase . (N = 10) . 
C+ Test phrase used completely different noun from priming 
AB-
phrase . (N :: 10) . 
Test phrase used same noun as pri mine phrase . Since 
the qualifiers in the tes t phrase i'fere not acce table 
qualifiers of either meaning of the noun this condition 
balances the design for both A+ and B+. (N = 20). 
C- Test phrase used different noun from primine phrase 
(N = 10) . 
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Examples of each conJ.itiol1 are tsiven in Table 19 . 
Priming Phrase Test Phrase 
A+ SOCH.L CLUB YOUTH CLUB Same eaning } B+ LOU REi 0 T TTEH PORT Different I:eanina ~cceptable 
C+ LEfui""'Y T , DIRTY j' Different Uoun 
-"" 
COUnCIL RATES sqU Same Noun } Tro t C- LAST \lJ:LL GENEJ'tOUS PL._IN Different noun Acceptable 
Examples of bach Condition . 
TJoB 19 . 
Subjects: 16 psychology undergraduates of Stirling University 
participated in the ex eriment to fulfil a course re uirement . 
Procedure: The subject sat facing a tachistoscope . On the 
table in front of the subject \las a sheet of paper l·Ti th the 
60 priming phrases printed on it . ~ch trial consisted of two 
parts - a priming phrase an a tent phrase . In the priming 
part of the trial the subject was instructed to read a cue phrase 
and write a sentence using this hrase. 
In the test part of the trial the paired phrase was presented 
to the subject on the tachistoscope. The subject pressed a 
button ui th his right hand if he thought the phrase .fas an accept-
able combination of w·ords and a left hand button if he thOUGht 
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the combination 1ias not acceptable . The subject I s response 
terminated t he display and stol)ped a millisecond stop- clock 
which beBan timing from the start of the di splay . 'i ccept-
ability lias defined f or the subject as excluiine; any metaph-
orical or poe tic use of the ''lOrds . 
Each subject received 6 pr a ctice trial s f ollolTed by the 60 
test trials. Order of presentation 1'Tas random . Each session 
l as ted approxi nately 40 minutes . 
;Equipm~: 'rhe equipment used in this experiment lvaS the same 
as t hat used in Exp . 1. The materials lere di splayed on the 
"mousetrap" t achistoscope . 
The phrase was typed on cards . The phrase is concealed in the 
tachistoscope by a shutter . lilien L presses the "startll button 
the shutter is lowered displaying the pbnase to S. Si multaneously 
a millisecond stop- clock is started . .1hen S responds by press-
ing one of tw'o buttons the shutter i s raised and the clock is 
stopped. 
Resul t s : For each subject there "Tas a uri tten record of hm, he 
had i nterpreted each primi ng phrase . This enabled a check to 
be made to ensure that the subject had interpreted the phrase 
in the 'IITay intended by the Experimenter . Out of a total of 960 
trials a difference of interpretation occurred on only 3 trials . 
Data from these trials ",ere not included in the anal ysis . 
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For the test trials the !lean error rate uas 8 . 5, . Data 
from correct responses only \-.'ere u.sed in the anal ysis . One 
item intended as an acceptable cOlJlbination uas responded to as 
an lllacceptable combination by 66, of t he subjects . Data 
from t his item uas excluded from the analysis • 
. ean RT for each condition is sho1m in .i!'iGUl'e 25 . 
Analysis of "acceptable" phrases : 
v . B v . C. ( eaction times) . 
By subjects F( 2 , 30) = 8 . 2 P ~ 0 . 01 
By materials F(2 , 26) = 4 . 34 p < 0 . 05 . 
,lin F1 (2,49) = 2 .84 P <. 0 . 1 . 
(n . B. I·;.in F1 is an underestimate of F1 • Computation of 
1 F "Tould require ca lculation of missing data . Some 
estimate of hon conserva tive !-lin F1 is can be obta ined 
1 by ca lcula ting Ha.x F • 
Hax F1 (2,49) = 3. 3 p <, 0 . 05 ~ 
Pairuise comparisons are sho~m in Table 21 • 
. + B+ C+ 
A+ 0 . 01 0 . 05 
B+ N.S. 
c+ 
Pair1,Tise CompariSOns (lfewman- Keuls) • 
T U3LE 20 . 
Hean S.D. 1; error 
A+ 116'5 338 .1 10 
B+ 1306 378.7 13.7 
c+ 1279 303.3 7 
AB- 1310 94.0 3 
c- 1431 119.9 10 
Heans ,standard rleviations and % errors 
for Fig.2'5. 
Rr in 
Msecs. 
1500 
1400 
1300 
1200 
1100 
Acceptable 
Not acceptable 
Mean Rr and percentage error 
for each condition. 
Figure 25 . 
Errors . 
15% 
7t% 
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· v . B v. C errors) • d£ = 2 p ~ 0 . 05 . 
~on-acceptable phrases: 
AB- v . c- . AB- (same 1I0rd re ea te d) ~'Tas on tho average 
69 msecs . faster t han C- different 1'I'ord) t = 1 .86 df = 17 
p ~ 0 . 05 (one-tailed test) . 
Discussion: 
The results from the acceptablo phrases support the Garden 
p. bX hypothesis, in that A ( B = C. This suggests that only 
one meanin5 of an item is accessed . ~s noted in the intro-
duction there is a considerable body of evidence w'hich supports 
the alternative models and it is therefore necessary to consider 
possible reasons for so many contradictory results . 
One reason is suggest~d by Garrett (1970) . Garrett points 
out that tasks where the ambiguity is relevant during testing 
tend to support the E.,"{haustive Computation I·iodel and the Per-
ceptual u pression Theory, whereas tasks in which the ambiguity 
only becomes relevant later tend to support the Garden Path 
Hypothesis . In the present experiment the ambiBUi t y of a ,'lord 
only became relevant in the testing phrase after the priming 
phrase . This experiment is thus to be grou ed uith those 
experiments which support the Garden Path BY othesis . 
The predictions for the present experiment by the lTord 
recogni tion model ,iere based on making the simplest of assumptions 
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about the model. If some more complex assumptions are made 
then this model is capable of accounting for both sets of con-
tradictory findings . 
Inasmuch as different meanings of an ambiguous ~TOrd have , 
by defi nition , identical physical representations then at some 
low level of sensory processing they must be treated identically . 
It is t he resul t s of some operations (feature extraction?) on 
this sensory representati on that is made available to the logogen 
system . The logogen system is the meeting place of different 
forms of coding . ive are interested here in how one of hTO 
(maybe more) possible meanings are assigned to an,ambiguous 
sensory representation. The hra different meanings are rep-
resented by two different logogens . ,Fe shall assume for the 
moment that the two meanings are equiprobable and therefore the 
logogens have the same t hreshold value . \;e shall not distinguish 
gTaphemic and phonemic codes , preferring to contrast sensory 
codes wit h semant ic codes . 
Given an i nput of graphemic/phonemic attributes "Thich belong 
to more t han one meani ng (e . g . BAT) the acoustic and graphemic 
attr ibute detectors of both logogens are activated . Which one 
reaches threshold f i rst (i. e . the meaning assigned) wil l depend 
on how many of t heir defi ni ng sets of semantic attribut es have 
been activat ed via t he cont ext syst em. E. g . f or t he i'Tord BAT 
in CRI CKET BAT some of the semantic attribute detectors will 
have been activated by CRICKET for one meaning but not f or the 
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other . Thus both meanings are given a graphemic/acoustic code 
but only one meaning is given a semantic code . 
By assuming different time spans for the different codes 
one can account for Garrett ' s observation that testing for effects 
of ambi~uity during processing s11pports the accessing all mean-
ings hypothesis and testing after )rocessing supports the access-
ing one meaninc; hypothesis. Baddeley (1968 , 1972) produced 
evidence sho'trTine that acoustic coding is important in short 
term memory and that semantic coding is important in lone term 
memory . 'lhile there is some evidence against this generalization 
(e •• Uickens, 1972 , ; Schulman, 1972) it is consistent uith 
the commonsense vieu that the prime function of language is 
the communication of meaninG. It is necessarY_.Yo retain some 
physical representation of a sentence while the meaning is en-
coded . Once the meaning is encoded the exact physical form 
of the sentence is largely irrelevant and may be allow·ed to 
decay cf Eartlat."t, 1932) . 
It is assumed here that for ambiguous vTords one of the 
meanings is encoded graphemically , acoustically and semantically 
while the other only encoded ~raphemically and acoustically . 
If one test s for ambiguity after presentation both logogens are 
activated to some extent . However , the activity in the logogen 
whose graphemic/acoustic features alone are activated ~uickly 
decays , so tllat the logogen which has pr oduced a semantic rep-
resentation is the only one still active if the testing is later . 
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Let us coopare the present experiment uith the recent 
eXIleriwent of Conrad (1974) vThich produced evidence of access-
inG all ~eanings . 
In Conrad ' s experiment subjects listened to a sentence 
Hhich they had to hold in memory Hhile they named tht. colour 
of a following ,'lord . r.I.'he sentences cont'l.ined an ambieuous 
word and one meaning of the word uas indicated. L . g . Till; GIRL 
l<'OU'I1) A HICKEL. The vTOrd uhich folloned was either an approp-
riate or an inappropriate cateGory of the ambiguous 'Tord . (For 
the exam Ie above: rIOlffiY or I ETlli) . Conrad found a s i gnifi cant 
interference on the colour- naminG task for both the appropriate 
and inappro riate category names . 
\fuy should Conrad ' s results differ from the present ex-
periment? In the present experiment in both the priming and 
test phrases the selection of one meaninG of the ~TOrd uas im-
portant . In the priming phrase one meaning is selected and 
a semantic representation is formed . The non-selected me~ng 
is only represented by an acoustic/graphemic code which has 
decayed by the time of testing. In Conrad ' s experiment the 
meaninG of the nord is not essential to the memory task and 
the sentence may only be represented acoustically and not seD~-
tical ly . As stated above in normal lan~age use semantic 
representations are usually retained not acoustic/STaphernic 
representations but the choice of code is to some extent w1der 
the control of the subject and the choice of strategy may depend 
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on the t ask . This point is made by Herriot (1974, p 172) 
" ••• while speakers and lis teners have to construct messages 
from meanine and me~ning from messaGes , memorizers do not neces-
sarily have to do so . They may use non- meaningful forms of 
coding to memorize, indica tine; that vThile the cO:lllIllunica ti ve 
function of language has an effect, this effect can be regulated 
by conscious control . strateGies . " 
Since Conrad required verbatilll r ecall of the sentences 
her subjects may well have opted for a non- meaningful form of 
coding . Such a coding would not distinguish bet"l'leen the two 
meanings , thus both logogens would be activated to some extent . 
Since , however , the interference of the colour- naming of cate-
gories does imply some involvement of meanine , it seems necessary 
to assume t hat although neither meaning is given a complete 
semantic representation the non- semantic codes are still capable 
of activating some semantic attributes albeit at some subconscious 
level. 
This account offers a description of what happens in sen-
tences such as Lashley ' s . Only one meaning of /ra jti?/ reaches 
threshold and i s used by the context/semantic system. The 
semantic representation used as information which is fed back 
to the logogen system and thus the meaning first selected will 
have an influence on subsequent words in the sentence . The 
meanings assigned to other uords in the sentence may be in-
appropriate as "ell as the obviously ambiguous word. Uhell 
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the \lord IIcapsi7.ed" is reached the 11 tern'1tiYG I!leanin'" of /r"'.jt:i Q/ 
J 
reaches threshold and has an effect on the assiGned I'leanines 
of the other ''lOrds , causinG the appropriate meanings to reo.ch 
threshold . The exact mechanism DluSt be very complex since the 
semantic representation of the sentence as a uhole is completely 
'::I.ltered . The 1fay in uhich the neanine;s of individual l10rds are 
combined to form complex seJLantic structures i s not et clear . 
(see for example Branford and ~TankS , 1971; Bransford and 
Johnson , 1973). 
I·~uch of tne present discussion has assumed t hat the dif-
ferent meanines of an ambi~ous 1ford are equiprobable. This 
is clearly not the case (cf. Kausler and lollasch, 1970) . 
One meaninG' of a \Tord tends to be more common than the others . 
Hoeaboam and Perfetti (1 975) have commented t hat t he rel ationship 
bet"Teen the primary anti secondary me.'lninB's must be considered 
in any model of ambiguity resolution . (see also Imckay , 1968) . 
The vTord reco8'lli tion model a1101'ls for the fact that there 'l'Till 
be a bias tmTards the more common meanins- since the threshold 
of its logogen will be lower, but the present experi!'1ent made 
no systematic examination of the effects of dominance of meanin~ . 
Primary and secondary meanings were assiL~ed at random to con-
ditions . By poolin.., results over pri mary and secondary meanings 
some va luable i nformation may have been lost . The next ex-
periment was designed to specifically investiGate the effects 
of primary versus secondary r:leanings in a controlled manner . 
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Conclusions· 
The results of thi3 experiI lent aPl)ear to sup~ort 11 model 
that aosuwes only one Il.e::l.nine; of an ambiGUOUS 1-/ord is accessed. 
Houever , it is arGued that sucl. .1 concl usiun reflects i ~ene!'a.l 
confusion as to '"lhC:l.t is me .tnt by "accessing" . huch of this 
confusion can be avoided by considerine instead hOlT a ",ord I:lay 
be represented internally . word can be coded as a set of 
GTaphemic, acoustic or semantic features . ~ach ty e of code 
has its O\,ffi function . Ambiguous 1-lords are represented by the 
same a coustic/graphemic features but by different semantic 
features . 
In normal language use each code has a typical life span . 
The graphemic code is usually very short , possibly less than t 
second (iconic memory?) . The acoustic code has a life span 
of approximately 2 seconds (STh? ) but bas the possibility of 
being retained by articulatory rehearsal . The semantic code 
has a virtually unlimited time span (LTM?) . 
The effects of ambiguity ,'lill depend on hOly the different 
meanings are coded at the time of testing. Testing for a short 
time after resentation both loeogens ' acoustic/eraphe~ic 
attributes will be active leading to the conclusion reached by 
those experiments that found evidence of access of all meanings . 
Testing after 8. loncer interval only the meaning which has been 
£~ven a full semantic representation will be activo leadine to 
the conclusion that only one meaning has been accessed . 
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If cou.ine by acoustic features is more useful for the task 
and a strate.';:.y is ado:pted to maint ain this code then evidence 
for accessinG all mealrin~s may be found even after a longer 
interval. This is because such a code will be common to both 
meanings . 
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EXPERHENT 6 
Context, Ambiguity and Frequency of meaning . 
Introduction: 
In Exp . 5. it WaS found that subjects ' were quicker to 
respond to an ambiguous vlord if it ,vaS used in the same sense 
as they had previously used it. If the meaning of the '\'rord 
WaS chane-ed response times ·vTere the same as those for completely 
new vlords . This finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
that only one meaning of an ambiguous word is accessed at any 
one time . However, Garrett (1970) has pointed out that such 
evidence is found in experiments where the effect of ambiguity 
is examined after processing. If the effect of ambieuity is 
examined during processing then evidence is found for access 
of ~ll meanings of ambiguous words . 
It was aregued in Exp . 5. that these time effects can be 
attributed to different forms of codin~ of the stimulus and that 
these forms of coding can be identified to a limited extent 
with the s t ructural notions of short and lone term memory . 
The problem in pr ocessi ng ambiguous words may lie in the de-
coding from an acoustic/graphemic code into a semantic code . 
Testing during decoding may i ndicate difficulty with ambiguous 
words but once coded semantically no difficulty may be found . 
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A similar point has been made by Boeaboam and Perfetti (1975, 
P 272) . " ••• contrasting the various models in the disambiguation 
process in effect may be setting up stra~.,r men . The models that 
have been discussed may be best conceptualized as characterizations 
that mi~ht apply to anyone, or more, of several levels . " 
1'Ven alloifin5 for this possibility it must b.!::. noted th:3.t 
the conclusions from many experiments (including xp . 5. ) are 
of limited value because they employed no systematic control 
of bias for the different meanings . The discussion in Ex • 
5 . assumed that the different llieanin s of an ambi mous lIord 
lTere equiprobable in thei r occurrence but thi s is clearly not 
the case (see Kausler and Kollasch, 1970; ~erfetti, Lindsey 
and Carson, 1971) . One meaning is usually dominant over the 
others . Ho "aboam and ... erfetti (op . cit . ). arguo that ny <lodel 
of ambiguity resolution must allOvT for the possibility that 
there may be differences bet Teen tho pri~'y and secondary 
meanings of an ambie;uous \'Tord . ~p . 5. is subject to the same 
criticism that Hogaboam and erfetti make about the experiment 
of Conr'd (1974) . In the change of ~eanine condition the 
primine: phrase may involve the primary sense (S1) and the test 
)hrase may involve the 3econdary sense (S2) or vice versa . 
There may be differences between the tlYO cases (S1 ..... S2 ' S2-' 81 ) • 
. ;~veraging over both cases may obscure any interaction. It 
is also possi ble that there may be di fferences in the same 
meanin conditions betlleen (S1 -+ 31 ) and (S2 ..... S2) ' 
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The present experiwent .-TaS desiened to investi{S'ate the 
priming effects of different/same meanings for both the primary 
and secondary senses of an ambiguous word . The task used 
was a sentence comprehension task (see Haviland and Clark , 1974) . 
Pairs of sentences were presented for comprehension consecutively . 
An ambiguous \Yord could appear in both sentences vTi th the same 
meaning (SM,re condition) , in both sentences with different 
mednines (DIFFERENT condition) or only in the second sentence 
(COriTROL condition) . This desi~ was repented for both the 
priT":l.ry A.nd the secondary meaning of the word . 
-Ie can non consider the predictions for the models discussed 
in f'..xp . 5. '1'hese predictions refer only to conrrehension times 
for the second sentence in each pair . Table 21 sun~arizes 
the predictions for each model . The first tuo Rodels are the 
simplest. It is unlil~ely tha.t anyone '1Ould seriously- propose 
these models but they are included as representin.; the extreme 
positions . 
1. The carden ath hypothesis stated in its rost baaic form 
is that only the meanin indicated by the context will be accessed . 
The redictions are the same as in Exp . 5 . and are the Bame for 
both primary and secondary meanings . 
2 . The Simplest version of the exhaustive computation hypo-
t hesi s is that all meanings are 4ccessed in parallel and only 
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and only at s ome later stage does context determine l'1hich 
meaning i s selected. The predictions are aeain the same as 
Exp . 5. and t he same for both primary and secondary laeanings. 
3 . Hogaboam and Perfetti (o;'J . cit.) des cribe an ordered search 
model l'1hich they clai m is the most arsi lllonious description 
of their results . In this model t he pri mary meaning i s aluays 
accessed first and then tested against context . If this meaning 
is inappropriate the secondary meaning is then accessed . As 
Hogaboam and Perfetti admit their results are also consistent 
with a model such as the loe-ogen model which assumes arallel 
processing of both meanings but faster processing of the pri mary 
meaning . '.Phe ordered search model assuming the primary meaning 
is always accessed predicts that use of the secondary meaning 
in the first sentence will facilitate access of the primary 
meaninG in the second but that use of the primary meaning in 
the first sentence vrill not facilitate a ccess of the secondary 
meaning. 
4. The logogen model assumes that in the absence of context 
the primary meaning ldll reach threshold first . However, some-
times given sufficient context indicating the secondary meaning 
this meaning will teach threshold first . On the other hand , 
if the context in the first sentence indicates the pri mary meaning 
it is extremely unlikely that the secondary meaning \'Till ever 
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reach threshold first . Thus ()1 ~ 32 ) uill never produce 
facilitation but (S2 .... 1) sometimes nill but less often thnn 
(S1 ...... S1 ) . 'fhere is thus an asaymetry between the primary and 
secondary meanin s . 
5 . I· ackay ' s perceptual su ression theory (1966 , 1970) is 
similar to the IOLogen model but makes the additional assumption 
th~t to perceive one meaning of an ambieuous word the other 
meanings have to be suppressed . This sue ests that conprehension 
times l'lill be sloi'Ter followi ng a change in meanin ' than in the 
control condition. It is probable that there fould be an inter-
action between suppression and frequency of meaninG. Hackay 
has sholm that time for sup ression is dependent on saliency 
of meanind' but for this experiment it lTould be necessary to 
know the consequences of sup ression of a meaning , in particular 
the tiue course of suppression but this information is not 
available at present . The interaction mentioned above may be 
expected but the exact form it mibht take cannot be redicted 
as yet . 
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hodel P {Hi illY S:.c.CQI,DIu Y 
G.P.H. Same <. Different = Control Same < Different = Control 
E. C.H. Same = Different <. Control Same = Different <: Control 
Ordered 
Search Same = Different <- Control Same < Different = Control 
Logogen Same < Different < Control Same to Different = Control 
P • .::> . T . Same < Control <. Different Same < Control <- Different 
Predictions from each model . 
TABLE 21. 
Hethod: 
Eyuipment: The sentences were presented on a .!>ieital Equipment 
Corporation GT40 display screen, under the control of a PDP 
11/45 computer. micro-sl'Ti tch "Tas in front of the screen. 
I. aterials: 18 ambiguous tTords uere selected from Kausler and 
Kollasch (1970) . This paper indicates the primary and secon-
dary meanin s of each "TQrd . ords were selected 'tThich had 
one clearly dominant me3.Uine- . fords were only selected l-lhich 
h~d two completely unrelated meanings and also words w'ere only 
used w'hich had nouns for both meanings (e • .:.; . BAT , FILE, 'OLE) . 
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For each nord 4 sentences "ere made u - 2 sentences in-
dicatine the primary meanin5 and two indicating the secondary 
meaning . These sentences Iyera then combined to roduce the 
followin pairs: 
Primary imary , 
2 Secondary - Secondary, 
3 Primary - Secondary , 
4 Secondary - Primary . 
Two further !lairs were created by combinin l' the test 6en-
tence in each of the above pairs (i . e . the second sentence) 
Iii th a completely unrelated sentence to produce 
5 Unrelated - prima.ry , 
6 Unrelated - secondary . 
Exam les of each type of pair are shown in Table 22 . 
Type of Priming Sentence Test Sentence 
pair 
P ..... P The bat Has made of Hood . The bat hit the ball . 
S .... S '.rhe bat had large ears . The bat flew in the window . 
P -.S ~lhe bat 'I'1aS made of wood . The bat flew in the windorT . 
S -+P The bat had larGe ears . The bat hit the ball . 
U-jl P Jim has a bike . The bat hit the ball . 
U-.S Jim has a bike . The bat flew in the \-Tindon . 
Examples of each pair of sentences . 
(p = Primary, S = Secondary , U = unrelated) . 
T L ..... 22 . 
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Six lis ts of 1 & pairs l'lere Juaue up usine; 3 pairs of e'3.ch 
of the 6 tY ... Jes so that each aILlbieuoud "lOrd appeareJ an e ual 
nu:noer of times in each llieanin& and in each condition over all 
lists. 
Subjects: 24 psychology undereraduates of Stirling university 
particirated as subjects t fulfil a course re uirement. I~one 
had larticil~ted in Exp. 5. 
Instructions: The instructions used were based on Haviland 
and Clarl (1974), who had reported usinl; the cOIDilrehension task 
successfully with sinilar instructions: 
"In this experiment you \Till be presented 'l'Ti th pairs of sentences . 
The sentences uill appe r one ':tfter the other. \1hen the firs t 
sentence appears read it and ress the button as soon as you 
understand it . The second sentence Till irtJ-aediately follou 
and a", dnress the button as soon as you understand what it 
means . There will then be a short interval before the next 
air of sentences appe.lr . Try to worl as quickly as ossible . 1I 
If the subject had any uestions about the task he lfaS 
told that "understand" was being used in the "normal , everyday 
sense" of the word . No further criterion of understanding 
was offered so to a large extent it vTas left up to the subject 
to define "understand ll for themselves . 
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Procedure: Each session started with 18 pr actice trials . In 
the practice trials the sentences in ea ch pair were unrelated . 
No w'ord was repea t ed . No clearly ambi guous 'I'lords 1-Ter e used . 
After the practice trials the subject received one of the six 
experiment al lists . 4 subj ec t s were ass i gned to each list at 
random. 
On ea ch trial a sent ence appeared and the subject responded 
as soon as he understood the sentence by pressing the microswitch. 
'Then the subj ect responded the fir st sentence 1'Ta8 removed from 
the screen and the second sentence was i mmediately presented 
in the same pl ace on the s creen . After the subject responded 
to this sentence the screen ,Tent blank for approximately 2 
seconds , until the first sentence of the next pair 'I'laS presented . 
Each session l as ted ap)roximately 20 minutes . 
Resul ts : The analyses .. Tere only carried out on comprehension 
times for the second sentence i n each pair. '1'he analysis 
resented a number of roblems . The reaction times 1Tere not 
normally distributed . eaction times are normally skew'ed to 
the left but these results wer e exceptionally she,red . A further 
problem 1'TaS that there lias considerable variation both between 
subjects and .vithin each subject . ~ith only 3 observations 
per condition per subject this presented a problem of reliability. 
In the light of the above mentioned problems it was felt that 
the median was a better estimate than the mean . All scores 
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reported here are i)ased on medians . 
The fact that inter-subject variance U[J.:3 so high and sub-
jects varied so "uch in l..rhich sentences they found difficult 
to comprehend meant that it vIas iml)Ossible to obtain reliable 
estimates of comprehenoion times for each sentence so it Vlas 
not possible to analyze the results over L~terials. This 
limits the eener~lizability of these results to other materials . 
(see Clark , 1973) . 
An analysis of variance tre~ting subjects as a random 
factor proQuced only one significant result . Comprehension 
of sentences indicatin~ the primary meaning o~ the ambituous 
vTords vIaS 88 msecs . faster than comprehension of sentences in-
dicating the secondary meaning . (F(1,23 = 4 5) p < 0.05) . 
The mean median for each condition are shOlm in .l!'igure 26 . 
analysi s of sentences indicatinb rimary meanin~ . 
Over all conditions Friedman' s ~ = 9 df : 2 
Pairw'ise compariDons by sign tests (N = 24). 
S IE v DIFFEREN'r 
v COlfl' OL 
DIFFERENT v CONTROL 
x = 6 
x = 7 
p = 0.022 
P = 0.064 
.A = 12 N.S. 
Analysis of sentences indicating secondary meaning . 
<. 0. 02 
Primary meanin g in 2nd sentence: 
same meanin g in both sentences 
different meaning in both sentences 
control 
Secondary meaning in 2nd s entence : 
same meanin g in both sentences 
different meanin g in both s entences 
cont"t'ol 
I·lean S.D. 
1716 
1805 
1728 
1809 
1803 
1890 
943.0 
945.9 
B30.9 
972.6 
833.3 
990.1 
11!eans and standard deviations for Fig.26. 
Comprehension 
time in sees . 
1.85 
1.80 
1.15 
o--<t Primary meaning in 2nd. sentence . 
Secondaxy meaning in 2nd sentence. 
Same Different Control 
Il1eaning in both sentences . 
Median comprehension time for 
each condition . 
Figure 26 . 
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Over all conditions Friedman ' s zi = 7.75 df = 2 P < 0.05 
Pairwise comparisons by sign tests (:l = 24) . 
SAME v DIFFflR.J:.:lTT x = 9 p = 0 . 154 
( .. 
.;) " !1 v COJ'l':'W1 x = 7 p = 0. 064 
DIFJ!'ERur,T v CONT 01 x = 6 p = 0.022. 
These comparisons are sUUlL1arized in T ble 23 in a llay to 
enable comparison with the predictions in Table 21 . 
U",. IT G IN S..;>co~ro SENTEl C 
PRI1;: Y S1:J 01 DUtY 
Same < Different = Control Same = Jifferent < Control 
esults 
T .t3Li!. 23 . 
Discussion: 
All the following discussion is based on the assumption 
that subjects perceived the meaning intended by the experi-
menter . It must be admitted , however, that the ossibility 
remai ns that subjects could perceive sone non- intended meaning. 
~ . g . it is possible to assign a meanin~ of some kind to a phrase 
like "flying bat " even usine "bat" in the sense of cricket bat . 
/hile possi ble it l'laS felt tha. t such events 'ltTould be highly 
infrequent . 
These results do not provide clear- cut support for any 
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one of the models outlined in the introduction. HOl'leVer, 
the different pattern of results for the primary and secondary 
meanin~s do enable us to reject the simplest version of the 
garden path and Exhaustive computation hypotheses . Both these 
models predict the same pattern of results for both meanin~s . 
The models that predict common meanings should be comprehended 
more quickly than rare meanings are supported . 
It was further assumed three remaining models predicted 
that repetition of the meaning should facilitate comprehension 
for both primary and secondary meanings . The results support 
this prediction although the difference between the SATIJE and 
CONTROL conditions does not quite reach significance . The small 
size of this effect is not particularly surprising. The am-
biguous word was only one of four to six words in the sentence 
and furthermore assigning meaning to the individual lexical 
items is only one of several stages in comprehension . 
The crit ical comparisons concern the DIFFERENT meaning 
condi tion . Let us compare the predictions for each model 1vi th 
the results obtained. 1. : . ~ ....... :.t""" 1. • ) "'1<"'::' • 
Not one of the three remai ning models can account for all the 
results . The present results give no support to the ordered 
search model ' s hypothesis that the primary meaning 'Ifill always 
be accessed before the secondary meaning . The results from 
the secondary meaning are not consi stent with the logogen model 
si nce it assumes that the primary meaning i.,ill never result in 
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riminb" of the secondary meanine. The results sU5c:est that 
primine does occur for the (31 -+ 32) condition . There I'm.s no 
support for the perceptual suppression theory since there was 
no evidence that chan~e of meanins made com rehension more dif-
ficult than in the control condition. In fact, uite the 
reverse occurs for the secondary meaning . It must be remembered 
however that these assum~tions about sup?ression may be over-
simple . 1.ackay (1970) shows that time for sUP.Jression depends 
on the saliency of the suppressed meaning. ¥.hat has not been 
established are the consequences for an item of bein suppressed, 
and hm1 lone: these consequences last . In the I'resent experiment 
the changed meaning condition requires access to a meanin6 that 
has been sUPI'ressed in the first sentence . It l'1US assumed that 
suppression would iWlibit access but the important question 
is hOl'1 lone does an item remain sUl)pressed . '~he time course 
of suppression is Ii-ely to be closely related to the saliency 
of the me!;!ning . 
It can be assumed that in this experiment there were t'l'10 
conflictin effects . The first assumed effect is that re etition 
of the same physical stimulus (i . e . repeating the ambiguous word) 
l eads to a faster enco ing of the stimulus into some internal 
represent ation . The second and conflicting effect is the 
sup ression effect . The effects of sup ressio~ can be considered 
for each meanin~ relative to the time taken to access that meanin 
in an unsuppressed state (the COl~ROL condition in the present 
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ex eriment) . Accessing the primary meaning causes suppression 
of the secondary meanine . 'l'he relative effect on access time 
for the secondary meaning vJill be small since being of low a 
priori probability it is easily suppressed . Thus an initially 
slow access time is made only sli ghtly slower . On the other 
hand accessing the secondary meaning requires suppression of 
the primary meaning . The primary meaning t.,ill require consider-
able suppression so that an initially fast access time is ereatly 
increased . It must be remembered that the effect is a relative 
one , so that a suppressed primary meaning may still be more 
accessible than an unsuppressed secondary meaning. This pos-
sibility can be demonstrated as folIous: Tp = time to access 
bhe ~rim~ry meaning, Ts = time to access secondary meaning, 
Tsupp . p = time to access primary meanin 'Then su pressed , 
Tsupp . s = time to access secondary meaning, Tenc . = t~e to 
encode stimulus (sta e earlier than accessine meaning) . 
The whole process of accessing meaning of a stimulus con-
sists of Tenc + Taccess. 
!row Tp < Ts but (Tsup . p-Tp) > (Tsup . s - Ts) . ...4.1 though this 
assum tion i s counter-intuitive it has been made by other sy-
~ Cambell , Donaldson and Young (in press) in a 
i\ 
chologists . 
different but comparable ar ea of research have made similar 
assumptions concerning saliency and su pression. Say for 
exam Ie Tp = 8 units, Tsupp . p = 10, Ts = 12, Tsupp . s = 13 . 
However, in the suppressed conditions the repetition of the 
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stimulus in the present experiment reduces 'renc . by 2 units 
reGardless of meaninGs then the prilrkl.ry meanin~ "Tould show no 
effect of rior use of secondary ~eanine and the secondar~ 
ll.eanine lTould shol .. that pri or use of the primary meaning .lOuld 
lead to a de crease in cOD'prehension time. 
found in the present ex eriment. 
These results 1 .. er0 
Thus it can be argued that these results are attributable 
to conflicting suppression and stimulus repetition effects. 
This account of the results is certainly not the only one that 
could be given (e.e . the disambiguation model described by Iackay , 
1970, has many similarities to the loeogen , odel but it is quite 
possible to add assumptions about sup~res$ion processes to an 
ordered-search model). Further the assumptions about the 
operation of suppression are purely hypothetical at the moment . 
This account does , hOiTever , point to tlw poss i ble reasons 
for the discrepancy between these results and 'Hogaboao and 
Perfetti (1975) . Hogaboam and Perfetti presented subjects with 
a sentence indicating one meaning of the final nord . Subj ects 
had to decide i f the final word had another meaning . They 
concluded from the experiment that the primary meaning of a 
1'lOrd is aluays accessed first . In the Ho a boam and Perfetti 
experiment there is nothing comparable to the effects of the 
stimulus repetition. 
To this extent they have avoided the problem of separating 
the sensory and the semantic elements of the process . (It 
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1'/'ould be possible using the present task to separate these effects 
by interposing some t ask behTeen the presentation of the t liO 
sentences so that sensory codi ng of the s timulus was no longer 
available, see the Discussion of 3xp . 5. ) . On the other hand 
the Hogaboam and Perfetti t ask allows no estimation of the 
access time of one meaning independent of t he other (independent 
in the Sense that the ambiguity of the word i s no t an i ntrinsic 
aspect of the subject ' s t ask ). It i s areued here that such 
a "base-line" measure is necessary to allo,!>T evaluation of t he 
other conditions . 
It seems \vorth~-lhile to lll8.ke some comments on the use of 
the s entence comprehension task in the study of ambi[~ity. 
Clark and his coworkers have used this task in a number of s t udies 
(not of ambie;ui ty ) vri th apparently little trouble . Hal-lever , 
in ambiguity studies the important differences in times ar e 
very small and the cotlprehension t ask is not exact enough to 
enable consistent, reliable measurement of these small dif-
ferences . The main problem is that subjects differ so much 
in hon they interpret the llOrd "understand". It is interesting 
to com are the present experiment vli th that of Buhler (1 908 ). 
Buhler asked famous psychologists to respond as soon as they 
understood sentences such as "we depreciate everything that 
can be explaine d" • The mean reaction time vTaS 1 2 sees . with 
a r ange from 5 to 22 secs . The present experiment used simpler 
sentences and the mean l-TaS 1.8 sees with a r ange from 0 . 66 to 
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9.5 sees . 
FurtherDore there \-laS SOl)]e sugc;estion from subjects '; reports 
that a subject uieht alter his criterion of comprehension from 
one sentence to the next . 
A third disadvantage is that the task does not allOvl de-
tection of errors . A subject might preos the button indicating 
cOml)rehension ,Ihen he had in fact interpreted the ambiguous .. Tord 
differently from the meaning indicated by the context. A 
task permitting detection of these errors might provide another 
source of information . 
In spite of these qualifications this experiment has pro-
duced some valuable results . It is interesting to note that 
the results from the primary meanings a.re exactly Irhat Hould 
be predicted from a simple model assumine access of only one 
meaning , whereas the results from the secondary meanine are 
exactly "hat t"lOuld be predicted from a model assuming access 
of all meanings . This sup~orts the argument of Hogaboam and 
Perfetti (1975) , that much of the confusion of earlier inves-
tigators arises from their neglect of frequency of meanine as 
a factor. 
This ( critici sm Cll':! be levelled at not only those experi-
ments which have been directly concerned vTi th ambiguity (see 
Exp . 5) but also those experiments vlhich have used ambiguous 
t'lOrds as tools in the study of the role of retrieval in recog-
nition and r ecall (e . g . Light and Carter- Sobell, 1970; Marcel 
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and Steel, 1973). 
Conclusions: 
The main conclusion of this experiment is that the pre-
valence of confusion in theories of .ambigui ty resolution was 
partly caused by the failure of earlier investigators to sys-
tematically control for the effects of frequency of meaning 'of 
the ambiguous words they used . The results of the present 
experiment do not fit readily into any of the existing models 
of ambi guity resolution . One possible account of the results 
assumes t 1'l0 conflicting effects , a facilitation effect due to 
repetition of the ambiguous stimulus and a suppression effect 
due to change of meaning. The facilitation effect is assumed 
to be the same for both primary and secondary meanings but the 
suppression effect is assumed to be relatively more ,~·.triJJi..e.ntal 
for the primary meaning than the secondary me~ning . 
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E!XPERHJENT 7 
The effect of shared features on learning pairs of species 
names . 
Introduction: 
It has been suggested in Exps. 4 and 4A, following Clark 
(1970) that associative priminG effects and '\fOrd associations 
are both the products of normal language use . It is proposed 
that both phenomena can be accounted for by a model of lexical 
storage that assumes that words are represented as bundles of 
semantic attributes or features . The probability of one \'lord 
eliciting another as an associate or its effectiveness in primine 
r ecogmition of that word is a function of the number of attributes 
that they have in common . In normal language use these ,viII 
be mainly semantic attributes but acoustic and visual attributes 
may be involved in certain tasks (see for example heyer , Jch-
vatveldt and uddy , 1973) . 
" 
Clark (1970) has described a number of rules governing 
associations which can be summarized as "change the least possible 
number of features to produce a new word" . Clark assumes that 
features are ordered and the changes are made according to this 
order . I n the model proposed here the notion of a fixed order-
ing of features is replaced with the idea that features will 
--- ----
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vary in their saliency and that the saliency of a feature can 
to some extent be affected by the context in which they occur . 
Exps . 4 and 4A gave some support to the hypothesis that 
the probability of hm words being associates or of one priming 
recognition of the other is related to the number of features 
that they have in common. Differences were found betw"een pairs 
of antonyms, synonyms, parallel associates and conceptual associates. 
These findings were not completely clear-cut since there was 
some confounding of number of shared features and frequency of 
occurrence in the laneuage , together with the related problem 
that a number of the pairs formed idiomatic expressions (e . g . 
BREAD-BUT'rER, LOV.8- HATE) . Such idioms it vTaS felt may be 
treated as single lexical items rather than separate words, 
thus obscuring any effects attributable to shared features alone . 
(cf. I·1orton and Broadbent · s, 1964 suggestion of the lIidiogenll 
as a higher order "thought unittt) . Another shortcomine in 
Exps . 4 and 4A was that comparison across types of pairs was 
inevitably confounded with parts of speech . E. g . by their 
nature antonyms tend to be largely adjectives whereas conceptual 
associates tend to be nouns) . 
The present experiment avoids these problems by restricting 
the materials to nouns and to only one kind of relationship . 
(items similarity according to membership of different categories 
and classes) , The t ask required subjects to form associations 
between pairs of words they were unlikely to have associated 
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into pairs in the past . It was possible to vary the assumed 
number of shared features independently of past languaGe habits . 
Habits are assumed to be different from knowledge about words 
in the sense that BLACK and :nrrT~ are connected through their 
frequent:r occurrence in such phrases as "black and vlhi te tele-
vision", but PURFL~ and GREEN could be ·connected through the 
knowledge that they are both colours. 
The hypothesis tested here is that recall of pairs of words 
will be better the more features that they have in common. A 
similar hypothesis was stated by Underwood and Schulz (1960) 
"fhich they called the associa ti ve pro babili ty hypothesis. The 
hypothesis was swnmarized by DoJ..lett (1964, p 209) as folIous: 
"This hypothesis maint ains that subjects generate associations 
to the items on a verba l list and that the greater the number 
of such associations the ereater the likelihood that one of them 
;rill serve as a functional mediator for the pair to be learned . " 
This approach implies that the mediator 1'lill be some other uord . 
The approach taken here is that both words will be coded in the 
form of abstract non-verbal semantic attributes and the more 
attributes in common the eas ier will the association be learned. 
For this experiment the number of associates two items tlere 
assumed to share was derived from a hierarchical structure sug-
gested by the \'Torb. of Collins and 2uillian (1 969) • See Figure 
27 . 
I->j 
.... 
~ 
~ 
I\) 
-J 
• 
Trout Shark 
Living thing 
Vegetable 
Robin Eagle Ant V/a s p Oak Beech Rose Daffodil Potato Turnip 
Hierarchy of part of the class IlLiving things". 
Based on Collins and Quillian, 1969 . 
--_._--
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N.B. f'Animal ll is used here to indicate the quality "anim9.te tl • 
It is not assumed that subjects 1'1Oul d use tlanimal ll in codin~ 
these ca.tegories since flanimal lf is often used as synonymous 
with flmamiliaI'!. l!u.rthermore such a hierarchy is only intended 
to reflect the similarity of the attributes used to represent 
each species name and is not meant to imply acceptance of the 
assumpti ons of Col lins and luillian concerning hierarchical 
storage of properties as a means of reducing redundancy . 
(see Revi ew of Literature) . Thus TROUT and SHARK '-rill share 
all the attributes that define them as FISH, AUnr...1.L'3 and LIVInG 
THINGS . TROUT and ROBIN l'Till share the attributes that define 
them as AliHt'l.LS and LIVING THINGS, TROUT and TURNIP 1-lill only 
share the attributes that define them as LIVING THINGS. 
Of course such a hierarchy is an over-simplification. 
For instance, a fish, bird and insect may have in common some 
other attribute that is not a defining characteristic of ANHlAL 
(e . g . they may all be PRED.<iTOHS) . Similarly a bird and flouer 
may have an attribute in common, independent of the fact they 
are both living things (e . &. CANARY and D) . .FFODIL ·share a colour 
attribute) . (.E'or a distinction behleen defining and charac-
teristic attributes see Smith, Shoben and Rips, 1974) . As 
far as possible in producing the pairs of words to be learned 
the shared features ITere restricted to those defining attributes 
that could be derived from the diagram in Figure 1. 
It is important to note that the task used involved learning 
~---
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a list of airs rather than the familiar paired-associate t ask 
in that both 1'lOrds had to be remembered since the first word 
vlaS not provided a t recall. Ie are concerned vii th the use of 
abstract semantic representations and there is some sugges tion 
that in the normal paired- associate task subjects tend to learn 
the list in a "rote" fashion (Jenkins, 1963) . It ,'ras hoped 
that having to remember both words would be a more difficult 
task and that this would encourage the subject to use all his 
available knowledge to aid recall. For the same reason subjects 
\lere instructed to use any strategies to help them remember the 
pairs . 
Method : 
Equipment: memory drun was used vrhich enabled presentation 
of one pair of "tlOrds at a. time. 
Haterials: 60 species names were taken from 6 categories in 
the Battie and Hontatue (1 969) belonging to 
tvTO classes (.: IIlA.L'3 and PLANTS) . Two lists, each containing 
18 pairs, 'VTere made up . In one list (referred to as the Animal 
list) the first word in each pair vTas an animal name . In the 
other list (referred to as the Plant list) the first 1-lord in 
each pair was a plant name . ltnimal names consisted of 6 insects , 
6 fish and 6 birds . Plant names consisted of 6 trees, 6 flowers 
and 6 vegetables. 
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3 kinds of pairs were made ul according to the munber of 
attributes the t110 species names Here assUL1ed to have in common: 
1 st order pairs: "'§ of the n:ll!les nore paired "Ti th a species 
name from the same categol1Y (e . e . BIRD .. ,ith BIRD, .?LO TER .,ith 
FLO . ~a) . 
2nd order pairs: t of the names 'fere pai red with a species name 
of the same class but not the same category (e .e . PISH .. ,ith 
rrf"EC~J.1, ~"'LO r'R 1'Ti th VEGET LJ). 
:;Ird order pairs: .,J- names were paired .. ri th species name from 
the other claSS (e . s . IlTSECT with TREE , VEGETABLE uith BIRD). 
Each cateGory lTas represented. an equal number of times 
in each order. 
Subjects : 10 1st year undergraduates of Sti rlinG University 
articipated in the Experiment to fulfil a course requirement . 
Iwne of them h3.d participated in .ciXps . 4 or 4 • 
Procedur2 : Half the sub j ec t s received the animal list and half 
received the pl ant list . Sub j ects were instructed to try to 
learn the list and to use any knowledge they had of the words 
i n the list to help their recall. ~ach pair of words were 
presented for 4 seconds . The pairs lTere presented in a random 
order. At the end of the list the sub ject i'las instructed to 
count backwards from 500 i n threes for two minutes . ...fter t wo 
minutes he nas told to llri te d01m as many of the pair s of lTords 
that he could remember . Three trials (learning list, backvTard 
----- -
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counting and rec"l.ll) ~Tere .;iven . The list vTaS l,resented. in 
a different andoUl ord.er on each trial . 
25 minutes . 
The session lasted 
Results: The effects of three m'3.in factors Here examined. in the 
analysis of the data, LISTJ (plants v . Animals), TRI~v (1st, 
2nd 3rd) , ~1U iBER OF SR'U1,ED _ TTRIBUT.clJ (1 st, 2nd, 3rd 0 DER) . 
The F values reported "Tere obtained treating SUBJECTS as the 
r andom factor . Unfortunately the data uas not available to 
test the effects against T~RIi1S as the random factor . The 
follol1ing results were found . 
Overall 29'" more airs 1'Tere recalled from the animal list 
than the Ilant list (F(1 , 8) = 10.65 p < 0 . 02) . See b~gure 2 ~. 
There was a significant increase in numbers of pairs re-
called over the three trials (F(2,16) = 72.47, 
See Figure 2e. 
~ 0 . 001) . 
There uas a si.snificant interaction betvTeen TRIALS and 
LI0'rs (F(2 , 16) 1 O. 01, P .( 0 . 01 ) . See Figure 28. 
The effect of number of shared at tributes was sicnificant . 
(F(2,16) = 7.44, p < 0 . 01) . See Figure 29 . 
It can be seen frOll! Figure 29 that {"lost of the effect 
of number of shared attributes is caused by the superior recall 
of tst order pairs compared l'Ti th 2nd and 3rd order pairs . 
Comparison of 2nd and 3rd order pairs "TaS not si,snificant 
• '" I. 
, . 
!·lean S.D . 
Trial 1 Animal 6 .4 3 . 9 
Plant 2. 8 1.3 
Trial 2 Animal 12 .6 3.6 
Plant 5.4 2.7 
Trial 3 Ani mal 15.4 3.4 
Plant .7.0 3.7 
Nean numbers of pairs recalled 
(out of 18) and standard deviations for Fi g . 28. 
Order 1 
Order 2 
Ord T 3 
Mean S.D . 
10.3 
'5 .0 
5.2 
l~ea.n n-u.mber of pairs r ecalled (out 
of 18 ) an~ standard deviations for Fi g.29. 
~~ Pairs 
l:'ecalled . 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
% Pairs 
recalled. 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
Trial 
1 
r er 
1 
Animal list 
Plant list 
Trial 
2 
'rri 
% pairs recalled by li s ts 
and trials. 
Figure 28. 
3 
rder 
2 
Order 
3 
% pairs recalled by number 
of s hared features. 
Figure 29. 
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(.:! < 1; see .liner, 1970 pp 65-70 and pp 207-211 ). Comparison 
of 1st order pairs 'lith the averace of 2nd and 3rd order pairs 
lIas sisnific'1nt (F(1 ,16) = 5.96, p < 0.05). 
There IlI.lS no interaation be t w'een TRI I.3 and NUIiBElt of 
SHA.RED .TT IBUTE.0 (F(4,32) = 1.97, p ,} 0 . 05). See Ficure 30. 
Discussion: 
Lists: The lare;e difference in recall betwee!l the hiO lists 
Has unexpected . Al thou.,sh there uaa no interaction (F < 1 ) 
between this factor and the factor Thich is our prime concern 
(number of shared attributes) it is worth comment . 'illy should 
a list consisting largely of animal names be so much better 
recalled than a list consisting largely of lant names (overQll 
54/ versus 255- correct recall)? 
One plausible hypothesis is that it is easier to forn: a 
memonic r.;e of a pair of Ylords if atL least one of the '!'lords 
is an animal name than if both the Hords are plants . mimA.ls 
beine capable of movement and action it is ossible that it is 
easier to form an imaee of hiD animals or an animal and a plant 
interacting in some ~fay . . $ . an eaffle attackin~ a sparrou, 
or a bee collectinG nectar from a flower . Such images have 
a dynamic quality lacking in an imaee of a otato ruld a tulip . 
ile such an ima~ery by othesis is ost hoc it is testable. 
Tri als and Lists: As would be expected recall i plproved over 
I -. 
\ I 
Mean S.D. 
Trial 1 1st order 1.9 1.1 
2nd ' , 1.5 1 .. 2 
3rd ' , 1 .. 2 1.5 
Trial 2 1st ' , 3 .. 9 1.6 
2nd ' , 2 .. 3 2.0 
3rd ' I 2.8 1.9 
Trial 3 1st ' I 4.5 1.6 
2nd I' 3.1 2.2 
3rd ' , 3.6 2.0 
l-lean numbers of pairs recalled (out of 6) 
and standard deviations for Fig.30. 
5~ Pairs 
recalled. 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
Trial 
1 
t)----4r01 1 st • order 
tiJ-~ 2nd.order 
3rd.order 
Trial 
2 
Trial 
3 
i> pairs recalled by Trials and 
Number of shared features . 
Figure 30 . 
168 
trials. . ore ii1terestinu is the interaction bctuecn '1:_ 1.'1..1 ~ 
and LI"'T3 . Rec:lll of the anilil~l list is 17/' better than the 
plant list 011 the 1st trial and this difference rno e than doubles 
to 39iv on the 2nd trial. It is sue ested above that su erior 
recall of the animal list may be due to reater ease in forming 
"uni t~" i mages of pairs containing an animal name . It is 
to be expected that such a strategy would be developed over 
trials as subjects become more familiar with the nature of the 
material and conse uently develo techniques for rememberinG 
the pairs . 
Number of shared features: The prediction that ease of le rning 
uould be dependent on number of shared features is sUJported 
by the superior recall of the first order pairs. Hm,rever, it 
was also expected that recall of 2nd order airs uould be better 
than 3rd order airs . This ,-ra8 not the findins . 2nd and 3rd 
order pairs l'lere recalled e1ually "ell . 
This su~gests that subjects liere not run-kinS use of any 
information about [.TOUp membership beyond the i lI!lediate super-
ordinates . Althou~h it is fact th~t pairs such as 'AGLE-
T OUT sha:e the feature of beinu aniaate , an OAK- C\BB GE share 
the feature of being lants, in the present task at least these 
ob jective facts had no subjective value as aids to recall , since 
such pairs were no better recalled than pair such as if '31- -
e UHO'r an' POT-\'TO- .lR.bN "Thich do not share these features . 
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It seems that 11hen presented 1Ti th a pair of vlOrds a subject 
categorizes them in terms of their i mmedi a t e su~)erordinates 
(eagle --. bird, carrot ~vegetdble) and then codes the pairs 
category membership as "same" or "different" . At recall given 
retrieval of one member of the pair, knovTine that it vlaS paired 
vTi th a member of the same cateeory is clearly of more value 
since it restricts the range of possible alternativ~s far more 
the retrieval cue that it ,laS paired with a member of a dif-
ferent category . 
wn.y do people not make use of information about membership 
of higher level classifications? Certainly the subjects ITere 
capable of saying •• hat characteristics T OUT and rASP or oue 
and POTATO have in common, yet they do not use these features 
as aids to recall . The answ"er presumably lies in the nature 
of the memorization task used . It seems likely that a search 
is carried out to find a common attribute Hhich can be used to 
code the pair . Information about membership of directly super-
ordinate groups is quickly found and used as a lll1emonic device . 
The -Tork of Collins an !uillian (1969) sug ests that finding 
hit:;her order similarities ,viII take more time than 100'1er order 
s i milarities (e . g . bath plants versus both trees) . Other strat-
egies may be quicker than searching for high order similarities . 
Given the limi ted time available for coding each air time is 
likely to be an important factor . If comparison of immediate 
superordi nates does not produce a match, this strategy may be 
, 
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abandoned in favour of SOlUe other strategy . 
Conclusions: 
The major conclusion of this experiment is that the hypo-
thesis that the main factor in learning pairs of animal and 
pl ant names would be number of shared feature i s insufficient. 
Subjects take advantage of shared features t hat are quickly 
found but failure to find such features rapidly leads to the 
adoption of alternative strategies . 
An unexpected finding was t hat pairs containing an animal 
name were better recalled than pairs containing both plant 
names . One suggestion is that it is easier to forill an image 
of both names if one is an animal since animals inter act ",i th 
objects in the \'lOrld around them in a "tray that plants do not . 
--
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EXPERHlENT 8 
The effects of riming information on recall from a category . 
Introduction: 
This experiment is an at t empt to investigate what kinds 
of information peopl e use i n comprehendi ng di scourse . Since 
the early 1'Tork of Bartlett (1 932) it has been evident that people 
do not store what they hear in its origi nal form . rorore recently 
Jarvella (1971) has shown that subjects only remember in its 
exact form the immediately preceding clause in running di s course , 
w"hen extracting meaning from di scourse . HovTe (1 970) has shovm 
that people remember very feN" of the actu3.l words i n a passage 
but that they can r ecall the meaning well . Sachs (1967) found 
that subjects could detect changes in deep structure but not i n 
surface s tructure . All t hese s t udies indicate that comprehension 
of sentences i nvolves active recoding processes . 
~s well as these paraphras i ng processes there is also 
evidence t hat comprehens i on involves processes of inference 
making . Br ansford and Franks (1971) have shown t hat subjects 
are unable to discriminate bet i'Teen sentences they have seen and 
related sen~ences which they have not seen . Furthermore subj ects 
f alsely recognize consequences of s entences they have seen .. Then 
the consequences themselves had not been pr esented. Kintsch 
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(1972) has found that subjects use information not actually 
presented in comprehenJing sentences. In particular they make 
extensive use of facts that are i nplied but not explicitly 
stated . 
All this evidence suggests that comprehension is an active 
process involving an interaction between stored information 
and the incoming discourse. It is worth noting, houeve::c, that 
Collins and ,uillirul (1972) failed to find evidence of the use 
of such knoilledge . They tested the hypothesis that subjects 
would be, quicker to make a true/false decision about a concept 
if that concept had been implied in the comprehension of a 
previous sentence . For example , it ,.ras hypothes i1:..ed that 
comprehending a sentence like "The gloves "ere in his cOat" 
should facilitate decidi ng that II coat has pockets" is true 
since the first sentence obliges subjects to mru{e use of the 
information in the second sentence. Decision times were, 
hoVlever , not faster than when the preceding sentence was "The 
gl oves ,iere under his coatH, which does not imply the second 
sentence. 
The present experiment vlaS an attempt to find another way 
of providing evidence about the use of stored information in 
comprehension. In particular the experiment investigated ,lhether 
people use their knowledge of individual members of a cateB'ory 
in com rehending discourse about the category . Evidence ha~ 
been , resented here showine the close rel ationship bet't'l'een 
a Hord and i ts superordinate . E. g . in Exp . 1 . a category 
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name cue facilitated verification of a prol,osi tion about a 
member of the category. In Exp . 7. being abl G to categorize 
t wo vfords together facilitated recall of the pair . In the light 
of this evidence it seems not unreasonable that people would 
use particular members of a category to aid comprehension and 
retention of facts about the category . E. g . given the sentence 
"Some birds feed in .vater" the subject !!l8y code this in terms 
of particular w"ater birds that he knovlS . One reason for doing 
this may be that members of category are more "concrete" than 
the relatively abstract category name (e • . • table versus fur-
niture) . Pai Yio (1 971) has sho~m the superiority of concrete 
over abstract words in a number of situations . If people do 
carry out such recoding operations this may manifest itself in 
increased recall of members of the category. 
I·!ethod: 
Subjects: 36 subjects "rere used . Subjects were lecturers 
and post-graduates of the ?sychology Depar t ment of the Uni-
versi ty of Stirling. Relatively IIsophisticated tl subjects .. lere 
use.d, since revious experience had sh01'Tl1 that subjects from the l~t 
·:·Year.,,;-l; undergraduate subject pool did not perform very uell 
when asked to recall category members verbally . 
Haterials: TvTO passages were taken from the Encyclopaedia 
Brittanica. One passa 'e concerned birds and one trees. 
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The passases uere of a L,eneral nature ~md any reference to 
specific bird or tree nahKS Jere excluded . The p<issaces Here 
tC:l. ... e recorded and each lasted a~ llroximately }~- hlinutes . 
(s~ Af~~}<.) 
ProceJure: 'rhe 36 subjects vTere randomly assiened to 3 Crou ... 's. 
Group 1 heard the "bird" passa~e , .;roup 2 heard the "tree" 
passage , Group 3 heard no passage . <)ubjects vlere tested in-
dividually. Groups 1 'lnd 2 ~'Tere instructed to listen to the 
t ape recorded passage and told that at the end of the passa~e 
they would be asked to carry out some unspecified task . 1lhen 
the assaee ended both groups were asked to rec~ll as many bird 
names as they nere able. Subjects were a.llovled 2 minutes for 
recall and their performance vms tape recorded. Group 3 subjects 
were simply asked to recall as Dlany bird names as they could 
ill tTJO minutes . 
Results and Discussion: 
Figure 31 shovTS the cumulative total of bird names produced 
by each croup plottel against time . Although this i s the 
usual way of presenting such data Smith and Claxton (1972) 
have made the follov/ing comment: "I~ean number of words :pro-
duced Joes not appear to be a very sensitive statistic, bec~use 
it is determined by tvlO f actors "'~'t.effects interact; the 
cumulative number of lfords produced by time t, Nt' is determined 
by (1) the asymptotic level that Nt gradually approaches, and 
Seconds 1.2 30 .45 60 ]j 2.Q 105 120 
Bird. Hoan 10.6 16.5 20.0 24.2 27.8 29.8 31.9 33.7 
S. D. 1.4 1.-1 3.5 4.7 6.0 6.6 6.7 7.6 
Tre e • I·je an 8.9 13.3 15. 8 17. 8 19.1 20.5 22.1 23.5 
S . D. 1.9 2.5 3.6 4. 8 4.7 4.7 5.0 4.8 
No. J.Iean 9.3 14.4 16.9 20.3 22.7 2Cj . 4 27.5 28.5 
S .D. 2.6 3.1 3.8 4.1 5,-2 6.0 7.0 7.0 
Heans and standard deviations for Fi g.}l. 
Number of 
na'lles recalled. 
0--0 Prior bird information. 
G--D Prior tree information. 
A.---4. No prior information. 35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
15 
Time in seconds. 
Cu.rnulati ve record of number of bird names 
recalled over time . 
Figure 31 . 
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(2) the rate at ilhich this asymptote is a))ro3.ched. 1I 
For the present , it is siLl}?ler to concentr'~te on the sin~'le 
factor of rate of produc..tL.o.iv , (Up. ..!icure 32 shous the rate 
of !?roduction in each 30 second interval for e'1.ch [.,TOU) . .'..n 
analysis of variance sholVed t hat the effect of the prior passa::;es 
nas s i gnificant (F(2,33) = 7 . 1, p <. 0 .01) . The results of 
pairvTi se comparisons by Uewman-Keu1s tests are shOlm in Table 
24 . 
Nature 
of prior 
information 
BLD3 
BIRDS 
TREES 
rrOTm m 
TREES nOTHInG 
p ( 0 . 01 P <.0 . 01 
IT .S. 
Pairwise compari s ons of effects of 
prior information . 
TWL' 24 . 
There vlaS also a significant difference betlleen time i n-
terva.ls (F(3 ,99) = 163 .3, <.. 0 . 001 ) . Table 25 shoi-TS the re-
suIts of pairwise com arisons of intervals by Ue1'lman-Keu1s . 
The interaction betveen time interval and prior inform tion 
was no t sicnificant (F < 1 ) • 
.An 9.1 ternative vTay of plotting these results is that sue;-
ested by Smith and Claxton ( see above) . Insteud of plotting 
Nt a a inst time interval (t) it is plotted ae;ainst the total 
- -
, . -
Seconds 30 60 2.Q 120 
Bird. Hean 33 .. 0 15 .. 6 11..2 7.8 
S.D . 2.9 8 .. 6 4.6 6.1 
Tree • I-lean 26.6 9.0 5 .. 6 6. 0 
S.D. 5.0 5.6 4.4 2.8 
No . Mean 28 . 8 11.8 10 .. 2 6. 4 
S. D. 6.2 5.0 5.8 5.0 
Means and standard devi ations for Fig.32 . 
. , 
Nt rate of 
production. 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
30 
Prior bird information 
r.1---fjI Prior tree information 
~ No prior information 
o 90 120 
Time in seconds. 
Rate of production of bird names 
in each 30 second interval . 
Figure 32. 
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number of ",,·ords produced by time t (~\). 
in this wo.y in E'igure 33 . 
The data is .lotted 
30 sees. 60 sees . 90 sees . 120 sees. 
t 1 P c:: 0 . 01 p ~ O. 001 p < 0 • 01 
t2 IT . S. n . .::> . 
t3 N.d. 
t4 
Pai~iise com arisons of time intervals 
T illL-, 25 . 
The curves in Fi5-ure 33 are similar to those obt~ined by 
Smith and Jones (1974) . Smith and Jones inter ret this shape 
as bein3 incom atible wi t h the sim Ie random search model pro-
posed by Bousfield 1953) and others . They suggest that there 
arc tvro processes involved . The initial steep linear seBment 
of the curves is assumed to reflect the search of a small ca}-
aCity, random access store . ilien the rate of production be-
comes too 1m., the subject switches to a slo\·rer syste ,atic search 
of a lar[.er stor e , which produces the shallo\< section of the 
curve. 
EXamination of Figure 33 reveals that the superiority of 
Group 1 over Group 3 is gTeatest in the initial part of the 
curve . Groups 2 and 3 differ only slightly in this section. 
Seconds 1'5 30. .42. 60 90 120 
Bird. Nt 43 .6 22 . 0 12.0 16.4 10.0 7.2 
Nt 5.6 13.7 17.9 21.5 26.0 31.5 
Tree . Nt 35.6 16.8 10.4 6. 4 5.6 4·4 
Nt 4.5 11.0 14. 4 16.5 18.7 21.7 
No. N' t 36 .8 20. 8 9.6 13. 6 11.0 7.0 
Nt 4.6 11.7 15 . 6 18.5 22.9 27.5 
Heans for Fi~. 33. 
(These figures are based on group data ,so 
devia tions cannot be calculated). 
standard 
I 
Nt rate of 
production. 
45 
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tt--e Prior bird infonnation 
c---u Prior tree infonuation 
A----.t. No prior infonnation 
10 15 20 25 30 
Nt total number of bird names 
produc'ed by time · t. 
N,t plotted against Nt. 
Figure 33. 
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H01'lever, in the shallow part of thE:: curve rate of production 
for c;rou .9 1 and 3 are s i c il!.lX (cert.:3.inly for the last hlo 
points), whereas Group 2 is nOVI infe ior to Grou 3. .some 
statistical sup ort is given to these claims by Figure 32. 
Usin Junnett ' s test for cO lparin; all means uith a control, 
( iner, 1970, p 89) the only interval uhere GrouLJ 1 ' s r ate of 
roduction is Significantly faster than Group 3 p ~0 . 05) is 
durino the 1st 30 seconds . The only interval during "hich 
Grou 2 ' s rate of production is simificantly slower than Grou 
3 (p < 0 . 05) is in the 60- 90 seconds interval. eferrin' back 
to Figure 3, during this interval (60-90 secs) Groups 1 and 
3 both shmV' an increase in rate of production whereas Groul! 2 
continues to decline. rhese statistics mus t be treated "Ti th 
caution since there was not a si::.,.rnificant interaction in Figu e 
2 beh-leen time intervals and prior information (See liner, 1970, 
p 310) . However, if one accepts that the curves in 1!'igure :3 
reflect the searching of two different stores or two different 
_ 3earch strate ies then these results su~eest that the effect 
of a prior passa~e about birds improves recall during the first 
"random 3,ccess " search and th t an unrelated passage i mpairs 
rec'lll during the slOHer systematic search. 
In an attempt to gain a clearer understandinG of the !Jro-
cesses underlyins these effects five ·rotocols from e ch .;rou 
were selected at random for closer examina tion. UsinG a tech-
ni ue su~~esteJ by Smith and Claxton (1972) each ~rotocol was 
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.:.:,i.ven a tlrelltedness" scors . ~his score consists of ra~in~ 
each ll8.llle on a 4 .... oint scale for the degree of relatedness to 
the recedin :Tord. ~ ' 0 ' rook - raven = 3, rook - e~01e = 2, 
rook - bl~ckbird = 1, rook - bud~eri~er - O. ince such rJ. 
score is to SOIJe e ... tent subjecti va an inclerendent l.''1.ter l'las 
asked to score the ... rotocold. }earson product llioment correlcl.tion 
behTeen the author I s scores a.nd the incie ..?endent rater ' s scores 
\'1 +0.61 IJ ~ 0.02. _ 1 thou£;h the '.;jTeernent uaS not 100;" it 
'l8,S felt that the ~._;reement '(i'US hi h enou""h to justify the use 
of the score . It 'Has felt th t this "1 st order·:- rJe3.sure d.id 
not exhaust the de ee of relatedness in the ~rotocols and so 
a "2nd order" lne~sure uas derived using the same techni'lue but 
conparinG each name 1'li th the m.me before the iIrlliledia.t~ly llreceding 
one. These scores are resented as mean relatedness !ler \'1Ord 
~roduced . 1st and 2nd order relatedness 11ere fairly highly 
correlated (r = +0 . 6 p < 0 . 02) . 
s 
\ combined relatedness score 
was obtained by adding the 1st and 2nd order scores. Table 
26 shmTs the correlation betueen 1 st order, 2nd order and 
combi ned relatedness scores l'li th the total number of names 
produced . 
1 st order 
1H~ 
+0.7 
2nd order 
~* +0. 68 
Combined 
Spearnan _ ank Correlations w'i th Total number of names 
produced . ** = p < 0.01. 
T \ELl:: 26. 
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Bousfield, r·:andler , Tulving , Bauer and others have all 
shovm that in list learnine; recall is closely relate to the 
organization that the subject can impose on the list. The 
present results demons trate that such organization is D.lso 
i ' portant in producing members of a category. 
It has been suggested here that recall can be divided into 
t uo sta..;es , the first random and the second systematic. The 
comparisons in Table 25 provide some support for such a dis-
tinction since they ShOll that rate or production in the 1st 
30 seconds differs significantly from rate in the other intervdls 
and that rates in these three intervals do not differ from each 
other . As well as the rate one ",ould expec t differences in the 
i mportance of organization in the two stages . :B'or each subject 
i n t he sampl e a relatedness measure was computed for the 1s t 
half of the names IJroduced and for the 2nd half . A 1st order, 
2nd order and combined relatedness score w'ere computed and 
correlated ~ith total number of names produced . 
ations are sho,m in Table 28 . 
1st order 
1st t 0. 39 
2nd order Combined 
0. 23 0.38 
* 2nd t 0. 5 ;\(-* 0. 74 ** 0.72 
Spearman Ranks correlations .. lith Total Humber 
produced . ·x- = p < 0 . 05 
TU3LE 27. 
.)(-* = P < 0 . 01 • 
The correl-
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It cw be seen that det.;ree of relate:lness in the 1 d;er 
sta~es of rec~ll is more closely relate~ t o total produced than 
relatedness in t he first sta,.;e . 'Ehis is particularly the case 
for 2nd order relatedness. .rhe difference bet\veen the corrol -
atio.ls for t llt- 1 at order and e:1c11 11alf is not s i snific :mt but 
the difference is s i (,"nificant for the 2n1 order (t = 2 . 37, 
d.f . = 12, p < 0 . 05) . 
Houever , the main concern of the present experiment i s the 
effect of the; prior pllssages ai.ld the question here is, do' the 
prior. passages affect de;3Tee of or..;anization? Fi gure 34 shoVls 
the mean combined relatedness score for each erOUI) . (1st 
and 2nd order r el a tedness both follo\ised similar patte ns) . 
There is an overall significant difference be t "Teen e;rou_ s 
(Kruskall- Iallis H=7 . 6, p < 0 . 05) . Groups t and 3 do not differ 
but both ~Touils are significantly different from (' roup 2 (hann 
lhitney LI=0 . 5 , <. 0 . 008; u=3, p=0 . 028 respectively). 
It thus seems that the .Door performance of Group 2 ca 1 be 
ex l a ined by a failure to or~ nize their output . T lha t causes 
t his failure of organization is not clear . t resent no 
su'estion is offered, althou.,h S .ith and Claxton ' s (1972) 
pro}osal that relatedness is a measure of spare ment al ca acity 
may indicate a direction for future research . 
Althoue;h iVe can a ccount for the poor performance of Group 
2 i n terms of failure to organize output some other explanation 
is needed to explain the superior erformance of Group 1 con pared 
Bird. 
rrree. 
No . 
Hean S.D. 
2.17 
1.48 
2.06 
0 .. 28 
0.27 
0.39 
Means and standard deviations for Fig.34. 
Combined 
relatedness 
score . 
2.0 
1.0 
Prior bird 
information 
Prior tree 
infonnation 
No prior 
xnformation 
I.lean combined relatedness score for 
each condition. 
Figure 34 . 
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to Group 3. To account for this finding it is necessa17 to 
outline a model of the processes involved in the generation 
task . 
It is assumed that all bird names are stored in the logogen 
system, discussed elsewhere, in the form of a list of semantic 
features . iJhen the instruction is given to recall bird names 
the logogen representing "bird" is activated and its features 
made available to the semantic system. These features are 
fed back into the logogen system and logogens sharing a sufficient 
number of features will r each threshold and can be output. 
The features representing "bird" can be divided into t 
"defining" and "characteristic" features (see Lakoff, 1972 , 
Smith ~hoben and Rips, 1974) . The probability of a bird name ' s 
logogen reaching threshold is a function of the number of features 
it shares vii th IIbird". Thus birds ~'Thich have both defining 
and characteristic features (e . g . robin, blackbird) will reach 
threshold before birds which only have defining features (e . g . 
chicken, duck) . There \lill, ho't-lever, be an interaction ui th 
frequency of occurrence, since there is a bias for high frequency 
names to reach threshold before lOll frequency names. 
To summarize, it is suggested that order of production of 
members of an instance will be a function of two factors; what 
might be called how "typical" an instance is and how frequently 
it occurs in the language . Some support for these assumptions 
can be obtained from the Battig and I·lontague (1969) category 
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norms . Sr:.i th et al. 1974 ) )resent a tYl)icality ratinz of 12 
bird names . These ratings have a raruc order correlation of 
+0 .89 (p < 0 . 01) with frequency of occurrence in the Batti u 
and I'lontar:;ue norms , i . e . the more t ypical a bird is, the more 
lihely it i s to ae produced as an instance of bird . 'rhorndike-
Lorge frequency of occurrence and number of times a bird name 
appeared first in the Battig and onta:ue norms correlate 
+0 . 78 (U = 1 0, p <- o. 01 ) • 
It is suggested here t hat t his model can account for the 
tuo seements of the curves in ].'igura 33 as follow's: in the 
nor mal "unprimed tl situation the effect of feedin", the features 
of "bird" into the 10G'ogen systen is to cuuse the loeogens 
representing bird names that are both hi',hly ty~ical (Le. 
share the characteristic feature of "bird") .ind hi "hly fre luent 
to r each threshold and be available for output . (Of course 
as each name reaches threshold it su plie ~ a list of features 
that CUJ.l be used d.S neil input to the lo(;ogen system) . Once 
these names have been out ut conscious strate~ies are needed 
to cause names that are either of 101 ty icality or 1011 fro-
uency to reach threshold . Such strategies Day involve acti-
vating low saliency attributes of "bird". ittributes below 
a certain saliency may not be automatically transmitted to the 
semantic syste at the initial activation of "bird ll • There 
may be a lifuited information capacity . The first part of the 
curve Si L' l y involves reading out !k1.mes automatically made 
-----
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available by "bird" and subsequGnt out put of highly typical 
birds , the second part involves active retrieval of features 
and this -rocess is slower . 
"ole can nO"l'T return to the effect of the l)rior bird passaGe 
and to the question asked at the be inning of the experiwent; 
what kind of information is used in comprehending discourse. 
E.xamination of the passage about birds : sUGgests 
that its effects may be to prime a number of kinds of birds 
that do not normally appear in the early part of recall (see 
Battig and I-onta .... ue , 1969; Brown, 1972) . Such sub-c;roups 
/ 
of birds (e . g . edible birds, water bird" , flightless birds etc.) 
tend not to share the characteristic features of "bird" . 
How'ever, having been rimed by the passa.::e, uhen the subj ect 
is aske~ to recall bird names these n~es automatically reacll 
threshold and can be read out during the initial strateGy- free 
stage of recall . This can be contrasted l[i th the '-roup who 
heard no passa&;e, uho I-rill only be able to recall such birds 
w'ith the a i d of strategies (i.e . in the second st9.Ce of recall) . 
Examination of the protocols using the ratings provided 
by Smith, Shoben and Rips , (1974) as a guide to typicality 
showed that overal l there vIas no significant difference beti-Ieen 
eroups in the percentage of non- typical birds recalleJ . Com-
paring only the first 10 names produced, hOllever, shm'led that 
there lTas a s i gnificant difference betvleen e;roups . Table 28 
show's the percentage of non-typical bird names produced by 
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each 01.~oup . x2 = 6 . 2, d . f . = 2 
Prior bird 
passage 
20 
Prior tree 
passage 
4 
p < 0 . 05. 
No prior 
assage 
8 
Percentage of non-typical birds produced 
in 1st 10 names . 
TABLE 28 . 
Conclusions: 
It vTaS assumed in this experiment that recall of members 
of a given category is a function of tt.l0 variables; hou "typical II 
an instance is a.nd hOll fre uently it occurs in the 19.1leua~·e . 
It is further assumed that in normal recall there are tl'1O stages; 
an automatic retrieval of hi h typicality and hiGh frequency 
instances , follo1Ted by a slOller strateeY dependent retrieval of 
loYl typicality or lo\,[ frequency instances . The second stage 
is highly dependent on strategies that permit orGanization of 
the out ut . In this experiment it ,\las found that these strateeies 
VIere less effective if the subjects 'VTere unexpectedly asked 
to recall members of the category after listening to an unrelated 
passage . 
It was found that a relevant passage im roved recall by 
enabling the subject to gain faster access to low typicality 
but high frequency instances . This finding is consistent 
- ... --- .... 
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l'Ti th a logogen model of >"Tord production and supports the vievr 
that comprehension of lan8uage involves activation of concepts 
i n memory . 
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Final Discussion and Conclusions 
I shall first briefly recapitulate the major findinus of 
the eK eriments reported here and the im lications of these 
findings for the version of the logogen model presented carlier . 
'rhe model assumes that each ~'ford is represented by a recot,9li tion 
device that examines input from visual, acoustic and contextual 
sources for features belonginG to its l1ord . 
In Ex eriments 1 to 3 a variety of associative primine 
effects were demonstrated . PriminG effects were found using 
superordina tes, sub0rdina tes and r sinIJle associates r as cues. 
( "J. B. Rosch (1975) has recently produced evidence sup orting 
the results concerning superordinates , using a task similar 
to Posner ' s (1973») . The results of these experiments are 
consistent ld th the logogen model . The findins of prill'inc 
effects using a pronunciation task (~p . 3) is consistent uith 
the assumption of the loeogen model that the function of con-
textual information is to facilitate the decoding of 3. visual 
representation of a vlord into a semantic representation r ather 
than facilitating any search through memory . 
the finding of Leyer et al . (1974) . 
This confiros 
Experiment 4 ShOl"S that associative priming effects are 
cOLlplex and depend upon the frequency of occurrence of the 1'lords 
used and the time bett-Teen the presentation of the cue and the 
associate . These findings are consistent with the general 
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~vorkings of the lOGogen model and further they enable us to 
specify in Greater detail the way in which context is used in 
the logogen system . It seems likely that certai n highly salient 
information (e.g . anton3~s , member ship of idioms etc.) is fed 
back very r apidly into the logogen system from the semantic 
system. The speed vii th which such information is made available 
(less than t second) suggests that this process occurs auto-
matically . Miller (1 962) has argued that the speed with vlhich 
deeisions have to be Illade in vTOr d recognition i s more compatible 
with a passive (i . e . aut omatic) syst em than an active syst em . 
Certainly as is argued by Laberge and Samuels (1 974 , see Intro-
duction) the mor e the ' lower order ' processes can be automated 
in l anguage recognition the greater tho mental capacity ' left 
free ' for handling processes that canno t be automated . This 
relationship between the logogen system and the semantic system 
is discussed in gTeater detail l ater . 
Exper iment 4 sugges t s that common Bechanisms are involved 
in associative priming effects and production of "Tord associations . 
Again 1-TOrd frequency and kind of associa tion were found to be 
important factors . This is consistent with the assumption made 
above that certain ki nds of informat ion about a word are made 
available automatically but that other k inds are only made 
available by the operations of the semantic system. The 
logogen model predicts that frequency l'lill be an important 
variable but as the model i s stated by r·:orton (1 970) there is 
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no reason to believe that one kind of information will be more 
important than any other kind . On the other hand Clark ' s 
(1970) rules for describine word association production are 
based on the assumption that a 11Ord ' s features vTill be ordered 
in some way (see also Katz and Fodor , 1963) . Exps . 4 and 4 
give some support to Clark ' s rules but demonstrate they are 
inadequate without taking frequency into consideration. It 
may be possi ble to redescrihe Clark ' s rules in terms of a log-ogen 
sys tem wher e ordering of features is equivalent to the order 
in which features arc made available to the semantic system by 
the 10Gogen system. Thus features will vary on some ' saliency ' 
diuension . Saliency may be determined by how often a particular 
feature has been relevant to a word ' s comprehension in the past . 
This assumpt ilim is similar to ~ilkins I (1 971) notion of conj oint 
frequency . 
It was ar gued that one of the primary functions of context 
in 13: system such as the logogen sys t em would be to resolve 
ambiguity due to homonyms by causing the most likely meaning 
to reach threshold first . Experi ments 5 and 6 do not provide 
unequivocal support for the logogan model or for any of the 
other models proposed . The perceptual suppression theory of 
Hackay , whi ch is siLlil ar in many respects to the loC'ogen model , 
can account for most of the results but only by J11akinS some 
post hoc assumptions . In general the position of theories of 
ambieuity resolution is unsatisfactory . Many of the reported 
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findings are themselves ambie,ll.ous or ha.ve fa.iled to replicate . 
see Eogaboam w1d Perfetti, 1975) . It seems possible that a 
10Gogen model incorporating some kind of suppression mechanism 
may account for uost of the available data but at present there 
is no clear experiment'3.l evidence of how such a sUI'.pression 
mech3.nism might 1·Tork . It is i'1terestinc to note that a recent 
theory of semantic memory not specif'ically concerned with ambiguity 
(Collins and loftus, in press) also includes an assuoption about 
sup )ression as follolfs: "If the tob.l amount of activation is 
limited then the activation of one concept by another closely 
related concept may make a third , distant concept temporarily 
less accessibl e . " 
On a rel ated note it should be pointed out that dividing 
meanings into pri mary and secondary may be an over- simplification. 
Homonyms vary from those with one clearly dominant meaning to 
those with both meanings approximately equiprobable . Future 
research should fo110,,1 I·Iackay ' s example and inclu~ def,.rree of 
.bias as a factor in ex eriments. 
Experiment 7 showed that subjects can use knowledge of 
i mmediate category membership in a learning t ask but do not 
use knowledge of higher order category membership . This again 
supports the assumption that information from the logogen enables 
retrieval of key information about a ivord very quickly (auto-
matically?) but that other information may only be obtained as 
a result of operations i:il the semantic systen . (!~, ,; 
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',fi18ther information about cateeory membershi:) 
is stored as a link betueen the instance and the ca teeory nJ..lJle 
(i.e . as a fe a ture in its o"m right) or is obtained by comparing 
the feature lists of the instance and the cateeory name \'Jill 
be discussed in Llore detail l ater . 
E:;:'!::periment 8 demonstrated how' sensitive recall i s to context . 
The most relevant conclusion from the point of vie"r of the logogen 
model "ras that recall from';!. category can be divided into an 
automatic read-out stage and a strategy dependent stase . (cf . 
the assumption of retrieval of information about a tlord made 
above) . It "las also conCluded that a passage about birds 
primed less salient features of ' bird ' causing less typical 
members of the category to be accessed more easily. \ 
I" 
Huch of the discussion of these results has been in terTilS 
of attributes and features, yet in the Introduction it was argued 
that it 1'laS implausible to restrict a vTord ' s meaning- to a finite 
set of features . Here I ,rant to describe harT a loeogen model 
could be conceived that includes aspects of both the feature 
models and the association network models of semantic memory . 
The follol"Ting account makes use of suggestions from a v':l.riety 
of sources, but notably Collins and Quillian (1972) and Kintsch 
(1970) • 
-----
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I '\Vant here to use the analogy of distinguishin.s a dic-
tionary frOJ'l an encyclopaedia . The logogen system can be 
regarded as the dictionary and is solely concerned vIi th vlords 
and their definitions . This definition may include '1 visual 
imagery component . The s8Llantic system is the encyclopaedia 
and is concerned with general kno1'Tled~e of the vTorld. It is 
neither verba l nor sensory but abstract in nature . The definition 
of "[ord in t he log-ogen system is in terms of features . Know-
ledge of the world in the semantic system is in the form of a 
netvTork . The essential tirinc about a dictionary ent ry is that 
it is not exhaustive; it merely lists the key features of a w·ord . 
These are both syntactic ands emt:!ntic. ';fua.t is the nature of 
these features? In quillian ' s termi nology they may be ~token 
nodes" belonging to "type nodes" in the semantic system. In 
Ki ntsch ' s terminology they may be pointers that give t he addresses 
of other words . Rere it is preferred to regard them as pOinters 
to abs tract concept s in the semantic system. Some of the con-
cepts may be more readily realized in verbal terms and others 
in some ki nd of sensory/imagery form. Features do not mere ly 
point to entries in s emantic memory but i ndicate a type of 
relationship . 
The operation of the logogen system i s independent of 
strategies . It simply receives input and provides output. 
The output to the semanti c system may t ake the form of activa ting 
a concept in semantic memory plus an i ndication of the relation 
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of the ".'Ord to the acti va ted concept. The semantic system, 
on the other hand, is richly supplied 1'lith strategies that can 
operate on the activated concepts to extract further information 
about the \lord. 
other concepts . 
These operations will themselves activate 
Information about activated concepts uill 
be fed back to the logogen system, whatever the source of the 
activation . 
It is assumed that activation of the key concepts in 
semantic memory that define a ","ord '\Ilill occur automatically, 
i . e . without any need for attention. Attention is neces~ary 
for the selection and operation of strategies in the semantic 
system. 
In reading or listening to s~eech in a normal everyday manner 
it is assumed that the concepts automatically activated by the 
logogen output are sufficient for comprehension . If the sit~~tion 
re;luires more information than is provided by these concepts then 
strategies may be used to obtain further information. 
It has been suggested here that a uord ' s loeo en provides 
access to only the key information needed for its definition . 
Kintsch says that an entry will be encoded by whatever semantic 
markers are "relevant" . Can we specify what features will be 
relevant for a given 1'lOrd? Al though the idea that all ",ords 
can be described by a limited set of features has been rejected 
it seems that it may be ossible to identify certain dimensions 
1ti thin restricted semantic domains . 
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i ps , Shoben and SLlith (1 73) have shOlm t hat mammal :::; and 
birds can be distinguished on the dimensions of size anJ pre-
daci ty . I,Tiller (1 972) has attempt ed to define the dimensions 
underlyine verbs of motion . Ii ['ore seneral areas t he results 
of Exps . 4 and 411. sUGgest that 'V.her e a ~wrd has an opposite 
(or cOill2lement) this op}osito vall playa key role in its de-
finition . Thi s is especially the cas e for many common adjectives 
that can only be defined in terms of the dimension they define 
(e .e. GOOD- B..:D , Lj.RG;4- Sli,\LL) although it can also apply to verbs 
(e . g . GIV8- TAKE) and nouns (KIJIJG- J.UI'!1EU ) . Si milarl y the results 
from the parallel associates sueeest t hat a word will be defined 
in terms of phr ases in 1'Thich it cOLlfilonl:y occurs (e . c; . Br{!;] D-
BUTl';::;. , HOR3L- CA.;:"lT, EGG- F CI)rI). It should be notel that SOhle 
of the antonym )airs Bay al so fall i n this class . Synonyms 
do no t appear to be :particularly key concepts in a word ' s 
definition . This conclusion i s sUGgested by Ex~)s . 4 and 4A 
and the generally low frequency of synonyms as associates in 
association norms . (Examination of the norms in Deese (1 965) 
su.sgests that this Day only be true for the mor e concrete nouns 
and ad j octives) . It may be that to obtain a synonym of a uord 
requires operations by the semantic syst em on t he features pr o-
vided by t he \vord ' s logogen . 
Perhaps t he most ~exed question is the role of superordinates 
in the definition of a word . As noted earlier a number of models 
(e . g . Kintsch , 1970 ; Rume l hart et al ., 1972) explici tly i ncl ude 
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links between a vTord and its superordinates . Indeed we have 
produced experimental evidence of a close relationship beh-Teen 
a "Tord and its superordinate (see in pa.rticular Ex s. 1 and 7) . 
HOI'rever, these r esults are equally compatible with the feature 
comparison models proposed by 3mi th et 0.1. (1 974), 3chaeffer 
and ~lallace (1 970) , and others . .s noted in the Introduction 
Smith et aI ' s . version of the feature model, incorporatin~ 
a distinction bet1-Teen defininG and ch~racteristic features can 
account for a number of findinGS t hat are uifficult for models 
which assume an ISA link betv18en a ITOI'd and its superordinate. 
Out of the present experiraents .zxp . n is the only one which 
provides any evidence relevant to this arcument . The findinGS 
of Exp . 8 can be more parsilhoniously accounted for by a featUl'e 
model. 
In general then the evidence is more consistent 1'li th the 
vie1'l that cateGorization is the result of an operation carried 
out by the semantic system rather than a direct link betucen 
an instance and its category . 
On the other hand it may l)erhaps be useful to emphasize 
the distinction (after Kintsch) behTeen features that carry 
essentially linguistic information and those that carry imagery 
information . It is quite probable that theorists who argue 
for feature c omparison are dealing lar~'ely i'Ti th imagery and th9.t 
theor ists who argue for an ISA relationship are referring to 
knowl edge that is verbal in oriein. }!ost of the materials 
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used in ca tezory experiL..ents are fall1ilin.r and more important 
highly concrete (Le . high in imacery content) . E. g . RillS eLal. 
(1973) use common bird and animal names; Rosch (1975) uses 
nine categories explicitly chosen for their highly concrete 
nature . Paivio (1 971) has shoun the pervasiveness of imaGery 
as a variable in a large variety of situations, which suggests 
that i magery , vJhere available , is extensively used . It is pro-
bable that for highly concrete 'VTords imaGery information is made 
available faster than semantic information. (For experimental 
sup~ort of this claim see Rosch , 1975) . men the system is 
asked to verify an instance as a member of a category if the 
instance is concrete the first thine; that will be made available 
li'ill be an image . This can then be compared vTi th some stereo-
typed image of the category . At the same time , although at a 
sl01'1er rate the semantic information vTill be illade available . 
This may be needed to confirm or reject the ima~ery-based feature 
comparison . Such a check 1l0uld be needed to avoid falsely 
affirming such sentences as "A whale is a f ish" 'VThere imagery 
feature comparison is likely to report a match. 'Jhether a 
decision will be made on the feature comparison alone '\'Till depend 
on the criterion that has been set . E. g . the linguistic hedGes 
described by Lakoff (1972) may produce different criterion levels . 
u~ whale is a true fish" may set a high criterion level , uhereas 
"loosely speaking a whale is a fish" may set a 101.'1' criterion. 
It is quite probable that imagery a l so plays a large role in the 
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verification of physical properti es . Seymour (1973) has civen 
sorre indication of hOil non- verbal features T:13.Y be handled by the 
logogen model . 
For abstract 1'TOrds (Le . those having no or few imagery 
features) category member shin verification must be de endent 
on language based knol .. ledge . It i s di fficult to see what role 
i magery could pl ay in verifyinG a sentence such as "Christopher 
~fren 'l'laS an architect II • Since , hOlTever , mos t of the experiment s 
on categorization have concentr ated l argely on concrete material 
the representation of abstract words is at present a mat ter of 
speculation. 
Throughout the discussion of this research fre-luent use 
has been made of the concept of activat ion both in the activation 
of concepts in semantic memory and in the activation of feature 
detectors in the logogen system. It has been assumed that 
activation spreads from the 10L,oge.n system to the semantic systelJ , 
within the semantic system from concept to concept, and from 
the semantic sys t em to the logogen sys tem, but not hO\'lever, 
from logo gen to loeoeen . The l ast assumption is lllade explicitly 
by I-"orton (1970 , p 247): "It shoulu be emphasized that the 
l ogogen systelll can i n no way be reearded as an associative net . 
There is no di rect way of transferring information from one 
logogen to another . All associative phenomena that involve 
any semant ic relationships are seen at the moment as proceeding 
via the Cognitive Sy stem. " 
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Since spreadin.s activation "hiS fir3t suc.:;ested by ~uillian 
(1966) as a rocess in nemory it has been extensively used as 
an eX;)lana.tory device (e. c. Collins and .:uillhn, 1972 j I·reyer, 
3chv9.Ileveldt and Ruddy, 1972; Harcel and ::?orrin, 1974). 
Recently Loftus has accounte.} for a number of findings by 10sch 
(1975) in terms of spreadin~ activation . Collins and Loftus 
(in press) have recently extended the theory by adding addi tiO~la.1 
processin~ assunptions (e . g . the assumption of a corresponding 
su!)pression effect). Loftus (1975, p 236) argues that these 
assumptions "enable the theory to account for .Tidely differing 
empirical results" . 110sch (1975) describes the theory as 
"interesting and pOl1erful" ani !l[;Tees with Loftus that it c n 
"encompass virtually all the present dab. i n semantic memory" 
(p . 243), althouGh this in itself raises the problem of uhether 
the theory is capable of being invalid~ted. The major problem 
is that, as yet, spreading activation is essentially a post 
hoc explanation. The ultimate e;oa.l must be to specify the 
theory with sufficient precision in advance so that it can be 
r,·ut to the test . It is not clear at the moment uhat assumptions 
vTill have to be incorporated into the theory . It seeBS probable 
that for some time to come ue shall have to keep adding assum-
ptions like those of Collins and Loftus to fit new data as they 
arise . .e. can be seen fro, I L.'C • 4 even l.l..1.1.!arently sir. Ie ues-
tions Ii -e "",hat is the time course of 'l.ctivation?" ITill require 
very cOTI)lex anSl'Ters . Jt present this author is basic~lly in 
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asreement 't'ri th the cOilll~ent of losch 1975, p 243): tI ',:hilst pos t 
hoc prediction is a considerable virtue Given the present state 
of psychological theory , such a relationship bet'tleen a theor y 
and research data does not invoke confidence that this i s the 
only possible explanation of the data , " 
Finally \'111at answer C "1.11 VTe gi ve to the question ".:hat is 
the role of context in retrieving information from semantic 
memory?" At the level of the i ndividual ,'rord context operates 
t o bi as t he r ecognition system towards t he most probable s timulus. 
The result of this biassing is to reduce to a minimum the amount 
of sensory analysis of the stimulus reg,uired . Huch of the 
effect of context occurs automatically as a result of interaction 
betueen t he llOrd recognition system and stored knotlledJ8 about 
the words . Further contextual inforn~tion may be obtained as 
a result of conscious strategies . Different types of Hords 
~vill provide different t /pes of information to the context 
system and at -different speeds depending upon v/hether the infor-
mation is made available automatically or not , This will result 
in biassing of different 't'lord recognition units . A similar 
2rocess is assumed to o~erate in the production system . 
In t his research we have largely concentrated ui)on semantic 
context , This type of context undoubtedly interacts 1'li th syn-
tactic and non-linguistic context . It is possible that these 
sources of contextual informat ion may be a ccount ed for i n terms 
of a model similar to the one described here for semantic con-
text . This, however , is a problem for future research . 
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PRIOR BIRD INFORMATION PASSAGE 
Birds belong to the class Aves. This class contains over 8700 
speC1es. All members of this class have feathers. Since the earliest 
time birds have helped to satisfy man's material needs and to provide 
him with recreation. With increasing leisure and education in the 
20th century, more people have become interested in their environment . 
As birds are one o f the most attractive features of animate nature; a 
tremendous amount of writing and reading about birds is done each year 
and many people watch and study birds as a hobby. 
Many birds have tasty flesh and palatable eggs which probably 
were eaten by most peoples throughout history. But it was only where 
birds were especially plentiful that they were important as food . Birds 
are economically important today in a number of parts of th e world. 
Because of the ir body structure and their feathery body 
coverning, birds are the best fliers among animals. Comparing a bird to 
an aeroplane, a bird's wing is both wing and propellor. 'The basal part 
of the wing supplies most of the supporting surface, the wing tip most 
of the propelling force. The record speed for a bird is 200 m. p . h. 
although this has been disputed . The record length of a migration is 
7200 miles. 
To serve their function a bird's feathers must lie smooth and 
neat. The grooming or preening of the plumage starts as the nestling's 
feathers are b reak ing out of the sheaths. The young bird spends a great 
deal of time combing the f eathers with the bill and freeing them from 
bits of sheath. Similar behaviour continues throyghout adult life . To 
aid its preening a bird often baths. Birds may use water or dust ba ths . 
Many birds have such poor night vision that they s i t quietly a ll thr ough 
the hours of darkness. The habitat in which a bird feeds during the day 
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may serve as its resting place at night. A bird on a branch retains 
its gr1p without effort , for the bending of the leg automatically 
tightens certain tendons that strengthens the grip, rather there must be 
an effort to straighten the leg and loosen the grip . Sociability may be 
more pronounced at s leeping time than during waking hours. 
Food ge t i ng has been a major factor in the course of 
evolution, in shaping birds structures and habits to fit -the environment. 
The habitats us ed by birds are not so many or so varied as those occupied 
by other vertebrates : no birds burrow in the ground for their food as 
do some animals, nor do any birds live 1n the great depths of the oceans 
as do some fishes. But birds do feed in the air, 1n the water and on 
the land. Availability seems an important factor 1n determining diet. 
Within limits a bird eats what is available . 
Birds IDay not need bodies of water but may drink droplets of 
rain or dew from leaves or grass, or may get what they need from moist 
foods, without any source of free water . 
The behaviour of birds is caused by both instinct and learning. 
There is no doubt there is a -broad range of bird activities , the paths 
of which are inherited. But just how and where the bird uses these 
activities may b e greatly modified by the individual bird's experience . 
PRIOR TREE INFORMATION PASSAGE 
A tree is a woody perennial, usually seed-bearing plant 20ft. 
taIlor more at maturity, in which the main stem dominates the lateral 
branches in growth, either through life to produce a conical or 
pyramidal outline, or only during early growth, after a few years 
forking one to seve r a l times to produce several ascending, almost 
equally important branches that collectively form a flat or rounded 
crown . There are countless graduations ~n s~ze, form and growth habit 
among trees. 
Trees made famous by historical events, religious beliefs, 
superstitions or by their sheet beauty, massive size, venerable age or 
bizarre appearance occur in many parts of the world. The tallest trees 
are over 360 ft. high. The oldest known trees are nearly 5000 years old! 
Growth rate and longevi ty var~ es considerably among trees . Some 
trees grow 12ft. 1n a single summer . Some trees grow very slowly for the 
first 10-15 years and then faster after their root systems have become 
well established . Others grow rapidly in youth but drop to a moderat£ 
or slow rate after the first fe\>, years . Variations 1n soil, available 
water and winter and summer temperatures are among the factors affecting 
the growth of trees , so that a plant that grows rapidly in one site may 
progress slowly elsewhere. The total growth is often affected by the 
length of the dormant period during wh1ch no appreciable growth occurs. 
Growth by trees in tropical rain forests is nearly uniform throughout 
the year. In temperate zones, however, lmver winter temperatures or 
rainless periods in arid regions result in distinct dormant periods. 
When Europeans first reached North America forests covered most 
of the lands from the Atlantic to the inland prairies ,of Illinoi~ and 
clothed vast areas in the Rocky Mountain region and along the Pacific 
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coast. Today after several hundred y.~ars of exploitation by man, all 
that remains of this virgin continental cover are bands and dots of 
forest scattered over the l and. 
If one eoul d have looked at Britain from the air before the 
Romansinvaded the country, the forest cover would have appeared almost 
continuous from north to south, with only a few open ar eas on chalky 
downs and Scottish heaths . The forests of Britain have suffered many 
vicissitudes, however, from encroachment by man, from insect pests, fire 
and exploitation . 
On the European continent the Scandinavia n countries have a 
larger percentage of their surface still supporting forests than has any 
country to the south. Around the eastern end of the Mediterranean the 
forests have nearly disappeared having succumbed to the inroads of 
cutting" fire, insect pests and the browsing of domestic animals. A few 
mountain slopes and canyons conta in relatively insignificant stands of 
forest . 
The primary tropical rain forests of Africa are very complex, 
similar in structure to those in the wetter parts of South America. The 
trees grow in three welldefined layers or. stories, the upper-most 
towering to 150ft. or slightly more and standing well above the tops 
of the continuous layer of the second story ,.,hich terminates at about 
75-l00ft. A lower third story is made up of shrubs and small trees 
that tolerate heavy shading . 
